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The Watergate scandal and resulting resignation of President Richard Nixon in the early 
1970s, is arguably the most egregious instance of corruption at the highest levels of 
government in the history of the United States (U.S). The scandal revealed a disturbing 
pattern of misuse of corporate funds for improper or illegal purposes by U.S companies, 
domestically and internationally. A series of hearings in response to these issues, made 
it apparent that legislation was required to address corrupt activities. The hearings also 
shed light on discoveries of cases of financial misstatements that were not discovered or 
reported by auditors and boards of directors. The role of accounting, auditors and 
accountability in disguising the corrupt and bribery payments were not the main 
concern of the hearings and inquiries. Even through, bribes and questionable payments 
had become the norm of business practices. It was apparent that the accountability 
system, that is designed to assure the proper accounting of the use of corporate funds, 
was frustrated.  
The United States became the global leader in the fight against corruption in 
international business with the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 
1977 as the first legislation in the world to recognise and seek to curb the contribution 
of domestically based corporations to foreign corruption. The act included accounting 
provisions relating to record keeping requirements and establishment of a system of 
controls for the perceived assurance of corporate accountability. However, the FCPA 
did little to address the accounting and auditing failures that were initially raised by the 
Congress or the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The act would have been 
significant if it had the ability to affect the governance and accountability mechanisms 
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of corporations, the work of independent auditors and the role of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission.  
However, the enactment of the FCPA became largely a symbolic exercise and was 
“referred to by some commentators as a legal sleeping dog” (Giudice 2011, p.351). 
From its inception, the proposed bills by Senators and Congressman reflected “a 
cautious approach to this immense problem” (United States 1977d, p.28), which led to 
“a more loose, flexible framework for disclosure… than lay[ing] down detailed, 
mandatory guidelines” (United States 1977d, p.29). The FCPA was not enforced 
vigorously by the two bodies in charge, namely the SEC and the Department of Justice. 
The number of cases that went to trial under the act were low and mainly resulted in 
minimal penalties. The enforcement was indirectly affected by the U.S. President of the 
time and their political agenda, which affected the amount of funding and resources 
available to the bodies in charge. Due to ineffectiveness of the FCPA in changing 
corporations’ governance system and accountability to their stakeholders, and lack of 
enforcement, during 2002 the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) act was enacted to address these 
post-Watergate accounting and auditing issues.  
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Chapter One: Where the 
Story of Corrupt Payments 
Started 
 
In the United States (U.S.), revelations of domestic and international bribery and illicit 
campaign contributions followed the politically funded break-in by five men to the 
Democratic Party’s headquarters in the Watergate Building in Washington DC in June 
1972 (Vega 2009). The Watergate scandal led to discoveries of patterns of concealed 
corporate political contributions for the purpose of obtaining foreign government sales 
and contracts as well as influencing the government’s policies and/or obtaining 
regulatory favours (Barovick 1976; Lesser 1979a). It demonstrated the ability of 
corporate executives and management, and in some cases independent auditors to 
conceal the use of corporate funds for bribery and illicit payments from their boards of 
directors, shareholders and even the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)1. The 
evident problem of bribery and corruption amongst U.S. corporations, stimulated 
enactment of a piece of legislation, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). 
Watergate was the catalyst in leading the political will to enactment of the FCPA 
(Lippitt 2013). The act “was a watershed event” (Cragg 2005, p.113) as it was the first 
legislation in the world aimed at curbing foreign and domestic bribery internationally 
and domestically. The accounting provisions of the act prohibited bribery indirectly 
(Sporkin 1997). 
                                                             
1 The SEC was established with the passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Previts et al. 2003), 
“by its very nature, is a political organization. Commission members are appointed by the President of the 
United States”(United States 1985, Part 1, p.742). 
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1. The Study’s Data Gathering  
This study will primarily focus on the FCPA and the accounting provisions of the act as 
it “resulted in one of the most significant expansions of the securities law since the 1933 
and 1934 Acts” (Kneedler & Grant 1980, p.22). It was “the most extensive application 
of federal law to the regulation of corporations” (Greanias & Windsor 1982, p.1). The 
importance of the act was not merely about disclosure of illicit payments but also 
criminalisation of the payments, which was aimed at demonstrating the moral stance of 
the Congress (Davis 2012a).  
 
The study is descriptive, analysing the history of accounting bodies and the involvement 
of the SEC in setting accounting and auditing standards in the United States (U.S.), the 
enactment of the FCPA and the political influences on the content of the act, and the 
enforcement and implementation of the accounting provisions of the act (systematically 
describing the political influences). Investigations of foreign corrupt practices in the 
1970s gave rise to “the most extensive documentation of business-government 
corruption ever produced in history” (Posadas 2000, p.350). It was “the culmination of 
almost three years of congressional interest” (Goelzer 1979, p.2). This provided an 
opportunity to have access to all the required information such as establishment of the 
FASB, and the SEC’s voluntary program in relation to questionable payments, from 
1972 onwards. This study has analysed the above material using a relevant theory, 
Actor Network Theory (ANT), to demonstrate the events surrounding the enactment of 
the FCPA and understanding the past as a critical path to be informed about the present 
rules and guidelines, as well as addressing the future. 
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For this reason, mainly primary data has been used to interpret specific situations. The 
data is taken from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) archives from 
http://www.sec.gov/, archival information from the SEC’s historical website, and 
documents such as Hansard, bills, committee transcripts, and media releases from the 
United States House of Representatives and the Senate and the Hathitrust database. 
These collections to some extent quote the academic and/or media sources that could be 
used as secondary data. This information has helped to target specific materials 
published and released by different authors with regards to this matter. This kind of 
secondary data has assisted this study to attain more information pertaining to the way 
the Government (Congress) was making decisions and the accounting profession’s 
behaviour in this regard.  
 
2. The Purpose of this Study  
This study will critically examine the history of enactment and enforcement of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) by taking account of the then social, political and 
economic context. The Congress passed the FCPA to address the problem that was 
unravelling during the 1970s in relation to national corruption and bribery scandals, 
which stemmed from the Watergate scandal investigations. Accordingly, the Congress 
proposed enactment of legislation that focused on ethics and corporate morality, since 
ethics had “become the motherhood issue of its time” (Gutterman 2013, p.25; Surrey 
1979). As Koehler demonstrates, “[t]he legislative record … evidences that 
congressional motivation was sparked by a post-Watergate morality, economic 
perceptions, and global leadership” (2012, p.938). 
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The FCPA, as the proposed solution by the Congress was the first legislation to include 
a provision in relation to corporate governance as promotion of “managerial integrity” 
(Goelzer 1979, p.11) that was intended to restore public confidence in corporations. As 
the illicit payments were seen “as symptoms of weak corporate accountability and 
governance mechanisms which transcended the disclosure requirements of the securities 
laws” (Goelzer 1979, p.6). This history reminds the reader of the significant role of 
“moralism … in shaping the original Act and its 1988 Amendments” (Davis 2012a, 
p.498). However, the history also reminds the reader that the lessons of the 1970s were 
not learned by the Congress, nor the accounting profession as the problems were still 
prevalent in corporations at the start of the twenty first century, due to lack of rigorous 
enforcement of the FCPA. Similar acts were enacted during 2000s to address allegations 
of financial fraud, bribery and illegal practices by American businesses. Hence, the 
reasons for focusing on this act are explained in the following sections. 
 
2.1 Unresolved Accounting Issues 
From the congressional and the SEC’s investigations, major American corporations had 
kept “off-the-books accounts or slush funds … for the making of questionable 
payments” (Fremantle & Katz 1989, p.757; Lesser 1979a) as well as falsification of 
financial statements (Lesser 1979a, p.159) mainly without the knowledge of the 
corporations’ accountants (Sporkin 1997). As stated by Lesser, the majority of these 
bribery payments were “limited to certain industries, particularly the military weapons, 
aircraft, and oil industries” (1979a, p.160). The investigations also led to questioning 
the integrity and reputation of American corporations.  
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The accounting provisions of the FCPA were argued by the then SEC chairman, 
Williams, as the “more significant feature of the new act … than the anti-bribery 
sections” (Williams 1979a, p.20). This is shown in the final Senate report wherein it 
states the purpose of the FCPA was “to strengthen the accuracy of the corporate books 
and records and the reliability of the audit process which constitute the foundations of 
… [the] system of corporate disclosure” (U.S. Senate 1977, p.4). From the SEC’s point 
of view the accounting provisions were a form of self-regulation rooted in the  
principles of ‘new governance’ requiring high standards of accountability 
grounded on the work of independent audit committees that would oversee 
stricter policies using enhanced systems of internal control for monitoring 
international business conduct (Cragg 2005, p.123). 
 
In unravelling the wrongdoings of corporations the hearings led to what was described 
as “the most significant hearings ever conducted by any committee of the Congress” 
(United States 1973b, book 1, p.7). In spite of the apparently noble motivations of the 
policy makers, the accounting provisions were minimal and did not include “any new 
disclosure” requirements and “merely require[d] a standard of tight management control 
of corporate expenditure” (Lesser 1979a, p.183; Sporkin 1997; Stevenson 1976). Cragg 
(2005) argues, this was partly due to the fact that the SEC pressed for provisions that 
required corporations to assume responsibility for self-monitoring and self-policing, so 
as to reduce its own enforcement role. The self-regulation system was viewed by the 
SEC as the most effective and efficient means of achieving corporate self-restraint in 
the market place (Weismann 2008). This point of view was not shared among many of 
the Senators and Congressmen, since the root of the problem was seen to be the system 
itself and the ability of management in overriding the companies’ control systems. The 
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SEC’s role and ability to take action against corporations, was mainly affected by their 
lack of resources and funding which were controlled by the U.S. President of the time 
(Cragg 2005; United States 1976l; United States 1976n). The President would appoint 
commission members of the SEC as a political organisation, affecting its policies and 
actions (United States 1985, Part 1). The Congress also did not consider the option of 
“requiring government auditors” instead of “Certified Public Accountants” in 
examining corporations’ financial reports (Sporkin 1997, p.272). 
 
2.2 The Role of the Accounting Profession in Formulation of the Accounting 
Provisions 
During the congressional hearings held in relation to provisions of the FCPA, the 
accounting professional bodies such as the AICPA and the private-sector standard 
setting body (the FASB) were mainly passive. The involvement in the lack of disclosure 
of illicit payments of the accounting profession was evident, since the illicit payment 
problem was mainly related to lack of disclosure to stakeholders and lack of 
accountability of management, executives and independent auditors in protection of 
shareholders’ assets. The problem at heart was mainly linked to the self-regulatory 
system of financial disclosure rather than criminalisation of illicit payments. 
 
As will be detailed in the following chapters, the profession’s contribution to 
congressional debates relating to the way corporations had accounted for illicit 
payments was minimal. The only body that publicly questioned the accountability of 
management, accountants and auditors was the SEC, as part of their voluntary 
disclosure program initiated in 1974. While other committees were investigating 
7 | P a g e  
 
corporations’ illegal payments, the SEC had instituted civil injunction actions against 
some of the corporations admitting to the illicit payments. It was also cooperating with 
the Congress in the formation of legislation containing disclosure requirements. The 
AICPA members were partly present during one of the House of Representatives 
hearings during 1976, commenting on the accounting provisions. But their contribution 
to the hearings did not lead to any changes or amendments to the bills presented to the 
Congress.  
 
It can be argued the striking absence of the accounting profession in the debates 
surrounding the accounting provisions of the act was its preoccupation with its own 
survival having recently “come under … [their] first broad attack in the Congress” (Zeff 
2003a, p.200). Based on the findings of this study, the cause of the lack of accounting 
profession involvement in the FCPA hearings was twofold. Firstly, during the 1970s, 
the need for replacement of the Accounting Principles Board (APB), a body in charge of 
establishing accounting principles became visible. The main concern was related to the 
private sector failure in their efforts to establish sound and effective accounting 
principles and standards. For this reason there were suggestions by the Government that 
the standard setting responsibility “be undertaken either by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission or by some new governmental body” (Sommer 1974, p.6).  
 
The AICPA was consequently in fear of governmental interference and formation of 
legislation for accounting practices. It wanted “to keep the setting of principles and 
standards in the private sector … at all cost” (cited in United States 1976b, p.105; 
United States 1985). The AICPA justified its desire to maintain authority over the 
8 | P a g e  
 
setting of standards and principles by citing “[a]llegations of government inefficiency 
and wastefulness” (United States 1976b, p.19). Hence, in 1971 it appointed a 
committee, chaired by Francis Wheat, to study and make recommendations for 
improving the methods of establishing accounting principles and standards in the 
private sector (United States 1976b). The Wheat study group members were mainly 
from large accounting firms, large corporations and academic accountants who were 
tied to big eight accounting firms (United States 1976b, p.119). The details of the 
committee’s report are explained in chapter three. 
  
Secondly, during this time period, the profession was challenged for its lack of 
competence in regulating the accounting and auditing profession as well as its lack of 
independence in performing audit procedures and standard setting procedures 
(Holtzman 2004; United States 1976b; United States 1977a; Zeff 2003a). Collapses of 
corporations such as Westec, National Student Marketing and Penn Central during the 
1960-1970s had raised concerns regarding auditors’ independence as well as “[p]ublic 
concern for fraud detection” (Briloff 1967; Glover & Aono 1995, p.3; Zeff 2003a). The 
collapses which led to questioning the “integrity of the financial statements … raised 
harsh inquiries concerning the practices of the accounting profession” (Sommer 1980, 
p.54). So, corporate accountability and corporate governance structure was partly 
focused on during this time period due to these financial debacles.  
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Two congressional committees2, held by Congressman Moss and Senator Metcalf, in 
the 1970s were established to address the issues with financial reporting and the bodies 
in charge of setting the underlying principles. The recommendations were related to a 
shift of standard setting powers and authority to the SEC or a federal agency (United 
States 1976b; United States 1977a; Zeff 2003a) as well as a “series of behavioural 
reforms … [to] improve auditing, accounting, and standard setting” (United States 
1985, Part 1, p.14). Similar hearings3, held by Congressman Dingell, were undertaken 
ten years later with the aim of investigating similar issues as well as “examination of the 
institutions administering corporate financial standards” (United States 1985, Part 1, 
p.13). The hearings were repeated because there was sufficient signs indicating the 
reforms of the 1970s proved to be “useless structural changes” and business was as 
usual with the accounting profession and the SEC (United States 1985, Part 1, p.14). 
 
The profession was defensive in the face of the recommendations of the initial hearings 
held in the 1970s. It was busy with its immediate response and proposed reforms in 
relation to these criticisms, in order to preserve their powers. The AICPA along with the 
FASB had prepared a 40 page booklet called the Institute Responds in which, according 
to Zeff, the two bodies “countered the arguments in the Metcalf staff study” (Zeff 
2003a, p.201). The recommendations and findings were related to independence and 
integrity of the FASB and the “objectivity of its process” (American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants 1977; Zeff 2003a, p.201). The reforms were mainly 
window dressing, to avoid enactment of any new legislation by the Congress to govern 
the accounting profession’s affairs and powers in setting standards. However, no new 
                                                             
2 The details of the two congressional committees held by Senator Metcalf and Congressman Moss, and 
their recommendations will be explained in chapter three. 
3 The details of the sixteen congressional hearings held by Senator Dingell, in the 1980s will be explained 
in chapter seven. 
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standard or guideline was proposed by the accounting profession. The FCPA accounting 
provisions, while debated in the Congress during the 1970s, were not modified to 
accommodate the relevant recommendations proposed by the above mentioned 
committees. It took however, until the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley act (SOX) to 
address post-Watergate accounting recommendations, as will be briefly explained in the 
following section.  
 
2.3 The FCPA Predates the SOX Requirements 
This study to note many of the accounting-related issues, has specifically focused on 
enactment of the FCPA. It is pertinent to note reforms proposed for inclusion in the 
FCPA were not legislated until “more recent legislation such as Sarbanes-Oxley and the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act” (Borgman & Datar 
2012, p.1). The purposes of these acts reflected those of the FCPA, specifically, 
strengthening the integrity and reputation of American corporations both nationally and 
internationally after the negative publicity that accompanied a new wave of corporate 
and accounting scandals that emerged in the early twenty first century. Another purpose 
of the above acts was the reaction and proposed remedy of the legislators to the 
scandalous and immoral regulatory failures by corporations in the U.S. competitive 
political system.  
 
While the FCPA was signed into law in 1977 to combat accusations of financial fraud, 
bribery and illegal practices by corporate America, later the SOX act was enacted to 
overcome the same issues. Both pieces of legislation were enacted to improve the 
accuracy of accounting and record-keeping of companies, since the problem was partly 
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due to corporations and independent auditors’ lack of accountability to their 
stakeholders. As will be pointed out throughout this thesis, the FCPA was intended to 
restore corporate accountability. However, from its inception, “major U.S. corporations, 
manufacturers’ lobbyists, and exporter groups” opposed the enactment of the act due to 
its claimed ill-conceived effect on corporations' operations and sales abroad (Gutterman 
2013, p.9). Also, the influence of successive presidents and their different political 
agendas and a lack of political will on the part of government agencies, insufficient 
resources, and monitoring and enforcement powers, resulted in the act not having the 
intended effect of changing corporate behaviour.  
 
Although it was intended by some of the Senators and Congressmen to address the 
prevailing problems by enacting the FCPA, the problems and issues had continued to 
occur up until the early years of the twenty first century. During this time period, 
outrageous scandals such as Enron and WorldCom evolved, which prompted the 
legislature to acknowledge that the problems were still prevalent in corporations and 
that the FCPA had not been enforced rigorously. The problems as discussed during the 
1970s congressional hearings as well, were mainly related to independence and the role 
of auditors and audit committees as gatekeepers. The enactment of the SOX act was in 
the hope of addressing these issues that were proposed to be included in the FCPA.  
 
It needs to be considered that the SOX act has been used in this study to demonstrate 
that the problem of corruption and bribery payments were not stopped or even 
minimised by the enactment of the FCPA. For this reason, references to the SOX act is 
used in this study to demonstrate the failure of the FCPA to stop or even minimise the 
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problem of corporate corruption and bribery. In other words, the lessons of Watergate 
and subsequent revelations of bribery and corruption were not learned by the accounting 
profession, the SEC and the Congress in combating corporations’ fraudulent activities.  
 
2.4 Supply and Demand side of Corruption 
The FCPA itself was only directed to the supply side of corruption: how American 
corporations had made illegal payments to public officials and overseas foreign 
corporations (Cragg 2005; Turk 2013). This put a “considerable legal and moral burden 
on US multinational corporations” (Cragg 2005, p.124), while the demand side “where 
bribery takes place” (Turk 2013, p.329), in return for political consideration, was not 
addressed. This was because the U.S was not in charge of moralising other nations as 
well as other nations' lack of interest or capacity “to rein in their corrupt officials” (Turk 
2013, p.329). As the primary focus of the original act, was mainly on the supply side of 
corruption, “leaders in the business community were quick to point out the potential 
negative effects the FCPA could have on U.S. business abroad” (Lippitt 2013, p.1893-
1894) and pushed for amendments of the provisions of the act. The business community 
demanded the act be eased and relaxed to accommodate their dealings with other 
nations. Consequently, the corporate lobbying pressures led to amendment of the act in 
1988 as part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (Turk 2013).  
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3. Theoretical Framework4 
Research methodology indicates the research methods that are considered to be 
appropriate for gathering valid evidence (Chua 1986a; Dillard 1991). Methodology is 
implicated by sets of assumptions where each one has important consequences on the 
way knowledge about the social world is being obtained. The methodology of this study 
is based on a critical approach for the purpose of taking into account the political, 
economic and social influences on the standard setting process. This approach to a study 
of accounting starts from the premise that problems in accounting potentially reflect 
existing problems in and of society that need to be critically analysed (Cooper & Sherer 
1984, p.222). Critical theory is founded on the notion that “the individual creates the 
world in which he lives” (Burrell & Morgan 1979, p.279). This paradigm is based on 
the notion that, ontologically, “the individual creates [rather than discovers] the world in 
which he/she lives” and the way an individual understands the social world is dependent 
on the way he/she views reality (Burrell & Morgan 1979; Chua 1986b; Dillard 1991). 
Consequently, an individual’s interpretation gives meaning to the reality which is 
dependent on an individuals’ unique understanding of a particular reality, and society 
does not exist independently of human activity (Chua 1986a; Dillard 1991; Gaffikin 
2010; Gaffikin 2008). 
 
A critical approach to accounting starts from the premise that problems in accounting 
potentially reflect existing problems in and of society that need to be critically analysed 
(Cooper & Sherer 1984, p.222). Such an approach emphasises qualitative methods and 
the contextual nature of the inquiry and, to a lesser extent, quantitative methods of data 
                                                             
4 Based on the format of this thesis, the theoretical framework is defined and explained as part of this 
chapter. The reason is that this study is demonstrating the shortcomings of the FCPA in a form of a story 
and the chapters are related to the timeline of the events that took place between the 1970s-1990s.  
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collection and analysis (Baker & Bettner 1997; Burrell & Morgan 1979; Chua 1986b; 
Dillard 1991; Miller 1994). This approach has been introduced in accounting to assist 
accounting researchers to understand how accounting is used as a mechanism of 
controlling society and organisations (Baker & Bettner 1997). Accounting is “concerned 
with a socially constructed world” (Gaffikin 2008, p.16; Hines 1988) and it operates in 
a “social, political and economic context” (Cooper & Sherer 1984, p.207). Also,  
[a]ny accounting contains a representation of a specific social and political 
context. Not only is accounting policy essentially political in that it derives 
from the political struggle in society as a whole but also the outcomes of 
accounting policy are essentially political in that they operate for the benefit of 
some groups in society and to the detriment of others (Cooper & Sherer 1984, 
p.208). 
 
The aim of this study is to apply a critical approach to analyse and explain the 
enactment and modification of the FCPA and enforcement and implementation of the 
act by the governing bodies in charge. The argument is that there is a need to adopt a 
deeper understanding of the involvement of political parties, and the accounting bodies 
and profession in the process of developing the FCPA from a critical perspective, as it 
involves an understanding of its impact on societies and organisations. Also, this 
perspective takes into account the political, economic and social influences on setting 
the details of the accounting section of the FCPA. 
 
There are various relevant and suitable methods that could be used to appropriately 
address the issues raised in this study. Social theories by Marx, Weber, Foucault and 
Latour for example would be suitable for studying enactment and enforcement of 
regulation as well as power relations (Cooper & Robson 2006; Latour 1991). Actor 
network theory (ANT), while argued by Callon as being “everything but a theory” 
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(1999, p.182), is employed as the method to understand the relation of various actors in 
the process of construction and reconstruction of networks in reaching a consensus in 
formulating legislation to put an end to illicit payments. ANT is utilised to re-examine 
the FCPA from a different perspective. This process is concerned with establishing and 
expanding the network and the shift of power between the actors in a network.  
 
ANT articulates the relationships between the actors and enrolment of new actors in the 
networks created during the political processes in enactment of the FCPA. Since the 
focus of this theory is on the assumption that no one acts alone and actors create a 
network to interact. The process of building and changing a network is political in 
nature. The theory is concerned with the influence of actors within and between 
networks that form and re-form (Spira 1999) by using persuasive language. However, as 
ANT is criticized by many scholars for its modest concepts, this study integrates ANT 
and a political economy approach to understand construction and reconstruction of 
networks from 1972 to 1988, since a political economy approach portrays the 
restructuring of networks and power relation changes through this time period. 
 
Political economy, the study of political and economic relationships, is a dominant 
social theory in examining governmental responses to political and corporate corruption 
and establishment of regulation. As argued by Turpin (2011, p.10),  
[p]olitical economy encompasses the full range of the social and political 
situation in which economic interaction takes place, especially with respect to 
… law, political debate over desirable and undesirable policies.  
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The political economy approach to analysis of the enactment of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act and the actors involved in the process of establishment of this new 
legislation is implemented and implied. Due to the fact that “[t]he regulation of 
economic life is where politics and economics meet; … everything to do with regulation 
concerns political economy” (Moran 2010, p.215). Therefore, political economy theory 
is embedded in the findings and lurks in the background, although it is seldom explicitly 
stated. 
 
3.1 Actor Network Theory (ANT) 
ANT was developed in the early 1980s from Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (Kuhn 1970) and as a contribution to the sociology of knowledge by French 
sociologists Michel Callon, Bruno Latour, and John Law (Sismondo 2004, p.65). 
However, they do not share similar views on ANT. The theory has been used to 
examine accounting matters by scholars such as Robson (1991), Ezzamel (1994), Chua 
(1995) and Spira (1999) to name a few. As it helps describe social structure as a 
relational effect that continuously generates and reproduces itself by actors forming 
alliances as well as involving other actors and non-human actors (artifacts) to strengthen 
such alliances. Just as Callon (1986b) used the translation model, to explain a certain 
situation in a case study format, the enactment and enforcement of the FCPA is 
explainable within the same model. Also, similar to Callon (1999, p.183), this study 
uses this theory since “ANT was developed to analyse situations in which it is difficult 
to separate humans and non-humans, and in which the actors have variable forms and 
competencies”.  
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The only assumption that ANT makes regarding actors is “that they have some interest 
in being involved in the change process, which may be based on their hopes and/or fears 
for the consequences of such change” (Emsley 2008, p.378). ANT is mainly concerned 
with the generation of power and operation of power in specific instances, in the 
network as well as the influences within and between networks which are constantly 
forming and re-forming (Spira 1999). Callon, as argued by Law (1986, p.16), agrees 
“with Foucault who warns … power is not a property or a possession, but a strategy or 
something exercised, the overall effect of a set of strategies”.  
 
Powers and orderings are contested by human and non-human actors for securing their 
own interests through the process that Callon called ‘translation’ (1986a; 1991). He 
defines it as “the method by which an actor enrolls others” (Callon 1986a, p.xvii) which 
is similar to conversion “into a scenario, carrying the signature of its author, looking for 
actors ready to play its roles” (Callon 1991, p.142). A translation presupposes a medium 
or a “material into which it is inscribed”, that is, translations are “embodied in texts, 
machines, body skills [which] become their support, their more or less faithful 
executive” (Callon 1991, p.143). 
 
Translation refers to the process of negotiation, representation and displacement which 
establish relations between actors, entities and places. It involves the re-definition of 
phenomena, and these re-definitions are inscribed in the heterogeneous materials which 
act to consolidate networks. It defines and distributes the roles of actors to be able to 
speak for others but in their own language (Callon 1986a). Translation would 
consequently lead to a situation in which certain entities control others. It is intended to 
provide symmetrical and tolerant descriptions of a complex process as well as 
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explaining the way a spokesperson would be able to obtain the rights to express and 
represent the interest of silent actors as part of the network (Callon 1986b). Any 
resistance during the translation, as indicated by Law (1992), would be defeated by the 
strategy of a good ordering and a set of relations in durable materials. This would be 
effective use of different communication approaches such as writing or speech. 
 
Callon (1986b) conceptualises the process of forming and re-forming networks in four 
moments by the original French labels of problematization, interessement, enrolment, 
and mobilization. The notion of translation emphasizes the displacements, 
transformations, and changes over time which occur at every stage of the four moments. 
The “actors struggle with one another … [to] first determine their existence and then (if 
that existence is secured) define their characteristics” (Law 1986, p.15). Each moment 
of translation will be explained in regards to the context of this study. 
 
3.1.1 Problematisation  
Problematisation is the initial stage in creation of a network by the principal actor. As 
well as defining the nature of the problem faced by others and his/her solution to the 
perceived problem. For the purpose of this study, a brief history and background of each 
of the principal actors is explained in the following chapters. This is to provide the 
reader with the context and an understanding of behaviour and actions of the principal 
actor.  
 
The principal actor defines identities and interests of other actors in establishing itself as 
indispensable to the other actors. The proposed solution would be used by the principal 
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actor to persuade other actors to accept it as the way forward. During this stage the 
primary actor tries to become an obligatory passage point to make the network 
indispensable and assure the vitality and success of the translation process (Callon 
1986b). The obligatory passage point brings the actors together and consequently helps 
in minimising the threat of predators. As Callon (1986a, p.27) states, “the 
translation…maps out a geography of necessary points of passage for those elements 
who wish to continue to exist and develop” and “problematization describes a system of 
alliances, or associations, between entities [actors], thereby defining the identity and 
what they want” (Callon 1986b, p.206). As explained by Callon and Latour (1981, 
p.277) this moment involves translation of “other actors’ wills into a single will for 
which they speak” in allowing “them to act like a single will which is, however, 
extremely powerful because of the forces on which it can rely”. 
 
3.1.2 Interessement 
The above moment is not assurance of the process of translation. Accordingly the 
principal actor is required to persuade and recruit other actors to assume roles in the 
network. The principal actor implements different actions in attempting “to impose and 
stabilize the identity of the other actors” that it has defined through its problematisation 
stage (Callon 1986b, p.207-208). This process is called interessement. During this 
process, the principal actor locks the other actors in place “by coming between them and 
their alternatives” (Law 1986, p.16). Consequently, the roles of other actors are mainly 
about recognising the centrality of the primary actor's own role, identity and goals.  
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3.1.3 Enrolment 
After interessement is successful the next moment, enrolment, occurs which is defining 
the roles of each of the actors as well as actors’ acceptance of the established roles and 
the newly created network. This moment also involves the way in which the actors in 
the network “relate to one another in the scheme devised by the principal actor” (Law 
1986, p.16). Nevertheless, “the device of interessement does not necessarily lead to 
alliances…to actual enrolment” (Callon 1986b, p.211). Callon (1986b, p.211) 
demonstrates that “no matter how constraining…convincing the argument would be, 
success is never assured” since each actor could choose either to submit to integration 
into the actor network defined or refuse the translation. During this moment the 
principal actors define “a set of interrelated roles” that are attributed to the other actors 
who are prepared to accept them (Callon 1986b, p.211). Enrolment according to 




The fourth and last moment of translation, mobilisation of allies, includes the actor or 
actors becoming representatives or spokespeople to act as a unit of force; and seeking 
continued support to the underlying ideas from other enrolled actors. As explained by 
Callon (1986b, p.216) “[t]o mobilize, as the word indicates, is to render entities mobile 
which were not so beforehand”. The primary actor during this moment employs a set of 
methods, such as persuasive language, in attempting to mobilise passive network actors 
to action and not to betray the principal actors’ interest (Callon 1986b).  
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When a network passes through the above four stages, “a constraining network of 
relationships” would be built which could “be contested at any moment” (Callon 1986b, 
p.218). Callon (1986b, p.219) explains this as “[t]ranslation becom[ing] treason”. So, 
actors of the networks can, due to foreseen or unforeseen reasons, become dissident. 
The principal actor can use their interessement devices to re-establish another network 
and also spokespersons/people. The above explained moments will be referred to 
throughout this study to explain the various networks created and re-created by 
principal actors with their political and self-interest agenda in initiating enactment and 
amendment of the FCPA in the U.S. 
 
4. The Study’s Format and Application of the Theory 
The study has been divided into three sections based on ANT. Section I comprises 
chapters two and three, defining the problem that surfaced from the initial hearings and 
investigations held by the Ervin Committee and the SEC. This section also includes a 
brief overview of the accounting profession and accounting bodies’ state during the 
1970s. Based on the phases of the translation model, chapter two explains the 
problematisation stage and the bases on which the main networks explained in chapters 
four to seven were formed. Chapter three briefly demonstrates the network that was 
created and re-created by the accounting profession, which was separate to the main 
networks explained in the other chapters.  
 
Chapters four and five are included in section II, and explain the proposed solution for 
the problem identified in the previous section and the formation and reformation of the 
main networks of this study. This study has assumed the creation and destruction of the 
22 | P a g e  
 
networks, with reference to ANT and based on the gathered information and documents. 
The last section, section III, demonstrates the enforcement and amendments of the 
FCPA demonstrating how the problem at hand was addressed by the politicians and the 
accounting profession. The following is a brief outline and summary of the chapters of 
this thesis. The outline will demonstrate the story of this study in the context of the 
explained theoretical framework.  
 
4.1 Chapter Two 
Chapter two provides a brief historical background regarding the Watergate scandals 
and pressures of this political crisis, beginning in spring 1972 as well as the outcomes of 
the SEC voluntary program which eventually led to enactment of the FCPA. This 
chapter is solely devoted to the events surrounding these hearings and investigations. 
The chapter explains the committees that were established to investigate corporations 
and also President Nixon and demonstrating the urge and push for passage of legislation 
to fight bribery. It also demonstrates how the committee’s hearings were a catalyst for 
the SEC to initiate their investigations. Chapter two sets the grounds for later chapters in 
explaining the passage of the statute as being justified as “a moralistic theory of foreign 
policy endorsed by the new Carter administration” (Greanias & Windsor 1982, p.3). 
The chapter lays the context in which Senators and Congressmen initiated establishment 
of actor-networks based on this anticipated solution. 
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4.2 Chapter Three 
This chapter also provides a brief historical background regarding the accounting 
profession and the perceived reason this study assumes for its lack of involvement in the 
process of enactment of the FCPA. Chapter three expands on the outcomes of the study 
conducted by the American Institute of CPAs (AICPA) in a move to avoid government 
involvement in the process of forming a new standard setting body. As well as the 
Senate subcommittee study into “the federal government’s role in establishing 
accounting practices” (United States 1976b, p.iii). As far as the theory is concerned, 
chapters two and three both explain the events that shaped and led to the movements 
towards establishment of new legislation perceived by politicians to be the appropriate 
solution to the problem of illicit payments.  
 
4.3 Chapter Four 
Continuing from chapter two, chapter four explains the actor-networks that were 
established from 1972 as part of the congressional hearings about various foreign 
corporate payments. Senators Frank Church and William Proxmire were advocates and 
leaders in widely holding these congressional hearings and investigations. They both 
had created their networks based on the problem of corruption and bribery that mainly 
stemmed from the Ervin Committee. Beside these committees, President Ford, as the 
successor to Nixon, also had created a Cabinet-level Task Force to investigate 
questionable payments cases and formation of new legislation. This network created by 
Ford was to some extent to help him in running for the 1976 presidential election 
(Greanias & Windsor 1982). Chapter four, provides the foundation for the following 
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chapter in demonstrating the bills and legislation formed by these networks as the 
solution to the bribery payments. 
 
4.4 Chapter Five 
From 1972 to 1976 various bills were presented to the Congress by the above 
mentioned networks that eventually led to agreement on one bill that was enacted as the 
FCPA. Chapter five in detail and associated with ANT, expands on the political context 
and influences surrounding each of the presented bills and the networks. In explaining 
the events that took place, the chapter details the formation, re-formation and 
termination of the networks.   
 
4.5 Chapter Six 
Chapter six focuses solely on the bills that were presented to the Congress during 1977, 
when Carter was elected as the President of the U.S. The bill that was eventually signed 
into law, had its perceived shortcomings and strengths, which were debated in the 
Congress. These arguments are utilised to demonstrate the movement of the networks 
through the translation model and success of the Senator Proxmire network in 
persuading other actors to agree to his proposed bill. This chapter partly concludes the 
last two chapters’ findings and arguments regarding the political economy 
circumstances surrounding the establishment of the bills. Lastly, the chapter briefly 
demonstrates the way the FCPA was enforced by the SEC and the Department of 
Justice (DoJ), the two bodies in charge of implementing the act.  
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4.6 Chapter Seven 
As soon as the FCPA was enacted in 1977, it came under attack by the Administration, 
and lobbyists such as the corporations. The claims of vagueness, lack of clarity and the 
cost to businesses were argued to be the main forces behind moves by the Congress to 
amend the act. Chapter seven demonstrates the arguments that were made in justifying 
the shift towards simplification and weakening of the FCPA. On one hand, it explains 
the influence and persuasion of the Reagan Administration regarding the effect and 
restraints of the legislation on corporations’ exports. On the other hand, it presents 
arguments by supporters of the act, such as Proxmire, refuting the claims of those 
seeking to dilute provisions of the act, demonstrating the increase in the U.S. export 
trade. The bills presented to the Congress, were mainly focused on significantly altering 
both the accounting and the anti-bribery provisions of the act. Eventually the act was 
amended in 1988 as part of the four hundred page Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act. The approved amendments by the Congress were a compromise in comparison to 
the initial proposed changes. 
 
5. Editorial Note 
Due to the focus of this study on United States congressional hearings and materials, 
there is a number of what appear to be spelling irregularities. Also, this study has used 
secondary documents and sources originating from different countries for direct 
quotation. The most notable of these irregularities is associated with words such as 
‘problematisation’/ ‘problematization’, ‘organisation/ organization, and ‘behaviour’/ 
‘behavior’. The alternative way of spelling these and other words is only used in the 
case of a direct quote. 
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Throughout this study and consistent with the reports and congressional hearings, the 
name of the United States departments are used for example as ‘the Department of 
States’ or ‘State Department’ interchangeably.    






The previous two sections detail the political events that led to the 
formulation of legislation condemning corruption and bribery. Section 
III aims at demonstrating that not only was the enactment of the FCPA 
controversial, but so too were the enforcement. 
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Chapter Two: Love of 
Power and the Proneness 
to Abuse it5 
 
We must never accede to the rationale, in foreign policy or in business, that we must become as 
corrupt as those we come up against (Church 1985, p.101). 
 
Prior to the 1990s, western societies viewed corruption as largely a problem limited to 
under-developed countries (Nelken & Levi 1996). However, political scandals have also 
been witnessed in developed countries. As argued by the then Director of Military 
Research, Council on Economic Priorities, Adams  
Questionable corporate uses of corporate funds has a long, if not honoured, 
history. Such payments are not new to commerce or to politics, and past efforts 
to control them do not seem to have ended the practice … and have become a 
problem of growing concern to American business and the public with the 
expansion of US business overseas following World War II (United States 
1977d, p.26-27). 
The Watergate scandal and resulting resignation of President Richard Nixon in the early 
1970s, is arguably the most egregious instance of corruption at the highest levels of 
government in the history of the United States (U.S). The combination of these events 
known as Watergate “has become a symbol for corruption in government” (Mosher 
1974, p.vii). Mosher (1974, p.5) stated “Watergate was a product of a system which 
shaped and guided the behavior of its participants”. Ralph Nader argued the perceived 
scandal and associated epidemic of corporate crimes discovered in its wake was the first 
the U.S had suffered, since the 1930’s “when [the] New York Stock Exchange president 
                                                             
5 George Washington (United States 1973b, Book 1, p.2)  
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… was convicted of stock theft … [but] escaped prosecution by fleeing abroad dressed 
as a woman” (United States 1976a, p.90).  
 
As described by Senator Ervin, the scandal “was perpetrated upon America by White 
House and political aides whom President Nixon himself had entrusted with the 
management of his campaign for reelection to the Presidency” (United States 1974, p. 
1097). It was considered by commentators as one of the most tragic events in the US 
and “a cancer growing on the Presidency” (United States 1974, p.xxiii). The scandal 
revealed a pattern of misusing “public responsibility and trust” to maintain the 
administration in office, by bending the laws to justify the means among public offices 
(United States 1974, p.xxiv). The Watergate case also revealed a disturbing pattern of 
misuse of corporate funds for improper or illegal purposes (Loomis 1980).  
 
According to a report by the Committee on Corporate Law and Accounting  
a number of United States companies or their subsidiaries had over long 
periods of time paid substantial bribes, or made other payments of dubious 
character, to officials of foreign governments (1978, p.308).  
Bribes and questionable payments had become the norm and routine business practices 
designed to gain a competitive edge over international and also U.S. companies (United 
States 1977d; United States 1977g). This point was argued by Roderick Hill, the SEC 
chairman, in a speech during 1976: 
[t]he present phenomena may present a greater crisis because it has been 
caused by top officers of major companies who were not stealing for personal 
gain but who claim that bribery has been one of the rules of the game … 
necessary for American business to be competitive worldwide; and that 
concealment of the truth from auditors and from boards of directors is a proper 
means to the end of better profits (Securities and Exchange Commission 
1976a, p.3-4). 
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Even though illicit payments were viewed as a way of life for corporations doing 
business overseas, the payments had a negative effect on U.S. foreign relations and 
interests. On one hand it would reduce foreign trade opportunities for U.S. corporations 
and complicate the relationships with foreign governments, “[t]he American reputation 
for quality, competence, and honesty is tarnished and eroded” (United States 1976i, 
p.68). On the other hand, it would affect the country by diminishing its “standing before 
the world … [i]n ways that are intangible and cannot be exactly measured”, and making 
the country “less influential and significant nation” (United States 1976i, p.68).  
 
In this regard, in the early 1970s corruption became an issue of international concern as 
a direct result of political events in the United States. The Watergate investigations 
generated a high level of public awareness regarding the questionable conduct of some 
of the nation’s political and business elite. Watergate led to other investigations into the 
role of major U.S corporations in financing domestic political campaigns (Posadas 
2000, p.351). Multinational companies had not only contributed illegally to U.S. 
political campaigns but had also actively channelled resources to foreign governments 
and foreign political parties (Posadas 2000, p.349). The bribe payments in some 
instances were made by U.S. companies to compete with other U.S. companies for the 
same business (United States 1977d). Because of the magnitude of the problem, the 
hearings were opened to the public and produced the most extensive documentation of 
corruption by business-government in history (Stevenson & Wagoner 2011).  
 
Findings of the Watergate-related investigations demonstrate the argument of Bargh and 
Alvarez (2001, p.43) that individuals who use their official power for their own personal 
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gain and goals, do so at substantial cost to “the aims and purposes of the organization” 
as well as society. The scandal also demonstrates the negative impact of corruption on 
the reputation of a country and its political system as well as on corporations implicated 
in such corruption. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) report to the Congress 
identified the adverse effect of these scandals on the image of American democracy 
abroad, and American foreign policy (Seitzinger 1999).  
 
At a general level, Tanzi (1998) and Nichols (1997) have argued respectively that 
corruption reduces public revenue and increases public spending by diverting resources 
from their most efficient uses as well as distorting the process of decision making. The 
resources and peoples’ talents would be shifted from productive purposes to corrupt 
practices, while corrupt investors would lower the quality and quantity of investments 
made in the country. It seems that no country can afford to sustain the social, political, 
or economic costs that corruption entails (Dye 2007, p.304).  
 
1. Watergate Scandal 
The illicit payments came to light following the investigations of the break-ins6 at the 
Democratic Party headquarters in the Watergate offices in Washington. The break-ins 
were part of the activities of President Nixon’s Re-election Committee known as the 
“dirty tricks department”7 to discredit and weaken Nixon’s political opponents (See for 
example, United States 1973b, Book 10, Book 11). Major details of the Watergate 
                                                             
6 The purpose of break-ins was to install telephone tapping devices in the Watergate offices. The major 
officials in charge of the break-ins were former CIA and FBI agents.  
7 The details of this department are beyond the scope of this study. For further information refer to House 
of Representative hearings in relation to House Resolution 803 or Senate hearings held in relation to 
Presidential campaign activities of 1972. 
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break-ins and cover-up of unlawful and improper Presidential campaign funding during 
President Nixon’s election campaign in 1972, were exposed by the Senate Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities. The committee hearings were seen to 
be more effective than “the criminal procedures of the courts in exposing, and thereby 
protecting the public from, unethical behaviour” due to the investigative power of 
Congress (Mosher 1974, p.123). The public hearings were referred to as Watergate 
Hearings. The Senate Select Committee, known as the Ervin Committee or Watergate 
Committee by the media, revealed various instances of manipulation of financial 
statements and diverse corruption by executives and CEO’s of corporations.  
 
Senator Gurne (United States 1973b, Book 1, p.7) during his opening statement at the 
initial hearing stated “[t]his committee begins today history hearings which may well 
turn out to be the most significant hearings ever conducted by any committee of the 
Congress”. The committee was established in 1973 to inform the public of the full 
extent of the truth and wrongdoings by performing “a complete investigation and study 
… and determine whether new legislation” was required (United States 1974, p.v) “to 
prevent future occurrences of such activities” (United States 1973b, Book 1, p.8). The 
investigations for establishment of new legislation set the grounds for creation of later 
congressional committees.  
 
It also helped these committees in moulding and re-moulding their networks and 
persuading other actors (Senators or Congressmen for example) to enrol in these 
networks. Accordingly, the Ervin Committee was viewed “as a turning point in postwar 
political history” (Johnson 2006, p.205). Equally important the committee had a 
powerful effect on the expansion of 1970s investigations of the Senate subcommittees 
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as well as the SEC’s increase of surveillance of multinational corporations that led to its 
voluntary program. The program required voluntary disclosure of illicit campaign 
contributions and bribery of political officials internationally and domestically. The 
SEC’s voluntary program, as will be explained in detail in this chapter, and the 
recommendations of the program were the deciding factor for one of the network’s to 
enrol the SEC as their dominant actor. The program also helped some of the committees 
in identifying the problem, formulating their networks and proposing a solution. 
 
1.1 Ervin Committee Investigations 
The task of the Ervin Committee was “much more difficult and complex” as “[i]t must 
probe into assertions that the very system itself … [had] been subverted and its 
foundations shaken” (United States 1973b, Book 1 p.3). During the initial process of 
establishing the committee, letters were sent to Senator Eastland and Senator Ervin 
seeking expressions of interest in holding public hearings relating to the Watergate 
scandals. Senator Eastland was favoured by 
the White House, as it was perceived that he 
would be friendly and that they had more 
friends on Senator Eastland’s Committee 
(United States 1973b, Book 3, p.980). After 
the Senate vote for Senator Ervin, the White 
House changed its strategy to “take a public 
posture of full cooperation” with the 
committee “but privately … [to] attempt to 
restrain the investigation and make it as 
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difficult as possible to get information and witnesses” (United States 1973b, Book 3, 
p.984; United States 1974, p. 76). The ultimate goal of the White House was “to 
discredit the hearings and reduce their impact by attempting to show that the Democrats 
had engaged in the same type of activities as the Republicans” (United States 1973b, 
Book 3, p.984; United States 1974, p. 76). 
 
1.2 Details of the Scandals 
President Nixon at first was confident that “[t]here was no crisis” and that the hearings 
would “peter out quickly” (Ashby & Gramer 1994, p.403; United States 1973c). 
However, one needs to take into account that the Watergate break-in was just the tip of 
the iceberg. The evidence before the Ervin Committee revealed that the break–ins were 
organised and paid for by officials of the Campaign to Re-elect the President (CRP).  
 
Initially, from the public view and that of the committee the truth was concealed. To 
hide the facts, documents were destroyed and shredded, moneys were offered and 
Executive clemencies were given (United States 1974, p.32). Throughout the Ervin 
Committee investigations, requests for access to information and political players were 
rejected. For instance, the President had directed the FBI to restrict the Watergate 
investigation to prevent exposure of the activities of a group called the Plumbers8, 
which was in charge of investigating the leaks of sensitive documents from the 
Pentagon to the media. For this reason, these cover-ups before and during9 the Ervin 
                                                             
8 An in-house investigative arm of the White House, conducting political and national security related 
investigations during its existence in 1971 (United States 1974, p.119). 
9 A conference committee was established to deal with the Ervin Committee and to make sure that the 
cover-up would not be unraveled in this committee (United States 1973b, Book 4). 
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Committee investigations were successful as higher presidential campaign officials and 
the White House officials were not exposed.  
 
Additionally, President Nixon argued that “I can state categorically that no one in the 
White House staff no one in this administration presently employed was involved in this 
very bizarre incident” (United States 1974, p.47). Yet, this claim was not based on any 
formal investigation even though Nixon claimed that he had assigned a White House 
staff member to conduct an investigation under his direction. The Justice Department's 
Director of Public Information declared as well that “the Department had concluded its 
investigation stating we have absolutely no evidence to indicate that any others should 
be charged” (United States 1974, p.48). By creation of the Watergate Special 
Prosecutor 10  during 1973, “a Pandora’s box of other significant and pervasive 
criminality” was opened (Biegelman & Biegelman 2010, p.8). Cases which “the Justice 
Department had almost never moved against illegal business contributions to political 
figures” were investigated (United States 1976a, p.95). This was also when the FBI did 
not have a “reporting category for business crime” in their “Crime in the United States 
annual report” (United States 1976a, p.95). In a news conference in August 1972, 
President Nixon was asked about the addition of an independent special prosecutor to 
investigate the Watergate case and he argued, based on the FBI’s “full field 
investigation”, the Department of Justice prosecution and the General Accounting 
Office independent investigation, “I don’t believe that adding another special prosecutor 
would serve any useful purpose” (United States 1973b, Book 4, p.1509). In addition, he 
                                                             
10 Professor Cox, a lawyer and law professor at Harvard University was appointed as the first Watergate 
Special Prosecutor. Upon his request for secret tapes of Nixon conversations, Nixon ordered his 
dismissal.  
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said that all of the Government agencies as well as the White House under his direction 
were fully cooperating with these investigative bodies (Woolley & Peters 1972). 
 
1.2.1 The Campaign to Re-elect the President Committees’ 
The Re-election Campaign that was involved in the break-ins consisted of two entities. 
One was in charge of political affairs (CRP, Political Committee), and the other raising 
funds and their distribution (FCRP, Finance Committee) (United States 1973b, Book 2). 
Most of the important positions in the campaign entities were given to White House 
aides (United States 1974, p.19). Hence, both of the entities were staffed and controlled 
by the White House. The Political Committee used a tactic called the “attack strategy” 
which later was “converted by others into gross abuses and unethical manipulations of 
the electoral process” (United States 1974, p.108). In respect to manipulation of 
electoral processes, Senator Inouye argued that  
[u]nless we can safeguard … [the] process from fraud, manipulation, 
deception, and other illegal or unethical activities, one of our most precious 
rights, the right to vote, will be without meaning. Democracy will have been 
subverted (United States 1973b, Book 1, p.8).  
 
Details of the Finance Committee’s purpose and processes are explained in the 
following section.  
 
1.2.2 Finance Committee 
The objective of establishing the finance committee was to raise sufficient money to 
cover the expenditures of the campaign committee (United States 1973b, Book 2). The 
importance of the finance committee was that “cash contributions and funds played key 
roles in virtually all aspects of the 1972 Presidential election” (United States 1974, 
p.108). As per the Ervin Committee’s investigations, large sums of money were “held in 
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secret places in the White House and elsewhere” (United States 1974, p.108) that were 
difficult to trace even though a new law called the “The Federal Election Campaign Act 
of 1971” came into place on 7th April, 197211. The new law required record keeping of 
the funds raised and the details of the contributor, as well as the disbursement of the 
funds (United States 1974, p.26). The enforcement responsibility of the legislation was  
upon the General Accounting Office … [which] was limited to taking evidence 
of violations to the Department of Justice, which … [had] failed to undertake 
vigorous prosecutions of delays or inadequacies in fund reporting (Mosher 
1974).  
 
It was argued by Stans, former U.S Secretary of Commerce and then chairman of the 
Finance Committee,  
[b]ecause of the complexity of the new law that became effective in the course 
of the campaign and the vast amount of work that had to be done under the 
new law there may have been some unintended technical violations by the 
committee. … [T]here were no intentional violations of the laws relating to 
campaign financing (United States 1973b, Book 2, p.689). 
 
By not reporting the source of the funding and the amount that was available for 
expenditures, the committee was able “to finance the bugging and the burglary of the 
offices of the Democratic National Committee in the Watergate complex … for the 
purpose of obtaining political intelligence” (United States 1974, p.1098) and “alleged 
hush money” (United States 1974, p.1109). As indicated by Senator Ervin, the people 
involved with the scandals  
were not seduced by the love of money which is sometimes thought to be the 
root of all evil … [but] were instigated by a lust for political power which is at 
least as corrupting as political power itself (United States 1974, p.1101). 
 
The Ervin Committee investigations found that “at least 13 corporations made 
contributions totaling over $780,000 in corporate funds … [of which] approximately 
                                                             
11  The bill was signed by February 7, but it was not effective until April 7 to allow time for the 
transmission. 
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$749,000 … [were] illegal corporate contributions” (United States 1974, p.446). The 
contributions, which were mainly in cash and occasionally in corporate assets, were not 
recorded until July 1973 (United States 1974, p. 447). The motivation behind the 
disclosure was rooted in an “imaginative suit” against the Finance Committee’s records 
of the contributors which required them to disclose how the contributions were paid 
(United States 1974, p.447). Accordingly, the committee, in return, sent letters to 
individuals in corporations seeking details of these political contributions. 
 
As per the Ervin Committee’s questioning, corporate executives were approached by the 
Finance Committee’s fundraiser personnel “searching for $100,000 givers” (United 
States 1974, p.448) referred to as the “100 club” (United States 1974, p.505) to be in the 
good books of the government (United States 1973b, Book 13). The stated bases of the 
contributions were in relation to the President’s outstanding performance and the need 
for organisations to assist him along the road. The funds were requested by the 
fundraiser personnel to be given to the committee before the 7th of April 1973. As 
indicated by the American Airline former chairman “sometimes the fear of the unknown 
may be more terrifying than fear of the known” (United States 1973b, Book 13, 
p.5514). Also Senator Ervin commented that “[i]t certainly is a human weakness or 
desire for any one engaged in business to have a friendly ear in government” (United 
States 1973b, Book 13, p.5449). It was argued at the time since the CEO or executive 
salaries per year were far less than $100,000; it was perceived that the political 
contributions had to be made from corporate funds (United States 1973b, Book 13).  
 
“In many instances … [the] contributions were carefully planned, artfully concealed and 
in no sense the fruit of illicit pressures” (Sommer 1975, p.1975). The funds were 
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sourced differently by the corporations. It needs to be considered that the political 
contributions and the reason for why the payments were made were not discussed by the 
board of directors or the shareholders. Rather it was apparent those who agreed to the 
payments argued “the reelection of the President was in the best interest” of their 
corporation or the U.S. (United States 1973b, Book 13, p.5530). As argued by the 
chairman of Ashland Oil during one of the hearings “[t]here was a good business reason 
for making the contribution and although illegal in nature I am confident that it 
distinctively benefited the corporation and the stockholders” (United States 1973b, 
Book 13, p.5447).  
 
The majority of the corporations had used foreign subsidiary reserves (Swiss bank 
accounts) or expense accounts (such as research expenditure), and others had recorded 
the payments as either corporate expense or bonuses. The bonuses which were referred 
to by corporate executives as “bogus bonuses” (United States 1973b, Book 13, p.5425) 
were mainly recorded as the executives’ reimbursement for their contributions (United 
States 1974, Final Report, p.447) or overseas agents’ commissions. The next section 
will illustrate a brief summary12 of some of the corporations under investigation by the 
committee, such as Ashland Oil, Gulf Oil, and Northrop Corp, that had paid political 
contributions. The reason for this brief summary is to illustrate how corporations were 
treating these payments in their books and records and were able to hide them from their 
stakeholders. The purpose is to shed some light on the importance of this study, the 
motivation behind the push for establishment of new legislation in later congressional 
hearings by the networks created and eventually the reason behind the need for 
including accounting requirements in this new legislation.   
                                                             
12 The summary provided in this study is not comprehensive, for full details refer to the Presidential 
campaign Activities of 1973 books and final report. 
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3. Instances of Political Contributions by Corporations 
3.1 Gulf Oil Corp 
Gulf Oil Corp was one of the first corporations contacted during 1971 to contribute to 
President Nixon’s re-election campaign as well as the Democrat candidate campaigns. 
The company had a history of making international political payments. For instance, 
during the 1960s payoffs were paid in Korea and Bolivia to help the recipients of the 
payoffs to get elected (washington (AP) 1975). The contributions were made through 
the vice president for Government relations, Wild13, without any consultation with the 
chairman or the board of directors as he had “broad authority to handle governmental 
matters” (United States 1973b, Book 13, p.5465). Wild, from 1965, “was responsible 
for disbursing the cash” personally to “national political figures and was somewhat 
involved in making political payments in Texas” (McCloy et al. 1976, p.65). Those 
assisting Wild with political payments were advised to spend the money “in the general 
interest of Gulf and the oil industry” (McCloy et al. 1976, p.66). The money, in the form 
of cash, was taken from one of the Gulf Oil foreign subsidiary’s in the Bahamas.  
 
The subsidiary was in charge of oil exploration in the Caribbean area which “ended up 
as a vehicle for accumulating cash with which domestic political payments were made 
and for recording charges resulting from transfers of funds abroad for political 
purposes” (McCloy et al. 1976, p.4). It was liquidated in the fall of 1972 as Gulf had 
“embark[ed] on an overall cost-cutting program” and was eliminating offshore 
                                                             
13 In 1963, he “became the head of Gulf’s Government Relations Department in Washington” (McCloy et 
al. 1976, p.63). Wild was the company’s Vice President during 1968 to March 1974 and after his 
retirement he was “retained by Gulf on an emergency basis as a consultant in legislative matters” between 
1974 and 1975 (McCloy et al. 1976, p.63). 
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subsidiaries with unsuccessful drillings (McCloy et al. 1976, p.54; United States 1973b, 
Book 13). All of the Bahamian offshore companies were “folded into a single new 
offshore investment company located in the Bahamas called Midcaribbean Investments 
Limited” (McCloy et al. 1976, p.54). By liquidating Bahamas, “the mechanism 
successfully employed since 1960 for providing cash for corporate political 
contributions disappeared” (McCloy et al. 1976, p.55). The reason for using the foreign 
subsidiary was that it was not required to consolidate the accounts in the financial 
reports of Gulf Oil14. 
 
The Bahamas subsidiary internal control was non-existent in practice. The company’s 
operation “on its face was … abnormal … with a number of aspects which should have 
aroused the suspicion of any responsible control officer” (McCloy et al. 1976, p.220-
221). The only control over disbursement of the funds to Wild was the accountability of 
the person in charge to his superior. Based on the available documents, the 
arrangements were designed in a way “to eliminate all corporate controls over 
disbursement of the fund” (McCloy et al. 1976, p.203). During 1967 to 1972, internal 
and external audit checks and controls were not performed on the Bahamas subsidiary, 
despite the fact that the external auditor, Price Waterhouse and Co, “had some 
knowledge of certain unusual transactions in Ecuador and in Switzerland” and the off-
the-books accounts maintained in these countries (McCloy et al. 1976, p.208). Based on 
external auditors’ reports between 1960 and 1967, they had performed their normal 
audit procedures on the information (on-the-books accounts) they had access to which 
was limited and were not able to detect the concealed facts (McCloy et al. 1976). Lack 
                                                             
14 The company’s board of directors had assigned John McCloy, the chairman of the Gulf Special Review 
Committee, to prepare a comprehensive report in relation to foreign political contributions. The detail of 
this report is illustrated partly in this section and in the following sections. 
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of internal auditing was related to internal auditors not being “authorized to perform any 
auditing work at Gulf’s head office in Pittsburgh” (McCloy et al. 1976, p.209) and “lack 
of independence and structure” (McCloy et al. 1976, p.212).  
 
The fund transfers to the Bahamas bank account “were recorded as deferred charges 
rather than cash transfers” (McCloy et al. 1976, p.40). The deferred assets were then 
written off “at the direction of accounting advices sent from Pittsburgh … so that the 
transfer was cleared from balance sheet by year-end” (McCloy et al. 1976, p.53). The 
Bahamas books at no time maintained any  
record of either deposits or withdrawals from the account … nor did the 
company maintain as part of its records any bank statements or documents 
indicating that such an account existed and contained company funds (McCloy 
et al. 1976, p.42).  
The political contributions from these funds were maintained off-the books and 
recorded as part of the travel and entertainment or miscellaneous expense account. With 
no documentation or record keeping system in place for these expenditures, “[t]he 
accounting entries on the Bahamas Ex. Books were really fictitious” (McCloy et al. 
1976, p.221). To not “stir the water” in the corporation or “attract public attention” as 
stated by Wild, the contributions were paid in cash (United States 1973b, Book 13, 
p.5470). 
 
By 1973 the Finance Committee initiated requests of corporations to grant them 
authority to disclose the name of the contributors. Wild was contacted to disclose the 
names of employees who had contributed, as previously explained in this chapter. 
However, because of the seriousness of the situation the matter was discussed with the 
chairman of Gulf Oil and a letter was sent to the Finance Committee requesting a refund 
of the $100,000 (United States 1973b, Book 13). 
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3.2 Ashland Oil Co Inc 
Ashland Oil was one of the corporations approached prior to April 1972, to make a 
$100,000 political contribution and a payment of $10,000 for advertising in the 
Republican convention brochure (United States 1974, Final Report, p.459). The 
chairman of Ashland Oil, Atkins, assumed the contributions were to be made from the 
corporation’s fund, as $100,000 was “an awful lot of money” and it was not “practical 
to raise it from any other source” (United States 1973b, Book 13, p.5441). He knew the 
contribution was illegal but he viewed it “as somewhat analogous to the situation in 
prohibition, the Volstead amendment15, where it was more honored in the brief than by 
observation” (United States 1973b, Book 13, p.5442). In a letter to an Ashland Oil 
stakeholder, Atkins states “[t]here was a good business reason for making the 
contribution and, although illegal in nature, I am confident that it distinctively benefited 
the corporation and the stockholders” (United States 1973b, Book 13, p.5802). Atkins’s 
good business reason was to have competitive advantage over governmental policies. 
He argued,  
being a relatively unknown corporation despite our size we felt we needed 
something that would be sort of a calling card something that would get us in 
the door and make our point of view heard (United States 1973b, Book 13, 
p.5441). 
 
The contributions were paid from its African subsidiary account. The subsidiary was 
mainly in charge of oil exploration in Africa and not all of their oil drillings were 
successful. The contributions were recorded as a capitalisation of investments and 
expenditures in relation to the land being explored, called “undeveloped leasehold 
                                                             
15 Volstead Act, formally the National Prohibition Act, was enacted in 1919 to provide enforcement for 
the Eighteenth Amendment, prohibiting the production, sale and distribution of alcoholic beverages 
(http://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1901-1950/The-Volstead-Act/). 
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account” for the purpose of not writing the amount off for tax purposes (United States 
1973b, Book 13, p.5443). The money was transferred from a Swiss Bank so as to “not 
excite anybody's curiosity” in the U.S. (United States 1973b, Book 13, p.5444). As the 
payments were made prior to 7 April, Atkins assumed the contributions would “be 
secret and not disclosed” by the Finance Committee (United States 1973b, Book 13, 
p.5441). However, the Finance Committee later announced that Ashland Oil’s chairman 
and his wife were the sole contributors of the $100,000, which was without their 
consent. Ashland, similar to Gulf Oil, was another company writing to the Finance 
Committee claiming that it had paid illegal political contributions and requesting a 
refund of the money.  
 
3.3 Northrop Corp 
Northrop Corp had made a “sizable contribution” of $150,000 as requested from 
corporate funds to the re-election campaign in 1972 (United States 1974, Final Report, 
p.487). However, in response to the questionnaire that was sent by the Ervin Committee 
in regards to illegal contributions made out of corporate funds, the corporations’ vice 
presidents and CEO had claimed that the contributions were personal and that the 
corporation’s funds were not utilised. The investigations had revealed that $100,000 of 
the contributions, which was Northrop corporate funds, in the form of cheques and 
$50,000 in cash were made through Northrop’s European business advisor, Savy, who 
had “been remitting a portion of the Northrop money” (United States 1974, Final 
Report, p.487). The payment was recorded as “additional fees and other compensation” 
(United States 1974, Final Report, p.487).  
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As the contributions were going to be publicly disclosed by the Finance Committee, the 
CEO assured the authorities in charge, the funds were not paid from the corporation and 
refused the return of the monies. To conceal the origin of the payments, the CEO and 
vice presidents agreed to prepare fake documents, supporting documents, and 
“promissory notes backdated” to prior to April 1972 and payable by 1973 (United States 
1974, Final Report, p.488). To cover the payments made through Savy, the amount was 
to be recorded “as an advance made in contemplation of substantial new efforts … to 
market a particular Northrop aircraft to NATO countries” (United States 1974, Final 
Report, p.489). The CEO and vice president also prepared documentation to represent 
arrangements with Savy to return the unused portion of the funds. A portion of the 
money was supposedly returned with a correspondence explaining this refund as a result 
“of the failure of the contemplated marketing effort” (United States 1974, Final Report, 
p.489). Northrop’s CEO personally delivered the above documentation to the Finance 
Committee.  
 
3.4 American Ship Building Co 
The American Ship Building treatment of the political contributions was quite different 
from the above mentioned cases. The CEO and chairman of the company, Steinbrenner, 
had asked the treasurer and secretary to prepare a list of eight “trusted employees” to 
whom bonuses could be granted (United States 1973b, Book 13, p.5420). The bonus 
cheques were issued to employees to pay for the re-election campaign prior to April 
1972 (United States 1973b, Book 13). The cheques were deposited in their bank account 
and a personal cheque was issued for the political contributions. The bonuses were 
recorded as expenses in an account named “researcher claim” (United States 1973b, 
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Book 13, p. 5424). This account was not “presented for payment but rather taken as a 
deduction for tax purposes” (United States 1974, Final Report, p.453).  
 
This meant that the taxpayers were taking on the cost in part. Steinbrenner, based on the 
testimonies, had personally contributed $75,000 to the re-election campaign, which, 
according to the investigations, happened to be the same amount that he had received as 
a bonus payment 1.5 years beforehand (United States 1973b, Book 13, p. 5423-24). In 
total the American Ship Building Company had paid $100,000 in political contributions 
as it was said “the Republicans were going to win big” this time and it was important 
“to get with the right group” (United States 1974, Final Report, p.451). Because the 
company “was involved in two major matters with the Government” it had to make a 
substantial contribution as the payments of $25,000 or $50,000 would have been 
“amongst many, many thousands that … probably would be lost in the shuffle or 
wouldn’t be remembered” (United States 1974, Final Report, p.452). 
 
When the company was investigated by the FBI, the lawyer for the company told the 
employees to argue the money was their own and to state the payment was made due to 
their future interest in the ship building industry and “backing the Nixon administration 
which … helped the industry” (United States 1973b, Book 13, p.5409). As far as the 
bookkeeping was concerned, in 1973 the CEO requested false memos regarding a 
“legitimate bonus payment plan” for “cosmetic purposes”, to show the bonuses were 
paid for the extraordinary performance of a division of the company in 1971 and 1972 
(United States 1973b, Book 13, p.5425). The bonuses were approved by the board of 
directors. During 1973, the president of the American Ship Building Company made the 
employees sign a false statement, backdated to 1971 and 1972. The statement was about 
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the bonuses from the company being based on their performance and not connected 
with receiving any instruction from the company in using these bonuses for political 
organisations. The statement also indicated any political contribution made by these 
employees was “a bona fide one, made voluntarily of … [their] own choosing” (United 
States 1973b, Book 13, p.5425). Since the story was hitting the newspapers, the 
employees were anxious and so were asked to take some time off from work (United 
States 1974).  
 
 4. The SEC’s Voluntary Program  
As explained before, the above and similar cases were investigated by the Ervin 
Committee. The congressional hearings and testimonies relevant to these cases, during 
1972 to 1974, had created “great television fare” (Sporkin 1997, p.271). Head of the 
SEC’s Enforcement Division, Stanley Sporkin 16  was following these hearings via 
television as the corporate officers’ testimony was intriguing for him. From his 
viewpoint, “the committee [had] made no searching inquiry into the methodology used 
by the corporations to make the payments” (Sporkin 1997, p.271). He was also 
questioning “[h]ow did a publicly traded corporation record such an illegal transaction? 
What, if any, information did the outside auditors have?” (Sporkin 1997, p.271). 
 
Sporkin’s curiosity initiated an informal investigation which led the SEC in 1974 to 
inquire into corporations’ disclosure of illegal political contributions. The facts 
uncovered by the Special Prosecutor’s office and the Watergate Committee were 
reviewed by the SEC (Nelson 1976). It was revealed that the federal securities law was 
                                                             
16 Sporkin was licensed as a Certified Public Accountant (Sporkin 1997). 
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violated as financial records were falsified “to disguise or conceal the source and 
application of corporate funds misused” and secret payments were made “outside the 
normal financial accountability system” (Nelson 1976; United States 1976n, p.3). The 
magnitude of falsification of corporations’ books and records, as “the very foundation 
of the disclosure system” (United States 1976n, p.3), provoked the SEC as the 
“American’s corporate policeman” (United States 1976m, p.483) in 1975 to initiate its 
first Voluntary Disclosure Program (Brodsky et al. 2008). The program was established 
by Sporkin (Lacey & George 1997-1998; Sporkin 1997). Even though the Ervin 
Committee and other committees shed light on the illegal political payment 
contributions’, the SEC program led to “far broader disclosures of corporate 
wrongdoing that followed” (Stevenson 1976, p.53). 
 
The SEC was able to require corporations to submit information or reports in relation to 
foreign bribes and payoffs, based on its power under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1933 and 1934. The rule gave the SEC the power to ask corporations to provide 
“necessary or appropriate [information] in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors” (United States 1976i, p.69). However, the program was performed  
with minimum resources, using the strength of the private sector … to 
undertake the corrective action in cleansing the enterprises and in uncovering 
the past conduct and in bringing it out to the investor and the public through 
disclosure …[and] the voluntary programs that were started or engendered by 
the Commission’s suggestion (United States 1976l, p.9). 
 
Information gathered by corporations voluntarily, would have helped the SEC to 
investigate illegal payment cases further and in a timely fashion without having 
extensive staff. The SEC also had requested corporations to submit the information in 
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the form of publicly available reports such as the McCloy17 report that was prepared for 
the Gulf Oil Corporation. The details of the report will be explained in the following 
section of the chapter. In return the SEC promised lenient prosecution and enforcement 
action against volunteers. As the program progressed, guidelines and procedures were 
developed for corporations to undertake in order to disclose the illicit payments.  
 
The SEC initially “was subject to substantial criticism… on the grounds that [bribery] 
was the normal way of doing business abroad and that shareholders had no right to such 
information” (United States 1977d, p.1). Regardless, this rationale and similar ones 
were deemed to deserve examination by them. The SEC’s reaction to revelations 
pertaining to concealment of bribe payments and international corruption demonstrated 
that it was “the only [small independent] Agency … [not] asleep” (United States 1976l, 
p.9). On this matter, it seemed other Government agencies had been “sitting on their 
hands or aiding and abetting the payment of bribes and kickbacks” (United States 
1976a, p.39).  
 
The accounting profession and accounting bodies were passive on this matter, while the 
SEC program was along the lines of suppressing fraud (United States 1976m). Their 
lack of involvement, as will be extensively explained in chapter three, was partly due to 
the fact that the accounting profession was under pressure from the Congress. The 
pressure was in relation to its lack of competence in regulating members of the 
accounting and auditing profession, who demonstrated a lack of independence in 
performing audit procedures and standard setting processes (Holtzman 2004; United 
                                                             
17 John McCloy had a “distinguished record of Government service” (United States 1976i, p.3). 
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States 1976b; United States 1977a; Zeff 2003a). Chapter three will explain the issues 
and difficulties the accounting profession and accounting bodies were facing during the 
1970s. 
 
From the SEC’s perspective, the essential problem was in relation to the system of 
corporate accountability, where information was intentionally concealed from the board 
of directors and independent auditors (United States 1976a). Accordingly, the SEC 
mainly focused on “full and fair disclosure” with “the question of whether the funds 
were used for the payment of bribes to secure business helped [in] establish[ing] the 
materiality of the evidence” (Posadas 2000, p.351). The SEC relied on the “materiality 
doctrine”, which was based on a qualitative standard, for this matter (United States 
1976l, p.1). The rule was, disclosure of payments that were material to investors or 
related to wasting corporation’s assets. This meant not all the payments, regardless of 
their size, had to be disclosed even though the payment was “illegal under foreign law” 
(United States 1976l, p.7). These measures were based on the SEC’s tradition of 
assuring the financial statements accurately informed the public of all the material 
matters (United States 1976l). The then SEC chairman, Garbett, in a speech stated  
if we require disclosure of all violations of laws against bribery or political 
contributions on the ground that illegal payments are material per se, we may 
be hard pressed to explain that other illegal corporate acts are not equally 
material for the same reason (United States 1975a, p.60).  
 
However, the doctrine was questioned later by one of the Senators, William Proxmire18, 
as the SEC could not “quite define what sort of bribe is material under existing law, but 
                                                             
18 Extensive details about Proxmire will be provided in the following chapters. 
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they know it when they see it” (United States 1976l, p.2). The Commission’s chairman 
noted that the problem with defining the term ‘materiality’ was a matter they had been 
struggling with for many years. The committee had observed that it was “not possible to 
develop an objective definition of materiality that will have general applicability to all 
fact situations” (United States 1977e, p.322). Nonetheless, defining the term was “not 
the real issue” that had to be overcome in the hearings later held by Proxmire (United 
States 1976l, p.8). The real issue was establishment of new legislation, in relation to 
disclosure, to curb illicit payments, and to assure that this problem would be solved. 
 
The program required companies under the SEC rulings to conduct independent 
investigations of their past financial statements and reports. If the investigations 
suggested occurrence of illicit payments, the board of directors of the company had to 
be informed to modify the statements, consult with the SEC and also to authorise a 
complete investigation (United States 1976a). The complete investigation was to be 
undertaken “by a committee consisting of independent” members of its board of 
directors (United States 1976a, p.10). However, as will be detailed in chapter four, the 
reliance of the investigations on boards of directors was questioned by Proxmire and 
other witnesses present during one of the Senate hearings.  
 
The SEC had advised the corporations to seek assistance from their independent 
auditors in this regard. The SEC hoped investigations by corporate management with 
the assistance of independent auditors would be thorough and lead the board of directors 
to attempt to change and reiterate policy statements, and implement “adequate internal 
controls and safeguards” to be “monitored by auditing programs established by the 
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independent auditors” (United States 1976n, p.10). The program was viewed by the 
SEC as the “new governance concept” and believed it would help to “strengthen the 
quality of corporate management and public confidence in business over the long run” 
(United States 1976n, p.55-56). Hills19, SEC Chairman, stated that “the future is taken 
care of certainly in all the enforcement actions we brought simply by the fact that we 
changed the governance of the corporation” (United States 1976f, p.313).  
 
4.1 The McCloy Report  
As explained previously, the SEC had requested corporations to submit public reports in 
relation to details of their illicit payments. John McCloy was assigned as the chairman 
of the Gulf Oil Special Review Committee, by the company’s board of directors, to 
prepare a comprehensive report in relation to foreign political contributions in March 
1975 (United States 1975e). The SEC was mainly “interested in exploring the facts as to 
how such illegal activity could happen within the framework of a large corporation with 
built-in controls such as Gulf” and not just the methods used by Gulf Oil or any outside 
parties (United States 1975e, p.13). McCloy as a lawyer and a director of Gulf Oil since 
1969 (United States 1975e), previously was an advisor to President Nixon and during 
this time was a partner in Milbank, Tweed, Hadley and McCloy law firm (known as 
Milbank) in New York20. The report was subsequently presented at one of the Proxmire 
hearings explained in chapter four.  
 
                                                             
19 Roderick Hills served as the SEC’s chairman from 1975 to 1977. 
20 McCloy as a partner in Milbank, acted for the “Seven Sisters” (the leading multinational oil companies, 
including Gulf Oil), in their initial confrontations with the nationalisation movement in Libya, as well as 
negotiations with Saudi Arabia and OPEC (http://polioforever.wordpress.com/john-j-mccloy/). 
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The report was called “ the great oil spill” and covered around 13 years of contributions 
that “were paid out of an off-the-books account” amounting to around $5 million 
(McCloy et al. 1976; United States 1976i, p.5). The findings and recommendations were 
based on the evidence which the committee was able to discover as well as Ervin 
Committee investigations, explained briefly in this chapter, and Church Committee 
hearings, which will be demonstrated in the following chapters. The SEC did not expect 
McCloy “to audit Gulf Oil Corporation’s books and records” but to  
be free to conduct as full an investigation of the relevant facts as … deem[ed] 
necessary to provide the Commission and the investing public with an 
independent and thorough appraisal of matters (United States 1975e, p.21). 
 
The committee in charge devoted the majority of its efforts  
to the task of establishing the extent of knowledge, if any, among Gulf’s 
senior executives of the use of company funds for political activities, both in 
the United States and abroad (McCloy et al. 1976, p.224).  
The committee’s investigation in relation to the external auditors, Price Waterhouse and 
Co, was “limited to those matters which came to its attention in the course of its review 
of various specific transactions” (McCloy et al. 1976, p.205). Some of the material 
available to the committee made it clear the external auditors had knowledge of bribery 
and illicit payments, as explained previously in this chapter. Also, in the committee’s 
meeting with Price Waterhouse and Co, they received “certain materials … including a 
report summarizing their knowledge of Gulf political contributions, particularly the use 
of the Bahamas Ex. account”, the matter was not reviewed or investigated further 
(McCloy et al. 1976, p.23). 
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The committee, also, did not “investigate the nature of Gulf’s domestic political 
contributions” before 1958 (McCloy et al. 1976, p.61). This was because, the company 
in 1958 had announced that in the future it would “take an increasingly active interest in 
practical politics” which led to formation of “A Political Program for Gulf Oil 
Corporation” (McCloy et al. 1976, p.61). The program was partly rooted in Wild’s 
statement in relation to Gulf being kicked and “knocked around by the government for a 
long time and that the time had come to do something about it … to have its voice heard 
in government circles” (McCloy et al. 1976, p.63). 
 
Some of the foreign political payments “were either legal or customary where they were 
made, and they seem to have been in large part induced by pressure from governments 
or political parties concerned” (United States 1976i, p.5). The committee on this matter, 
had found that corporate funds which were “used abroad for political contributions or 
related expenses were so used to accomplish what was deemed to be a corporate 
purpose” and no evidence was found to suggest “such funds were recycled in any 
manner into the United States for the purpose of providing funds for domestic political 
contributions or related expenses” (McCloy et al. 1976, p.93). The Governments’ 
pressures for these payments were common in both underdeveloped and developed 
countries. For instance, in relation to Gulf dealings with South Korea, the company 
“had no desire to make” these payments (McCloy et al. 1976, p.103). The payments 
were initiated by the South Korean Government, so that Gulf would be able to “to 
prosper and do well” (McCloy et al. 1976, p.102). McCloy’s observation was that there 
was need for future guidelines for companies, since from his experience from preparing 
the report, “the barn door … [was] well fastened” (United States 1976i, p.7).  
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McCloy’s argument was that the SEC’s efforts while the voluntary program was in 
place, had been effective in the “alteration of attitudes” and doubted “any [need for] 
new substantive legislation” (United States 1976i, p.7). He believed in the movement 
that was taking place in U.S. corporations due to their “definite alertness and awareness 
to this whole problem that hasn’t existed before” (United States 1976i, p.14). 
Corporations’ “tone of the top management” had started reforms in industry (United 
States 1976i, p.14) which was ideal from McCloy’s perspective. Hence, there was no 
need for having a body or  
somebody … looking over the shoulder of the executives forever. … I believe 
the multinational corporations are highly desirable figures in our economy and 
it isn’t synonymous with vicious behavior (United States 1976i, p.15-16). 
McCloy felt corporations were over victimised as they were “just another American 
citizen” that in the process of disclosing their foreign payments had “shown alertness 
and strength” (United States 1976i, p.16). 
 
5. Conclusion 
The Ervin Committee prepared a final report in relation to the hearings that were held 
and detailing cases of corporations that had used foreign subsidiaries and banks to 
launder corporate funds in order to contribute to the Re-election Committee in cash 
(United States 1974, Final Report, p.567). The report also demonstrated the ability of 
the Re-election Campaign Committee to conceal the source of the money and the way it 
was used. This explains the way political powers can blind people in charge to forego 
“ethical considerations and legal requirements” (United States 1974, Final Report, 
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p.1102). As part of the investigations by the Ervin Committee the corporations were 
fined various amounts ($1,000-$5,000), which meant that the stakeholders were affected 
by these payments, even though they were not consulted in relation to the political 
contributions 
 
The final report also made recommendations in relation to enactment of new legislation. 
These recommendations were mainly related to the Presidential election process, 
limitation of public contributions in the form of cash and cheques to name a few. 
Accordingly, there was a need for the SEC and the accounting profession to step in and 
investigate the lack of disclosure or accounting processes used by corporations. Also, as 
the independent auditors had not detected these false recordings, action by the 
accounting standard setting body of the time was required and necessary.  
 
The SEC initiated its first Voluntary Disclosure Program under Stanley Sporkin’s 
supervision, in 1975. The program requested corporations to conduct independent 
investigations and disclose their material illicit and questionable payments made 
domestically and internationally. Companies’ concealment of information from boards 
of directors, shareholders, and external auditors was alleged to be the shortcomings of 
the system of corporate accountability. The program helped the SEC and the Congress 
to compose the accounting provisions of the proposed bills leading to the FCPA, as well 
as strengthening the aim of the networks that were created by Senators during the 
1970s. However, as will be argued in subsequent chapters, the proposed reforms had 
“not moved to the Senate floor” promptly and even if they did, they had “rather low 
priority in the Congress and there … [would be] no priorities in the White House to 
push for these changes” (United States 1976i, p.17). The accounting profession, as 
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having their own network and separate from the congressional attempts, also had turned 
a blind eye to these concerns and had not initiated any new auditing or accounting 
standards or even a study in this regard.   
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Chapter Three: The 
Accounting Profession’s 
Reaction to the Scandals  
 
The story of the apocryphal accountant who, when asked the sum of 2 plus 2 replied, “Well 
what did you have in mind?” Mark Twain suggested: “Things are bad when you’re publicly 
criticized; things are disastrous when you’re laughed at.” (cited in United States 1977a, p.17). 
 
Chapter two demonstrated the response of the 1970s Congress to the public outcry 
regarding the issues surrounding the Watergate scandal. During this time period, 
investigations and hearings were held in relation to the scandal which shed light on 
multinational corporations’ concealment of domestic and foreign political contributions 
and foreign bribes. The illicit payments made by executives, in a majority of instances, 
were not discussed by the board of directors or independent auditors. As far as the 
accounting treatment of these funds is concerned, the political payments if recorded in 
the company’s books, were either recorded as an expense or bonuses to employees and 
executives. The Ervin committee’s questioning opened a can of worms in relation to 
record keeping and corporate accountability to the public. These revelations kindled the 
interest of the SEC in finding out the way these corporations were able to hide their 
wrong doing from the public, accounting profession and independent auditors. The 
issues exposed were at the heart of accounting and auditing standard setting, disclosure 
requirements and reliability of financial statements.  
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As explained in the introduction chapter, during this time period the accounting 
profession was under pressure by the Congress because of its lack of competency in 
setting accounting and auditing standards as well as lack of independence in performing 
accounting and auditing services. In this context and based on ANT, it can be observed 
that the accounting profession and the big eight accounting firms had formed allies and 
their own network to avoid any government interference in the standard setting process. 
The aim of the network was to retain its power and ability to self-reform and self-
regulate. As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, the networks that were 
created or re-created in relation to the problem of illicit payments were not supported or 
combined with the network already formed by the accounting profession. The 
accounting profession network, however, had not been successful in responding to 
public criticisms and resolution of fundamental accounting issues, leading to 
government supported inquiries during the 1970s, 1980s and even during 2000 after the 
Enron scandals. The inquiries were generally related to the “need for greater 
accountability” and independence of auditors in their work (United States 1976b, 
p.105), since as corporations have grown larger, the level of accountability advocated 
by the profession and the accounting firms has diminished (United States 1976b). As 
will be explained in this chapter, in response to these criticisms, the accounting 
profession was prompted to establish task forces to investigate the matters raised in 
response to the revelation of illicit payments by corporations. 
 
Repetition of the inquiries over time and details of those inquiries are demonstrated in 
this chapter. From analysis of successive inquiries it can be deduced, asserted reforms 
instituted by the accounting profession were sometimes rushed, and mainly constituted 
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cosmetic changes to show that some adjustments had been made. However, there was 
no fundamental improvement. The aim of the accounting profession was to maintain 
their system of self-regulation and avoid additional regulation by Congress. This was 
achievable by the accounting profession, since the American Institute of CPAs (AICPA) 
“as the dominant private accounting organization” had “extended its power and 
influence beyond its position … through close relationships with Federal agencies and 
State boards of Accountancy that regulate the accounting profession” (United States 
1976b, p.70). It had advocated for Federal officials and the public “to lower their 
expectations” in relation to corporate accountability “through legislative and publicity 
campaigns to re-educate the public” based on this lower standard (United States 1976b, 
p.69). The other issue was the ability of the AICPA to make decisions “in the 
backroom”, while claiming to be acting in the name of protecting the public interest 
(United States 1977a, p.379).  
 
This chapter will explain the events surrounding the accounting profession being under 
public scrutiny prior to the Watergate scandal, as well as the impact of congressional 
“post-Watergate morality” (Koehler 2012, p.938). The explained events demonstrates 
the accounting profession’s conspicuous absence and low profile in the congressional 
investigations and hearings that led to the FCPA. The absence of the accounting 
profession can partly be explained by their perception, the self-regulation and disclosure 
system was “second to none in the world” and their lack of eagerness to change the 
system in place (United States 1977a, p.98). The other reason as stated by Olson (1982, 
p.33), a former president of the AICPA, could be that “the Institute’s Washington office 
was ill-prepared to cope with the increased governmental pressures” during the 1970s. 
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Also, up to this time, the AICPA dealings with the Congress were mainly “confined to 
the expression of views on proposed tax legislation” (Olson 1982, p.35). 
 
During this time period, Congress was purportedly searching for a solution to the 
problem of corporations’ illicit and political contributions that had revealed apparent 
accounting and audit deficiencies. It is important to highlight the problems and 
deficiencies raised in relation to the accounting profession, in order to set the context 
and environment in which the illicit payment hearings and proposed legislation were 
established. For this reason, this chapter will address the deficiencies and issues with the 
accounting profession commencing with the dismantling of the Accounting Principles 
Board (APB) during the 1970s. 
 
1. Initial Concerns with the Standard Setting Process 
During the 1970s, as briefly explained in the introduction chapter, a push for replacing 
the APB was evident. The APB was initially established in 1959 after criticism of the 
accounting guidelines and principles for “preparation and certification of financial 
statements” (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 1972, p. 17). The 
criticisms were in relation to alternative accounting methods or the absence of 
acceptable alternatives. The AICPA, as “the most powerful and influential force in 
shaping the environment in which accountants operate” (United States 1976b, p.70), 
established the APB with dual purpose. The purposes were “the elaboration of a 
conceptual framework and the development of positions with regard to specific 
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accounting principles and practices” (Sommer 1974, p.5). However, “the conceptual 
framework took a secondary role” (Sommer 1974, p.5).  
 
The Board was mainly in charge of setting accounting standards, while the SEC had the 
“right to reject or modify … [its] pronouncements” (American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants 1972, p.25). The SEC, during the existence of the APB, issued 
pronouncements regarding “matters of accounting practice”, comprising “Accounting 
Series Releases or opinions of the Chief Accountant … considered … to be 
interpretative rules” or statements of policy (American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants 1972, p.51). However, by the mid-1960s the APB was facing problems and 
criticisms of its accomplishments and structure. The handling and completion of 
research projects pertaining to pronouncements and standards, was time-consuming. Its 
“opinions became less and less animated by theoretical concepts and more and more by 
the pragmatic necessities of gaining two-thirds majority of the Board” (Sommer 1974, 
p.5).  
 
The processes and means by which standards, and principles were established were 
moving towards not being “content to express opinions” but to issue “hard-and-fast 
rules and directives” (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 1972, p.37). 
This led the pronouncements to “become increasingly lengthy, detailed and subject to 
controversy” (Sommer 1974, p.5). For instance by 1969, the board issued Opinion 
number 15 in relation to “common stock equivalents and related matters on earnings per 
share” (Sterling 1974a, p.318). The rule was a detailed sixty one page document, 
replacing a one sentence principle in relation to the same matter. Savoie (1974a, p.318) 
criticised the detailed ruling claiming it to be plugging loopholes “to provide a safe 
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haven for an accountant who follows them”. The issues of concern were partly due to 
the structure of membership being part time and unpaid which meant that there were 
minimal opinions released by the members on the matters at hand. This caused the 
board to lose “opportunities to educate the accounting profession as well as the entire 
financial reporting community” (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1972, p.38). Nevertheless, the SEC was unable to use this opportunity “to prod itself 
from its spectator role and to take charge” (United States 1977a, p.25). The SEC’s 
performance was largely “ceremonial and caretaker” and it preferred to step in only 
when it felt that the accounting profession did not have the capabilities which was rare 
(United States 1977a, p.26).  
 
Also, the board operations were “on an ad hoc basis” (United States 1977a, p.25). Based 
on the observation of Burns (1974b, p.332), three quarters of “the research studies 
published by the APB through 1972 were started” in earlier years, 1960 and 1961 and 
since then, no new studies was started or undertaken. The espoused reason for this 
included the “rapid expansion of accounting firms …, the development of increasingly 
complex and innovative business practices, and the corporate merger movement” 
(American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 1972, p.3). Business Combination 
accounting, for example, was one of the two topics that became a “highly controversial 
and emotion-charged issue” between 1963 to 1971 (Sterling 1974a, p.318). At the time, 
the topic was widely debated since corporations had “an eye towards instantaneous 
growth in earnings” (United States 1977a, p.25; United States 1985). In order “to create 
higher stock market prices” (United States 1977a, p.25; United States 1985), 
corporations pushed for the pooling of interest method. This method in comparison to 
the APB’s preferred purchase method, would not have accounted for goodwill and 
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would have allowed the combined company to report and reinstate the acquired 
company’s prior period incomes as their own income, leading to inflating company 
earnings (Briloff 1972). The APB was under intense pressure by the industry and the 
accounting profession to back away from abolishing the pooling of interest approach. 
According to Savoie (1974a, p.325) “some groups wrote to key congressional 
committees suggesting this subject should more appropriately be left to the legislative 
and regulatory functions of the federal government”.  
 
The criticisms surrounded the APB’s “inability to solve the abuse of the pooling of 
interests accounting for business combination technique” regarding the merger 
movement (United States 1985, Part 1, p.22). The body was not able to rule out the 
pooling method and by the 1970s issued two separate Opinions simultaneously, one 
relating to Business Combination and the other to Goodwill and Intangible Assets 
(Briloff 1972). The reason for the issue of two Opinions was because the APB required 
a vote from “one of the major firms” to reach “the required twelve affirmative votes” 
(Briloff 1972, p.89). The firm was in agreement with the Business Combination 
Opinion without the inclusion of Intangible Assets or Goodwill. This controversy and 
inability of the APB to reconcile the issue, resulted in the standard for Business 
Combination to be split into two separate Opinions with loopholes and loose 
requirements (United States 1977a). It also eventually lead to the abandonment of the 
APB which “was essentially closing the door after the horse had left” (United States 
1977a, p.25).  
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2. The FASB Establishment 
The above concerns and the AICPA’s attempt to resolve the issue in house and as part 
of their formed network, led to establishment of the Wheat Committee. The committee 
prepared a report called ‘Establishing Financial Accounting Standards’. One of the 
recommendations of the report was the establishment of the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB), as a new actor of the profession’s network, and a self-
regulatory board, independent of government with the AICPA and non-AICPA 
members. Mattli and Buthe (2005, p.409) described the FASB as “a novel structure of 
private-sector standardization that represented a bold experiment in self-regulation, with 
both legislative and judicial qualities”. The AICPA touted the formation of the FASB as 
a “major, even revolutionary, shift” in accounting standard setting (United States 1977a, 
p.123). This point of view was probably announced to eliminate any government 
intervention. The recommendation was based on the committee’s conclusion that it was  
essential that the private sector standard-setting body become more actively 
and intimately involved with the concerns of agencies of government which 
may possess the power to override its standards in areas of their jurisdiction, 
demonstrating to them, in turn, that usefulness to investors must be the basic 
consideration in financial reporting (American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants 1972, p.54). 
 
The FASB, in practice, gave the AICPA the assurance of retaining its authority over 
setting accounting standards within the private sector. It was established and organised 
in a fashion to ensure it would “be responsive to the private interests of the groups that 
have created it” (United States 1976b, p.130) as the decisions were “made behind closed 
doors by private parties with a vested interest in the outcome” (United States 1976b, 
p.136). In theory, the AICPA was claiming otherwise, by stating that the final authority 
for establishing accounting standards, was with the FASB which was “independent of 
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the institute” and no longer in the hands of “[t]he Institute and practicing accountants” 
(United States 1977a, p.123). 
 
The AICPA was the only private organisation that “could create a body to set 
accounting standards and immediately bestow upon it the reputation of being [an] 
accepted source of authority within the private sector” (United States 1976b, p.157). 
Meanwhile, the SEC’s then chairman believed that “reliance on the private sector for 
solving financial measurement problems … [had over the past years] served investors 
well” and the pursuit of this policy was the way forward (Garrett 1973, p.5). The big 
eight accounting firms, as actors of the network, accepted the FASB pronouncements 
and standards from its establishment and “agreed to a system of enforced compliance 
with” them (United States 1976b, p.157). 
 
The Wheat committee report also proposed paid and full time members for the FASB as 
opposed to the part-time, unpaid APB members to maintain a sound standard setting 
function in the private sector. The AICPA played “a key role in selecting its members” 
(United States 1976b, p.13). The FASB was structured to be operated by a non-profit 
corporation called the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) which was operating 
under the AICPA and private interest groups such as the American Accounting 
Association21, the National Association of Accountants22 to name a few (United States 
1976b). This structure was created to have the FASB establish accounting standards in a 
way that would appear to be independent, unlike the APB, “to boost its credibility 
                                                             
21 The American Accounting Association was “influenced by the big eight accounting firms through 
financial support and individual membership (United States 1976b, p.26). 
22 The AICPA had extensive influence over the National Association of accountants as well. 
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beyond that of the previous standard-setting bodies within the private sector” (United 
States 1976b, p.142). The then Chairman of the FASB, Armstrong23, as an actor of the 
network, was certain that “the spirit of independence” was driving the boards functions 
(United States 1977a, p.176). 
 
As argued before, the independence and separation of the FASB was “one in name 
only” (United States 1976b, p.15). On the one hand, it represented “only the interests of 
its private sponsoring groups” (United States 1976b, p.19). On the other hand, the 
private interest groups, business groups, the accounting profession and the AICPA were 
in charge of financing the FASB’s operations and expenditures (Mattli & Buthe 2005; 
Sommer 1974; United States 1976b). These contributions were the means of controlling 
and aligning the activities of the FASB with their interest. For instance, business groups 
could have pushed for their demands and interest through the voluntary donations they 
made to the FAF which confirmed the FASB’s “continuing financial viability” (Mattli 
& Buthe 2005, p.410). This control from large accounting firms was seen as an 
opportunity to “increase their … image with the public and with their clients” (United 
States 1977a, p.375). The primary contributions were from the AICPA with the large 
accounting firms donating “about half of the money contributed” (United States 1976b, 
p.14). However, the AICPA claimed that their opinion “is no different from any other 
group having opinions about financial accounting standards” and that their “advice does 
not prevail” (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 1977, p.17) 
 
                                                             
23 He was the chairman of the FASB until end of 1977. 
68 | P a g e  
 
As stated by the SEC’s then chairman, Garrett, the FASB was “the offspring of the 
accounting profession and the profession has the right to be proud of it” and that “the 
board is pursuing a logical course, that its members and staff have been well selected 
and … its institutional structure is sound” (Garrett 1973, p.4). The Commission’s 
recognition of the FASB was based on its professed belief that it “would provide an 
institutional framework … [permitting] prompt and responsible actions flowing from 
research and consideration of varying viewpoints” (United States 1976b, p.177). 
However, not everyone was in agreement with Garrett after the FASB began operations. 
Senator Lee Metcalf, Congressman Moss and Associate Professor Robert Chatov24 were 
among the many who questioned the FASB’s legitimacy and authority and were the 
outside actors to the accounting profession’s network.  
 
Senator Metcalf, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on reports, accounting, and 
management, argued that the formation of the FASB was an AICPA attempt to respond 
to the major problems the accounting profession was facing. The FASB was established 
with the hope of achieving “serious reform by establishing a system of uniform and 
meaningful accounting standards” (United States 1976b, p.16). However, it “resulted in 
[an] …. inadequate system of establishing accounting standards” (United States 1976b, 
p.12) which “affect[ed] the Federal Government and the public” (United States 1976b, 
p.13). Also, as the FASB was established to be independent, the private interest groups 
were not “suited to control the setting of accounting standards” (United States 1976b, 
p.13). Accordingly, Metcalf, in 1976, initiated a study in relation to “organizations and 
                                                             
24 He had authored a book in 1975 called “Corporate Financial Reporting: Public or Private Control” 
(United States 1977a, p.20). 
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agencies comprising the accounting establishment” (United States 1976b, p.iv). The 
details of the study and their key findings are discussed below. 
 
3. The Accounting Establishment Study 
The Senate Subcommittee on reports, accounting, and management “began a study of 
the federal government’s role in establishing accounting practices” in 1975 (United 
States 1976b, p.iii), since “[a]ccounting issues … [were] too important to be left to 
accountants alone” (United States 1976b, p.2). It was  
the first time in nearly forty-five years … [that] the purposes behind corporate 
financial reporting … [were] carefully examined as [well as] …the system 
which controls and implements the development of financial standards (United 
States 1977a, p.38).  
The study was “centered on improving the auditing and financial reporting of large 
publicly-owned corporations” (United States 1977a, p.4). Achieving a meaningful 
disclosure by corporations and adequate accounting practices were important to the 
Congress and for this reason a review of the accounting establishment was “long 
overdue” (United States 1976b, p.iv).  
 
The study’s report comprised eleven chapters and included recommendations for the 
accounting profession as per the findings and chapter details. The focus of the chapters 
was on the operations and influences of the big eight accounting firms, the AICPA, the 
FASB, and the SEC on one another and their role in setting accounting standards. The 
two major findings of the study were in relation to the SEC delegation of  
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its public authority and responsibilities on accounting matters to private groups 
with obvious self-interests … [as well as] lack of independence and … 
dedication … shown by the large accounting firms which perform the key 
function of independently certifying the financial information reported by 
major corporations to the public (United States 1976b, p.v). 
The findings were related historically to the issue “that the public interest … [had] not 
[been] well served by leaving the setting of accounting principles and auditing standards 
solely in the hands of the accounting profession” as was stated by Congressman Moss, a 
member of the House of Representatives for 26 years from 1953 (United States 1977a, 
p.15).  
 
The study findings and recommendations were mainly agreed to by the smaller 
accounting firms such as Alexander Grant & Company. The AICPA instead argued that 
“there is a total lack of evidence that adoption of the recommendations in the staff study 
would remedy any of the alleged faults” (American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants 1977, p.6) and the study showed “no relationship between the charges 
against the profession, its bodies, and the SEC, and the business failures and misleading 
financial statements mentioned” (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
1977, p.12). It was believed by the AICPA that the cases and concerns that were 
mentioned in the staff study were “totally groundless” (American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants 1977, p.2). As mentioned in the introduction chapter, the AICPA 
prepared a report in response to the recommendations and suggestions. In their opening 
section it was stated 
[w]e believe that the record of the profession refutes the principal charges 
levelled at the Institute, the accounting profession, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board and the Securities and Exchange Commission in the staff 
study and shows that such charges are not supported by the study (American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants 1977, p.2).  
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The AICPA report emphasised “the substantial efforts” of the accounting profession in 
the past and the present in avoiding “repetitions of past problems, as well as [the need] 
to anticipate new problems” (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 1977, 
p.2). 
 
As will be detailed in this chapter, the Accounting Establishment study 
recommendations were not fully implemented by the accounting profession or the SEC. 
The AICPA concluded that the study findings had failed to recognise “the tremendous 
efforts … made by the accounting profession to eliminate as far as humanly possible the 
causes of misleading financial statements” (United States 1977a, p.114). Such efforts 
were explained to be undertaken by the Auditing Standards Executive Committee25 by 
strengthening auditing standards and clarification of auditors responsibilities (United 
States 1977a, p.115). A remarkable fact is that the Auditing Standards Executive 
Committee was controlled entirely by the AICPA while the FASB had nothing to do 
with auditing standards. Accordingly, as will be explained in chapter seven, due to 
corporate failures and fraud, in 1983 hearings were held regarding similar issues with 
the accounting profession and the staff study was praised as being “the most meaningful 
and complete report ever published with respect to the practice of public accounting” 





                                                             
25 This Committee was in charge of establishing auditing standards. 
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3.1 The Accounting Establishment Study’s Findings 
 
3.1.1 SEC’s Power in Setting Standards 
The first finding of the study related to the SEC distancing itself from the “extensive 
power given … by congress” and transferring its power of developing accounting and 
auditing standards to the private sector (United States 1976b, p.175). The Metcalf study 
pointed out that the public suffering from economic losses as a result of corporations 
reporting financial information which was “false and misleading” (United States 1976b, 
p.176), was related to the SEC failure to exercise its power and reliance on the private 
sector in establishing accounting standards. The SEC position was viewed to be 
protecting “the privileged position of the AICPA and its standard-setting bodies, rather 
than to protect the public from improper accounting practices” (United States 1976b, 
p.175). 
 
The shift in power to the private sector, had led the SEC to avoid “making difficult 
decisions on developing accounting standards in the public interest” (United States 
1976b, p.109). The SEC had only retained its “direct initiative in accounting and 
auditing standard rulemaking for only 27 months … from its inception in October, 
1934” and had never “tried to regain its authorities”, even though it was not approved 
by the Congress (United States 1985, Part 1, p.20). The reason was that the SEC, in a 
majority of cases, had taken the position “toward ambiguity” (United States 1985, Part 
1, p.21). This was because of the “constant level of recalcitrance and hostility” the 
practicing accountants had towards the commission, which would lead to the SEC not 
always specifying “what had to be disclosed, and how”, while putting “the 
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responsibility upon the reporting group to disclose whatever was material” (United 
States 1985, Part 1, p.21). The FASB at the same time was not achieving anything 
significant. From its inception, the FASB avoided development of more controversial 
issues and “comprehensive accounting approach as well as uniform accounting 
principles, preferring the ad hocism long established” (United States 1985, Part 1, p.69). 
 
Instead the AICPA had become “the authoritative source on accounting [and auditing] 
standards within the private sector” (United States 1976b, p.156). For the AICPA to 
keep the SEC enrolled in its network it was important to keep the relationship between 
them tight, by having the SEC Commissioners heading the AICPA study groups or 
becoming members of the AICPA (United States 1976b; United States 1977a). The 
AICPA was “careful to protect its enviable relationship with the SEC” (United States 
1976b, p.109) as the close relationship meant development of “similar perspectives, 
sympathies, and understandings” (United States 1977a, p.22). This close relationship 
implied a similar relationship between the SEC and the FASB which was “controlled by 
the Big Eight and other large national accounting firms” (United States 1976b, p.174). It 
was “the revolving door between regulatory agencies and the firms they regulate” 
(United States 1977a, p.18).  
 
This endorsement for the AICPA meant “the stamp of Federal Government approval” 
and the standards they set were “accepted as authoritative … because of the expertise 
and impartiality which have been associated with the image of the accounting 
profession and its institutions” (United States 1976b, p.156). The system in place, for 
setting standards, was approved by the AICPA, as neither the public, investors nor the 
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SEC members had complained about this cosy relationship (United States 1977a). The 
chairman of the AICPA board argued that the system was sound and was serving the 
public well and “holds the promise of functioning even better in the future” (United 
States 1977a, p.100). 
 
The SEC had defended the shift of standard setting powers to the private sector, which 
was argued by the study to be adversely affecting the public. This was firstly because, 
the purpose of standards designed would not be to protect the public or investors as was 
claimed by the AICPA (United States 1976b, p.175). Secondly, since the SEC delegated 
setting auditing standards to the private sector, it had “no procedures designed to verify 
whether independent auditors … [were] performing their duties properly” as well as 
periodic reviews of the “accuracy, competence, and thoroughness” of their work 
(United States 1976b, p.182). The SEC even had “opposed legislation which would 
have enabled the General Accounting Office (GAO) to verify the accuracy of 
independent audits for oil and gas companies” (United States 1976b, p.175).  
 
Based on the findings of the study in relation to the standard for oil and gas companies, 
“the SEC joined with the FASB and the AICPA in lobbying the Congress to leave the 
establishment of such standards to the FASB” (United States 1976b, p.175). The SEC 
was more concerned the credibility of the FASB was not eroded or threatened by the 
actions of Congress in relation to this standard than the “failure of the FASB and its 
predecessors to establish proper [and uniform] accounting standards for oil and gas 
companies during the past 40 years” (United States 1976b, p.175). This represented the 
success of the profession’s network in enrolling and capturing of the SEC, even though 
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the FASB had stated as part of their 1974 annual report that it “has neither a mandate 
nor a motive to attempt to influence legislation” (Cited in United States 1976b, p.168). 
Until then, the FASB and its predecessor, the APB, due to influences by the accounting 
profession and corporations, had failed in their primary responsibility of establishing 
uniform accounting standards “which was the impetus for Congressional action” 
(United States 1976b, p.169). 
 
In another instance, to show their respect for the accounting profession, the SEC 
“withdrew [their] proposed auditing standards” relating to clarifying auditors 
responsibilities in relation to larger corporations preparing more frequent financial 
reporting statements (United States 1976b, p.1444). The SEC reasoning was that the 
profession had “come up with satisfactory procedures of its own” (Olson 1982; United 
States 1976b, p.1444). In keeping the SEC enrolled in the network, the AICPA’s 
response to the SEC’s recommendation about “significant expansions of auditors’ 
responsibilities”, was to “be taken very seriously by the profession” (American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants 1977, p.28). To overcome these problems, 
Congressman Moss suggested the establishment of a “framework for the setting of 
accounting principles and auditing standards” by the SEC that would force the 
profession “to issue pronouncements within this framework” (United States 1977a, 
p.15). His suggestions were to “blend the expertise” by retrieving SEC’s authority in 
acting “on its own initiative in appropriate circumstances” in reviewing the 
pronouncements that were adopted (United States 1977a, p.15). 
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Loomis, SEC commissioner, in a letter to the House of Representatives argued the 
SEC’s direct involvement in establishing these standards would “undermine a long 
standing and successful policy of relying upon the private sector” (Cited in United 
States 1976b, p.1437). He continued to argue that the area was highly complex and 
required an extensive time frame and it required the FASB to take over. In this regard, 
the FASB took charge of the standards and it followed its normal procedures for 
establishing a committee consisting of “representatives from big oil, gas, and mining 
companies, their Big Eight auditors, and large institutional investors” to put together the 
standard (United States 1976b, p.170).  
 
The FASB’s reliance on the industry in providing expertise led to “an intense lobbying 
effort by the industry” (Cortese 2011, p.19). This was apparent from the review of the 
accounting establishment study that the standards established by the FASB from its 
formation were “following in the same direction as previous AICPA standard-setting 
bodies” (United States 1976b, p.170). The study recommended the SEC “reclaim its 
public regulatory authority” (United States 1977a, p.5), while the FASB chairman 
argued “[i]f the SEC rulemaking procedure were to be imposed on top of … [their] due 
process, the FASB’s effectiveness … would be significantly challenged” (United States 
1976b, p.169). The AICPA also argued that this recommendation was not sound as 
“governmental agency might be less effective, since it would not have as readily 
available the experience of the profession in identifying problem areas” (American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants 1977, p.29). 
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3.1.2 Big Eight Professional Responsibilities 
The focus of the second finding of the study was on the big eight accounting firms and 
their performance in discharging their professional responsibilities. These firms had 
extraordinary influence over corporations and the Government as excessive 
concentration existed among big eight firms in supplying auditing and accounting 
services. This was the result of an increase in “corporate mergers” and companies going 
public and a growing need for utilising larger accounting firms were rising (United 
States 1976b, p.7 and p.45). Elliott a former AICPA member, described the move 
towards the large accounting firms as being due to their attractive offering of “creative 
accounting” for their clients or providing an auditing opinion which was a “clean 
certificate” (United States 1977a, p.384). Their size had assisted them “in resisting 
enforcement” as well as creating an opportunity “to make informal contact with 
potential clients” (United States 1977a, p.720). They, in comparison to smaller firms, 
were the most influential groups in relation to controlling “virtually all aspects of 
accounting and auditing in the United States” (United States 1976b, p.25). This 
domination and power of the big eight accounting firms was refuted by the AICPA. The 
AICPA’s reasoning, that they wanted the public to believe in utilising big eight 
accounting firms, was that auditing a large international company required a large 
accounting firm to meet the needs and requirements of the auditing process (American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants 1977; United States 1976b).  
 
The CPAs associated with these large accounting firms, were treated less “harshly by 
the SEC” even though “their appearance of independence” was compromised in relation 
to their services to publicly-owned corporations (United States 1977a, p.7). Elliott 
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agreed with the argument, that “the big eight technically, seem[ed] to be immune to 
discipline” as he had never witnessed “a firm being brought to bar, being brought to 
book” (United States 1977a, p.374). He argued that at times the SEC had closed their 
eyes on the review of “some rather loose accounting” treatments by these firms which 
“no small firm could possibly manage” (United States 1977a, p.385). Even if there was 
a lawsuit in this regard, he claimed that “some little guy underneath … [would be] 
thrown to the wolves, a senior accountant, a management accountant …[and] get 
indicted and suspended, and the firm rolls on” (United States 1977a, p.374).  
 
Figure 1 demonstrates the large accounting firms self-interest and domination in the 
accounting standard setting system which in 
return benefits them by enhancing “the value of 
their services to clients by permitting more 
flexibility in reporting financial results to the 
Federal Government and the public” (United 
States 1976b, p.19; United States 1977a). Also 
the figure explains that the accounting firm’s 
employees and the FASB were “drawn from the 
same pool” as it would be irrational “to assume that independence takes place because 
of an occupational change” (United States 1977a, p.27). Senator Metcalf was concerned 
that the auditors had “lost sight of the fact that the public is their real client, as well as 
the ultimate source of accounting fees” (United States 1977a, p.7). A similar argument 
was made by the SEC’s Chief Commissioner in 1936 in accusing the accounting 
profession of being loyal to management rather than “their responsibilities to the 
Figure 1 
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investors” (United States 1977a, p.69). Nevertheless, the AICPA felt that the accounting 
profession had “compiled an excellent record of public responsibility” and that their 
“concern for the public interest has never been stronger than” at this time (United States 
1977a, p.103). Being the independent auditor of a large corporation in the U.S., they 
also had the power to “affect the Federal Government and its programs” (United States 
1976b, p.48). 
 
The accounting establishment study had found that the management advisory services 
by big eight firms were “the primary problem area regarding the services offered” 
(United States 1976b, p.50). As this duty requires auditors to be involved in the 
management information system which conflicts with their obligation to act 
independently in their dealings with their clients. The auditors were bound by the 
AICPA code of professional ethics when conducting management advisory services. 
This service indicated real independence did not exist as accounting firms were 
providing “both accounting and management advisory services”, putting them in the 
position of “possible temptation to bend the accounting and auditing services to validate 
or fulfil a promise or advice” (United States 1977a, p.26). This non-accounting 
management advisory service was encouraged by the AICPA, the large accounting 
firms’ clients as well as the auditing firms increasing their profits. Since from the early 
1970s the audit market had become “largely saturated … [and t]o compensate, the firms 
aggressively broadened the scale and scope of their consulting practices” (Zeff 2003b, 
p.271). Even though the Association of Consulting Management Engineers (ACME), 
which consisted of independent management consulting firms, had been mainly 
responsible for performing this services for the past 100 years (United States 1977a). 
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The large accounting firms with their “unique insider position” were successful in 
performing these services and even dominating this part of the profession (United States 
1977a, p.696).   
 
The study confirmed the loyalty of these firms was first “to managements of corporate 
clients who retain them and authorize payment of their fees” which could lead to the 
problem of performing “defective audits” (United States 1976b, p.68). However, the 
study findings on this subject were denied by the AICPA. Since there was “no evidence 
that the performance of these services … [were] compromised [by] any auditor” or that 
their independence was impaired (United States 1977a, p.112). On the contrary, the 
services were argued to have assisted auditors “to learn more about the client, its 
internal controls, the quality of its … operations, knowledge that is helpful to the 
performance of the audit function” (United States 1977a, p.112). The AICPA was 
certain that the accounting firms had “sophisticated systems” in place to insure their 
“compliance with standards of independence” that were “rigidly enforced” by the 
AICPA (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 1977, p.29; United States 
1977a, p.113), taking into account that “[i]ndependence essentially is a state of mind 
and not something that can be measured with precision” (American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants 1977, p.29; United States 1977a, p.135).  
 
3.2 Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and Management 
In April, May and June 1977 hearings were held in relation to the accounting 
establishment study, after it was completed and distributed to the public. The hearings 
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were described by the then AICPA chairman, Chetkovich, to be held “during a time 
period when the roles and the performance of all of our institutions are being 
questioned, probed and tested for their adequacy” (United States 1977a, p.98). The 
purpose of the hearings was to assure the financial reports of corporations, which were 
independently audited, were “accurately and meaningfully” incorporating accounting 
practices and reflecting the “substance of corporate activities” (United States 1977a, 
p.1). The system of self-policing by the accounting profession was considered to be 
facing serious deficiencies and had raised questions regarding its ability to continue into 
the future. It required reform in its auditing and accounting procedures and 
establishment of standards. As one of the senior partners in Price Waterhouse and Co, 
Biegler26, claimed  
the problem is not with the auditing and accounting standards themselves, or 
with the methods by which they are established. Rather it is with the quality of 
performance in implementing them (United States 1977a, p.475).  
 
One of the issues argued was the quality of the standards, not necessarily the quantity of 
them. The other issue was the lack of policies in place to independently monitor and 
review the quality of the work of auditors and accountants. The AICPA’s board 
chairman of the time claimed that the problem of “corporate failure and significant 
shareholder losses” was minimal in comparison to the total number of audits that were 
performed by the large accounting firms (United States 1977a, p.99), but failed to 
comprehend that auditor failure even by one accounting firm could lead to harming “the 
entire profession” (United States 1977a, p.476) and losing its reputation which is its 
“most important asset” (United States 1977a, p.471). 
 
                                                             
26 Also at the time was the president of the FAF, which had the authority to appoint the FASB members. 
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In general, this reform by the private sector, supposedly was the solution to problems 
that had surfaced “because they could no longer be suppressed” and had “created a 
crisis of credibility … in the private sector” (United States 1977a, p.13). However, 
Professor Chatov argued that the reform was not achievable as the problem was by far 
“broader than just the accounting and auditing rules developed by the selected private 
institutions” and was related to deficiencies in “the operation of the regulatory 
commissions”, the SEC, for instance (United States 1977a, p.22). His reasoning was 
that the SEC had been working closely with the AICPA “in an interactive network to 
achieve consensus on matters that are of most importance to the network” (United 
States 1977a, p.22). This consensus would only be achievable as long as the SEC did 
not “perform the responsibilities that were assigned to it in the area of corporate 
financial reporting under the 1933 and 1934 Securities Act” and avoided conflicts in the 
network (United States 1977a, p.22).  
 
Congressmen Moss and Metcalf, also agreed that there was a need to restore the 
authority of the Government over the SEC which was mischaracterised by the 
accounting profession “as a Federal takeover of authority from the private sector” 
(United States 1977a, p.23). For example, the AICPA recognised the staff study 
recommendations were “imposing a vast new scheme of federal regulation on the 
accounting profession” which was unnecessary (United States 1977a, p.115). The 
recommendations were seen to “impede, if not destroy” the most extensive and vigorous 
efforts of the profession since it assumed the standard setting responsibility (United 
States 1977a, p.118). Biegler however, had recognised the restoration of power to the 
SEC in the area of monitoring auditors’ duties was an appropriate way to prevent future 
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problems rather than the current system that was based on responding to problems after 
their occurrence. He believed that federal legislation was required to establish “a new 
system … [with] an appropriate regulatory framework to strengthen and monitor the 
quality of work performed by independent auditors” (United States 1977a, p.620). 
 
Nevertheless, there was a need to bring in the government authority and partially, a 
change in the SEC structure. The SEC was to have “a leadership role” in making rules, 
rather than to be seen as the FASB’s staff function (United States 1977a, p.26). The 
SEC’s confirmation of the FASB authority implied that it would never  
take over a leadership role, that there … [would be] little reason to believe the 
FASB leadership … to follow any pattern of behaviour other than those 
followed by its predecessor organizations [which is] … to develop financial 
standards on an ad hoc basis without any focus on creating uniformity (United 
States 1977a, p.26).  
One of the reasons, as stated before, for this behaviour was the AICPA’s substantial 
control over the  
appointments to the FASB … [so] that the people on the FASB are totally 
unconscious, unconcerned, and insensitive to the needs of the industry, other 
than the large national and international corporations who happen to be public 
(United States 1977a, p.373).  
 
The other reason was the influence of the corporations and large accounting firms who 
were cooperating with the AICPA in policymaking. This view was not agreed to by 
Armstrong, the then FASB chairman, stating that the board was “the most effective and 
most promising vehicle to advance accounting standards necessary to maintain and 
enhance the strength of the capital markets” (United States 1977a, p.175). He testified at 
the hearings  
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to set the record straight with respect to many of the allegations made in the 
staff study concerning the lack of progress by the FASB and the lack of … 
[their] ability to eliminate the accounting alternatives (United States 1977a, 
p.333).  
On this matter, Senator Metcalf was disappointed with the way the FASB’s then 
chairman had testified in the hearings and argued that it was “a self-serving declaration” 
(United States 1977a, p.333), as it had defended “the inactivity, the incompetence, the 
ineptness” of the accounting profession in establishing accounting standards and had 
rejected the recommendations made by the staff study (United States 1977a, p.333). 
 
4. Conclusion 
The accounting profession’s struggle to keep the power of standard setting in house and 
out of reach of the Government has been apparent in history. The profession has tried to 
establish its ability to fully protect the public in its “reliance on audited financial 
statements” (American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 1977, p.40). The 
criticisms of the profession that resurfaced in 1983 and related hearings were held 
between 1983 to 1986, did not assist the accounting profession in maintaining its power 
over the standard setting process. Senator Metcalf’s Committee study and hearings were 
aimed at improving the credibility of audited financial reports, by analyzing the role of 
the accounting profession, mainly as standard setters and independent auditors.  
 
The reported findings of this committee, while supported by Senators and academics 
such as Chatov, were criticised by the accounting profession, namely the AICPA. The 
AICPA argued that the “adoption of the recommendations … would, in truth, hinder” 
and frustrate any achievement of protecting the public (American Institute of Certified 
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Public Accountants 1977, p.40). Since, “imposing a vast new scheme of federal 
regulation on the accounting profession is unnecessary” (American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants 1977, p.7). 
 
While the accounting profession was occupied with responding to the study’s 
recommendations, the Congress was dominated by enactment of legislation to put a halt 
to bribery and illicit payments. The SEC arguably, was the only governmental agency to 
be seen actively investigating the illegal payments made by corporations registered with 
the SEC, as briefly explained in the previous chapter. However, the SEC’s lack of 
resources and funding meant that the investigations, which were partly undertaken by 
the corporations’ management and the assistance of their independent auditors, were 
neither sufficient nor thorough. Chapter two also demonstrated the SEC’s hope for these 
investigations to be leading to changes in corporate behaviour and corporate governance 
systems. The following chapters reveal the efforts of Congress and the SEC in 
combating illicit payments while demonstrating passive involvement of the accounting 
profession. 
  





The previous two sections detail the political events that led to the 
formulation of legislation condemning corruption and bribery. Section 
III aims at demonstrating that not only was the enactment of the FCPA 
controversial, but so too were the enforcement. 
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Chapter Four: Hear No Evil, 
See No Evil 
 
The heart of the problem ultimately is not economic but political. It is a problem of power 
… where an institution that is able to skate above national regulations to work within the cracks 
between the laws of different countries is really accountable … in our system. The global 
corporation has become … the principal planners for our society and increasingly for other 
societies. The source of power is the control of capital … becoming concentrated in fewer and 
fewer hands. The problem … is … where our political institutions, our laws, our tax laws … our 
disclosure clause, have kept pace with the revolutionary changes in the world economy. 
(Richard Barnet testimony in United States 1973a, Part 12, p.60-61). 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter two, the Ervin Committee helped greatly in investigating 
the Watergate Scandal that eventually led to the detection of American corporations’ 
corrupt behaviour and illegal contributions. A brief summary of corporations’ 
wrongdoings was presented in chapter two to show the incentive for further 
investigation by other congressional committees as well as the accounting profession 
and accounting bodies. The Ervin Committee as the initial hearing in this regard shed 
light on the problem at hand, the illicit payments and the lack of disclosure of the 
payments. The problem was employed by the principal actors of the networks that will 
be extensively explained in this chapter, to create their network as well as enrolling 
actors to their network. Stephen Solarz, Robert Eckhardt, Senators Frank Church and 
William Proxmire, were leaders and proponents, in the mid-1970's, in holding 
congressional investigations about various foreign corporate payments. The SEC, 
Congressman Moss and Senator Proxmire were the dominant actors questioning the 
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adequacy of the independent auditor’s reports and function in revealing the questionable 
payments. The end result of these widely held hearings and investigations was the 
enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) that was signed by President 
Carter in December 1977.  
 
The committees led by Church and Proxmire were the major ones that came to a general 
consensus of a need for new legislation to end corrupt practices and falsification of 
financial records (Dardess 1979). New legislation was perceived by these two Senators 
as the solution to the problem initially identified by the Ervin Committee and partly by 
the SEC voluntary disclosure program. During their hearings, primary actors, as defined 
by ANT, such as Church and Proxmire had created their own networks to persuade 
other members of Congress that their proposed bill/solution was the best way forward. 
The following sections will demonstrate the efforts of Senators, Congressmen and 
regulatory bodies’ in the hope of establishing legislation to fight foreign corruption as 
well as the networks that were created and re-created respectively. The chapter is 
structured on the timeline of the creation of congressional hearings from 1972 up to 
1977. 
 
1. Senator Frank Church Actor-Network 
Senator Frank Church, of Idaho, as a member of the Democrat Party became, at the age 
of 32, one of the youngest ever Senate members. Church was “known for his flowery 
speeches and heartfelt morality” (Olmsted 1996, p.53). He was described by Newsweek 
as “one of the most articulate and insistent proponents of the ‘new morality’ that has 
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dominated American politics since Watergate” (cited in Ashby & Gramer 1994, p.466). 
In 1965, he began to criticize the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War, and 
by the 1970s initiated the investigations of multinational corporations, and creation of 
his network, in relation to foreign bribery in spite of doubts amongst his colleagues 
about his success in investigating bribery cases (Ashby & Gramer 1994).  
 
As “a strong advocate for fighting international corruption” (Biegelman & Biegelman 
2010, p.10), Church as the principal actor of his network, revealed a pattern of 
disregarding law at corporate and U.S. government levels which ultimately led to a 
president resigning “rather than risk impeachment” (Ashby & Gramer 1994, p.466). 
These investigations led Church to head inquiries into intelligence bodies, the CIA and 
FBI, in order to make “the secret agencies more accountable” (Olmsted 1996, p.55). 
The hearings were held by the Senate since during this time period, the House of 
Representatives “was more divided, [and] more partisan” in comparison to the Senate 
(Olmsted 1996, p.56).  
 
The above investigations and subcommittee hearings assisted Church to enroll actors to 
his network and mobalise his network. The hearings  
marked some of Church’s finest hours. They fused in compelling ways his 
views on foreign policy and civil liberties … [as] he dealt with issues that cut 
to the heart of American democracy, asking who, or what, ruled America 
(Ashby & Gramer 1994, p.491).  
Senator Church ran for presidential candidate pre-selection in 1976 with an emphasis on 
“his role as investigator of the secret government” (Olmsted 1996, p.55) which had 
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exposed the public to information about “institutions that had never been challenged 
before” (Olmsted 1996, p.103). He campaigned for Democrat presidential nomination 
but was defeated by Jimmy Carter27. Subsequently, in 1979, he chaired the Foreign 
Relations Committee after the retirement of the previous chairman. His passion for 
becoming the U.S. president had led to Church abandoning his network, and a turn in 
his goal and focus of establishment of new legislation to curb corruption. The ANT will 
be used throughout the following sections to demonstrate the process by which Church 
created a network during his hearings on Multinational Corporations that was ultimately 
defeated. More importantly, the bill that was born from these hearings was left idle and 
was defeated by other networks. The following sections and next chapter will explain 
the details of the networks, hearings and the bill proposed by Senator Church.  
 
1.1 The Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations  
In 1972 Church became the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Multinational 
Corporations, a multi-year inquiry originally convened to run to 1976 and then 
converted into a Subcommittee on International Economic Policy (Broad 2002). The 
Subcommittee known as the Church Subcommittee, was the network that Senator 
Church had successfully created and it had become “[o]ne of the long-standing 
investigative committees of the congress” (Broehl 1998, p.299). It was formed as part of 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. A majority of its members, the actors of 
the network, was chosen based on their business backgrounds to avoid “charges of 
being anti-corporation” (Ashby & Gramer 1994, p.418). Senator Church, as the 
                                                             
27 Senator Church in Washington announced his withdrawal from the presidency race.  
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principal actor, was “all hot to go after … multinational corporations”, and was “willing 
to chair hearings on this subject” (Cited in Ashby & Gramer 1994, p.419).  
 
For Church, “the investigations offered a splendid opportunity to combine moral 
convictions with personal advantage” in bringing him “substantial national exposure” 
by effectively chairing this committee (Ashby & Gramer 1994, p.423). He wanted to 
enrol other actors outside his network and interest them in the problem that had surfaced 
from the Ervin Committee hearings. His argument for holding these hearings and the 
aim of his network was that the  
basic tenet of our democracy is that the people must be told of the mistakes of 
their government so that they may have the opportunity to correct them. We 
believe that foreign people will, upon sober reflection, admire our nation more 
for keeping faith with our democratic ideals than they will condemn us for the 
misconduct itself (Church 1985, p.104-105). 
The subcommittee was initially established to investigate allegations that International 
Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) offered money to the CIA to influence and manipulate 
the Chilean presidential election in 1970 (Jain 2001; Johnson 2006; Olmsted 1996; 
Solomon & Linville 1975). The ITT case was the obligatory passage point for the 
Church network to assure the validity of its existence and success. The CIA, as an 
outside actor, had previously made efforts to shift the inquiries to a committee where 
detailed questioning and investigations were not part of the agenda (Johnson 2006).  
 
The subcommittee’s findings from these investigations “were explosive” and led to 
“investigations in the Netherlands and Italy and led to the arrest of a former Japanese 
prime minister” (Olmsted 1996, p.54). The ITT case helped Church to enroll corporate 
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wrongdoing as a non-human actor and to recruit other actors. However, the political 
reactions in the U.S. were different as the outside actors such as the then United States 
ambassador to Costa Rica, Viron Peter Vack, claimed the investigations “just stirred 
things up but I do not think it was taken seriously. It was not taken seriously by Henry 
[Kissinger]. It just fed people’s anxieties” (cited in Gustafson 2007, p.199). The 
corporate executives even warned Church concerning the effect of investigations on 
their businesses abroad and “subvert[ing] U.S. interests abroad” (Ashby & Gramer 
1994, p.419).  
  
As the subcommittee was coming to its conclusions about ITT, the Watergate 
investigations brought to the surface the questionable payments by a variety of 
multinational corporations such as Lockheed, Northrop Corporation, Exxon 
Corporation, and Gulf Oil. The issue of illicit payments became substantial as it was 
“not just … a little baksheesh to grease the palm of some petty clerk in order to speed 
needed documents on their way through the bureaucratic labyrinth” (United States 
1975d, p.7). Accordingly the subcommittee expanded its investigation revealing the 
significance and growth of questionable payments in the 1960s and early 1970s (Jain 
2001). The illicit payment cases were enrolled as the non-human actors, which helped 
this newly established network to strengthen its existence. By enrolling these actors, 
Senator Church was able to demonstrate his central role in this network. So, it can be 
said that by this time the network had passed through the interessement moment of the 
translation model.  
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The subcommittee “had put its finger on a whole series of shady practices, just about all 
of which had turned out to be both accurate and needing amelioration by some form of 
congressional action” (Broehl 1998, p.300). It “publicized investigations of 
relationships between U.S.-based multinational corporations and American foreign 
policy, illuminated shocking corruption and the arrogant misuse of power” (Ashby & 
Gramer 1994, p.415). The inquiries resulted in “seventeen riveting volumes that 
offer[ed] a more thorough examination of corporate practices overseas than any other 
inquiry of this … era” (Broad 2002, p.71). The subcommittee exposed payments to 
foreign governments made by U.S. international companies such as Gulf Oil 
Corporation, Northrop Corporation, Exxon Corporation, Mobil Oil Corporation and 
Lockheed. It became apparent “[i]n the course of the Watergate Committee hearings 
and the investigation by the Special Prosecutor, … that major American corporations 
had made illegal political contributions in the United States” (United States 1973a, Part 
12, p.1) and abroad.  
 
From the documents and information that the subcommittee evidenced, it seemed to 
Church that the United States was “on a treadmill with no end in sight. It is time for us 
and our allies to stop and consider what it is that we are doing and to what end” (United 
States 1973a, Part 12, p.108). The hearings and the network created by Senator Church 
were deemed necessary because it was “time for plain speaking” on foreign bribery and 
corruption (United States 1973a, Part 12, p.239). Palazzolo (2012) indicated that 
Senator Church “believed U.S. companies were undermining the nation's Cold War-era 
foreign policy, tarnishing free enterprise by sowing corruption among U.S. allies” and 
the seeds of new wars (United States 1973a, Part 12, p.108). Corruption was “[a] cancer 
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… eating away at the vitals of Western society” and that one would be able to “no 
longer pretend that this is purely a matter of personal or corporate morality” (United 
States 1973a, Part 12, p.239). 
 
The subcommittee inquired into multinational corporations promoting their sales 
overseas by channeling “money to foreign government officials through large agents’ 
fees or direct political contributions” (United States 1973a, Part 12, p.341). These 
hearings on foreign bribery were held in the hope of forming clear legislation or 
guidelines having the force of law, domestically and internationally, with help from 
multinational companies testifying to this subcommittee. This was also the ultimate goal 
of the network, it was the proposed solution to the problem of illicit contribution 
payments. However, from past experience, “the effectiveness of governmental 
regulation has not been very reassuring” and over time it is apparent “regulating 
agencies are taken over by the very industries they attempt to regulate” (United States 
1973a, Part 12, p.97).  
 
It was argued by corporations, that if a law existed to prohibit bribery and corrupt 
payments, these companies would have resisted the demand for illicit payments. From 
the point of view of Senator Church, it was “no longer sufficient to simply sigh and say 
that is the way business is done” (United States 1973a, Part 12, p.2). Such a stance 
would only perpetuate the illicit payments. Hence it was necessary to treat bribery as a 
“serious foreign policy problem” (United States 1973a, Part 12, p.2). The rationale 
behind this way of doing business was explained by Senator Biden as “the American 
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way … [and i]f it interferes with what the law says, and what our concept of morality is 
supposed to be, well, that is just the price of doing business” (United States 1973a, Part 
12, p.378). Even though corruption and bribery were and continued to be “present and 
institutionalized in many of the countries with whom” U.S. multinational companies 
dealt (United States 1973a, Part 12, p.15), Senator Church argued “[t]he notion that 
American companies must do it because foreign companies do it, seems … to be not 
only morally wrong but exceedingly shortsighted” (United States 1973a, Part 12, 
p.344). By taking corrective measures “it can hopefully prevent perpetual enslavement 
to a system that thrives on secrecy and darkness” (United States 1973a, Part 12, p.15). 
 
A common view amongst Senators and actors of Church’s network was the need for 
enactment of new legislation or a code of conduct dealing with illicit payments. The 
network was at the mobilisation moment as the actors had become spokespeople for the 
network and supported the proposed solution. However, having new legislation even 
though it would help to eliminate the illegal payments to domestic and international 
political parties, was not perceived to be assurance of enforcement of the law. Senator 
Church observed the problem of “corporate lawlessness” stemmed from the “disrespect 
for law” that was apparent in the highest levels of U.S. Government (Ashby & Gramer 
1994, p.466). In 1976 Professor Ratner 28 , from Cornell Law School, expressed 
agreement with this view stating before the Corporate Rights and Responsibilities 
hearings, that the issue was with the enforcement of existing laws and would be the 
same with new ones (United States 1976f). The problem was not with having a law in 
place but  
                                                             
28 Professor Ratner testified at the ‘Corporate Rights and Responsibilities’ hearings held by the Senate 
Committee on Commerce on June 23, 1976. 
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the moral fiber of any Organization … [which] embraces corporate compliance. 
… ‘The top guy has to set the ethical standards’ and without that support, no 
number of codes of conduct or laws will work (Biegelman & Biegelman 2010, 
p.13; N.A 1976).  
 
1.1.1 Pre-existing Illicit Payment Laws 
At the same time as the bribes and illegal payments were made, the U.S. and many other 
countries such as Korea, France and Germany already had laws in place that prohibited 
these payments. The pre-existing laws served as a foundation for the problematisation 
process instigated by Church and others including Proxmire, as will be explained in the 
following sections, leading to the FCPA. These laws were knowingly violated by the 
American corporations. This can be illustrated by the fact that in the U.S., for example 
The Corrupt Practices Act of 1907 prohibited political contributions by corporations to 
federal political campaigns (Greanias & Windsor 1982).  
 
The act was described in the 1971 Senate committee report as “worse than having no 
law regulating Federal elections” (United States 1971, p.114). It was full of loopholes, 
lacked enforcement, and had provided “neither the candidates nor the public with any 
guidance or information concerning the election process” (United States 1971, p.114). 
The law was described as having created “an illusion of regulation” providing for “an 
easy excuse for preserving the status quo” (United States 1971, p.115). The failure of 
such laws and policies in the U.S. were described by Church to be a consequence of  
pure tokenism … - once in a while somebody will bring a token case - 
obviously the policy has failed because giantism is the name of the game .... 
There must be a much more effective way to restore and revitalize the free 
market, to cope with this oligopoly that is developing (United States 1973a, 
Part 12, p.81). 
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Accordingly, the enforcement of the act “by both the federal and state authorities until 
the Watergate prosecutions … [, was] practically non-existent” (McCloy et al. 1976, 
p.3).  
 
With respect to American companies selling arms abroad, the Arms Export Control Act 
of 1975 was amended to include sections in relation to public disclosure of the agents’ 
fees, commissions, political contributions and gifts which were resisted by the 
corporations (Dardess 1979). As part of the opening statement of the Lockheed Aircraft 
Corporation hearings, as will be discussed later in this chapter, Senator Church stated,  
It would be the height of irresponsibility for the Congress at this time to give in 
to the tremendous lobbying campaign that is now being waged by the 
corporations against legislation to control arms exports and foreign agents’ 
fees and to adapt the present administration’s attitude of “see no evil, hear no 
evil” (United States 1973a, Part 14, p.2).  
  
From the hearings held by the subcommittee, it became clear that enforcement of a law 
was not the only concern. The other issue was that the Government not only encouraged 
but educated corporations in making illicit payments abroad. For instance, the 
Departments of State and Defense had  
given some companies the impression that it is willing to tolerate the use and 
misuse of agents’ fees so long as growing arms exports continue to contribute to 
a more favorable balance of payments for the United States (United States 
1975d, p.8).  
Senator Clark likewise was mainly concerned with the companies’ application and 
enforcement of the law by questioning “[w]hat would one more law mean to you … 
why one more law would be more effective than the laws that are already on the books” 
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(United States 1973a, Part 12, p.34). Few corporate leaders have condoned corrupt 
practices “as a necessary feature of their operations in certain parts of the world” 
(United States 1976i, p.39) by making excuses that the payments are counted as being a 
normal part of doing business and are an “established part of the economic and social 
system in many countries” (United States 1976i, p.39). The excuses from Church’s 
viewpoint were doubtful as corporations had used “off-the books accounts, Swiss bank 
accounts, dummy or shell corporations set up in Switzerland or Lichtenstein, numerous 
agents or intermediaries, whose existence … [was] often kept secret” to conceal their 
conduct from auditors, boards of directors and shareholders (cited in United States 
1977d, p.2). 
 
1.1.2 Details of the Multinational Corporations’ Illicit Payments 
In relation to multinational oil companies, the majority of their worldwide competition 
was among U.S. based oil companies. In addition, the chairman of the board of directors 
of Gulf Oil argued that after World War I, “oil companies were encouraged” by the 
government to go international and “to get … [their] stake in the Middle East”, but they 
were left on their own “like motherless children” in regards to their dealings and 
investments (United States 1973a, Part 12, p.27). International contracts, regardless of 
this matter, were attractive for the corporations as it was a way of increasing their 
income and profit by paying the price of bribery. For Gulf Oil Corporation for example, 
the pressure to pay bribes was greater when the company was deeply involved in 
contracts and the amount of investment in foreign countries was greater (United States 
1973a, Part 12). It was argued by the company’s chairman that these illicit payments 
had to be paid to preserve the investments that were assumed by him to be in the best 
99 | P a g e  
 
interest of the company, its shareholders as well as the public (United States 1973a, Part 
12). 
 
However, these payments were made without the knowledge of the company’s board of 
directors and through subsidiary companies, recorded as advances to these subsidiaries 
and miscellaneous expenses by the subsidiaries to conceal the actual use of the money29. 
As the amounts of expenses recorded were not material in comparison to the contract 
amounts, it was never questioned even though “it was a matter of national interest” to 
the U.S. Government and people (United States 1973a, Part 12, p.25). This pattern of 
falsification of records and books of the company was apparent in other multinational 
companies such as Exxon Corporation, Northrop Corporation and Mobil Oil 
Corporation. Thus, the accountability of the multinational corporations to society was 
violated.  
 
At the same time, the board of directors, as the governing body in charge of the 
management of the affairs of the corporations, had breached their financial reporting 
responsibility and stewardship to the stakeholders. Corporations’ lack of social 
responsibility, as the non-human actor, had become one of the main concerns of the 
Church network and was enrolled as part of the actor-network. Corporate morality, too, 
as another non-human actor was recruited. Accordingly, the subcommittee dedicated the 
majority of its time inquiring and questioning people representing the Government and 
Multinational Corporations, to make certain of the soundness of the network. The 
following sections detail the findings of the subcommittee, how the Church network 
                                                             
29 As briefly explained in chapter two. 
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based on ANT, was able to continue its existence and finally put their proposed 
legislation before Congress.  
 
1.1.3 Examples of Falsification of Financial Reports 
Mobil Oil Corporation had recorded the political contributions as either advertising 
expense or research depending on the invoices received by their branch in Italy or at the 
request of political parties in Italy. Mobil Oil claimed that this procedure was the 
custom that was followed in Italy. The board of directors was not informed of the 
political contributions that were made in Italy due to lack of internal controls (United 
States 1973a). The board was not advised, even though the political payments were not 
part of the general operations of the company. The same pattern was found in the case 
of Exxon. 
 
At Exxon, political payments were recorded as administrative and marketing expenses. 
The board of directors and some managers were not advised of political payments, even 
though these payments involved large sums of money and were not “typical of the 
general pattern of operation” in Exxon (United States 1973a, Part 12, p.247). Failure to 
inform the board was justified by Exxon controller, Monroe, by the fact that political 
contributions were legal and lawful in Italy. However, these payments were not 
recorded in the company’s books and were disguised using “dummy invoices to indicate 
payment for services not actually rendered; overbilling customers” (United States 
1973a, Part 12, p.248). This pattern was used by an Exxon subsidiary in Italy which was 
not questioned by the company’s management as it was “the customary way” of doing 
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business in Italy (United States 1973a, Part 12, p.248). Exxon auditors knew of the 
accounting treatment and expressed “concern about lack of management controls … yet 
nothing was done about this” until the Watergate hearings and questioning by the SEC 
had commenced (United States 1973a, Part 12, p.252). 
 
Northrop Corporation bribery payments were mainly made to agents, consultants and 
business partners. These individuals were described by the committee as “shadowy 
figures operating behind the scenes whose activities [were] … vaguely alluded to but 
never explicitly stated … a cast of characters out of a novel of international intrigue” 
(United States 1973a, Part 12, p.107). As the company did not want to know how the 
business was performing and to whom the products were sold by its international 
branches. According to the committee’s findings, the payments were documented by 
Northrop “in a way that would permit the company to disclaim knowledge or 
responsibility for the uses to which it was put” (United States 1973a, Part 12, p.107). 
Accordingly, these payments were assumed by the board of directors or the executive 
committee to be the standard procedure and the best practice and it was not questioned. 
The use of consultants or agents that were doing the business on behalf of the 
corporation required a creative mind to be able to conceal the nature of the transactions 
overseas. The creativity as debated by Senator Percy, “in the name of greed can concoct 
schemes faster than we can get legislation against them … [and] this was invented long 
before we started doing major overseas business” (United States 1973a, Part 12, p.119). 
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The Northrop Corporation, Exxon Corporation and Mobil Oil Corporation cases were 
not only about corporate morality. The Northrop case was also about the Pentagon, and 
U.S. Government involvement and their lack of attention to detail. As in the 1960s the 
company had entered into “Pentagon-sponsored export sales” securing them huge 
profits (Ashby & Gramer 1994, p.459). Under the foreign military sales program30, the 
Defense Department’s duty was to approve all of the weapon manufacturer’s expenses 
including any commission fees. However these fees were never questioned by the 
Defense Department until the 1970s when the Watergate investigations surfaced.  
 
Northrop Corporation in return provided the Defense Department with entertainment 
services for their officials. From the point of view of Senator Church these commission 
fees were linked to the contract amounts. Specifically, there was a tendency to inflate 
the contract amounts, so there would be “an unprincipled race to arm to the teeth the 
newly rich nations of the Persian Gulf” which could “end up corrupting ourselves and 
those who deal with us” (United States 1973a, Part 12, p.108). In relation to the Exxon 
Corporation and Mobil Oil Corporation cases, each was paying political contributions to 
favourably affect the Italian legislation dealing with oil companies. Senator Church 
argued that the U.S. Government including the State Department was implicated in 
these dealings. The payments were also used to fund the election campaign of Italy’s 
different political parties, mainly the major non-communist Italian parties. Also, to curb 
the advancement of communism and the Communist party. However, when Exxon 
wanted to come clean and reported these payments to high U.S. Embassy officials in 
                                                             
30 The U.S. Defense Department through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program facilitates sales of 
U.S. defense articles and services such as arms, and military training to foreign governments and 
international organizations when the President formally finds that to do so will strengthen the security of 
the U.S. and promote world peace (http://www.dsca.mil/foreign-military-sales-fms). 
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Italy, the reaction by the U.S. officials was “that’s a nice slice of pie they’re getting” 
(Cited in United States 1973a, Part 12, p.240). 
 
The Lockheed scandals came to the subcommittee’s attention during their Northrop 
investigation and the discovery of documents that referenced Lockheed. The 
subcommittee was able to secure “masses of documents from Lockheed’s auditors 
before the company could intervene” (Ashby & Gramer 1994, p.461). Investigations by 
the subcommittee revealed significant involvement of “more than thirty countries, 
spread across four continents” as part of the questionable payments which were referred 
to by Newsweek as “Great Global Fall” (cited in Ashby & Gramer 1994, p.465). The 
Lockheed scandal, as a non-human actor enrolled in the Church network, was quite 
distinct from the previous cases discussed above. First, it was “a company that [lived] 
only by the grace of Congress”31 and was the recipient of government loans under the 
Loan Guarantee Act (United States 1973a, Part 12, p.344). Second, the U.S. was “the 
single largest arms exporter in the world” (United States 1973a, Part 12, p.341). Thus, 
the survival of Lockheed was in the national interest and for this reason, “the President 
brought all the force and pressure [necessary]… to keep the company going” (United 
States 1973a, Part 12, p.361).  
 
The scandal revealed immediate benefits Lockheed had gained were in effect “contrary 
to America’s long-term interests. … demonstrat[ing] how easily corruption, hidden 
behind a curtain of national security, could infect America’s own government” (Ashby 
& Gramer 1994, p.460). Lockheed’s corrupt sales were supported by the U.S. embassies 
                                                             
31 The company’s attorney was Nixon’s Secretary of State (Ashby & Gramer 1994, p.463). 
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abroad and the State Department even though it influenced and subverted U.S. 
Government military sales’ objectives abroad (United States 1973a, Part 12). Lockheed  
had used an off-the-books account to buy business intelligence and pay the 
officials of major European airline consortia … in Italy, thus providing the 
Italian Communist Party with its strongest election issue, corruption; and … its 
agent, a prominent leader of the ultra right wing militarist political faction in 
Japan … has paid him[, Lockheed agent,] millions of dollars in fees and 
commissions over the last few years (United States 1973a, Part 14, p.1).  
As with the Northrop case, Lockheed hired foreign agents and consultants to promote 
their sales abroad. Lockheed’s reliance on agents was joked by Strauss, West 
Germany’s Defense Minister, as the company having “salesmen … everywhere. I can’t 
open a drawer in my desk without a Lockheed man falls out of it” (cited in Ashby & 
Gramer 1994, p.462). These agents were hired mainly based on their “connections in 
influential Government circles” rather than on their “local expertise or … technical 
knowledge” (United States 1973a, Part 12, p.342). The agents were paid huge fees 
which were recorded as cost of sales in Lockheed’s books and records which would 
have significantly inflated the price of the military weapons sold to the governments.  
 
From Senator Biden’s point of view this way of record keeping had “financial 
advantage domestically” for Lockheed, and was “directly cheating the American 
taxpayers” by recognising less tax revenue “to maintain the same service” (United 
States 1973a, Part 12, p.379). In relation to their sales in Japan, as stated by the auditors, 
the corporate funds were transferred to another bank or trust account to be transferred to 
the agent. The funds were recorded as a payment to a marketing consultant and shown 
on the balance sheet as prepaid marketing expense (United States 1973a, Part 14, 
p.313). Lockheed was using “the U.S. Government … [at] its convenience and 
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undermin[ing] U.S. policy”, regardless of the quality of the policy, “when it … [was] 
convenient from the point of view of promoting sales” abroad (United States 1973a, 
Part 12, p.386).  
 
1.1.3.1 Strengthening the Actor-Network 
In Senator Church’s opinion, the problem of bribes and payoffs would have adverse 
effects on the economic and political situation of the U.S and other countries. His point 
of view was consistent with the aim of the previous hearings held by him in relation to 
the intelligence bodies for instance and his strong advocacy and speeches for morality 
dominating after the Watergate scandal and revelation of corrupt and questionable 
payments. From his perspective, the arguments put forward by Church reflected a 
genuine stance rather than political posturing. As such, his arguments presented during 
the hearings facilitated maintenance of the Church network.  
 
His first viewpoint was that it would create unfair competition between companies, 
forcing ethical companies to be squeezed out of these foreign markets. Consequently, 
competition and getting “the most favored treatment” would be related to the amount of 
money that is slipped under the table (United States 1973a, Part 12, p.2). The reason 
being the foreign officials that are “looking for money are unconcerned about the 
quality of the product or service being offered” (United States 1973a, Part 12, p.2).  
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Secondly, illegal political contributions in other countries can influence the political 
party that would control a country. This was apparent in the Exxon Corporation case, 
resulting in the Italian communist party winning the election as they used corruption in 
the democratic party as a potent weapon using the slogan “[w]e are the only ones with 
clean hands” (cited in United States 1973a, Part 12, p.239). Senator Church argued the 
change in Italian electorate behaviour was because the “democratic government [was 
seen as] … the servant, not of the people, but of large vested economic interests … 
[f]undametal changes … will then become inevitable” (United States 1973a, Part 12, 
p.240).  
 
Thirdly, it may influence the way a country is going to spend their national income on 
the import of commodities and resources, and diversion from products that would be 
more beneficial to their people and the country (United States 1973a). For instance in 
the Lockheed case, it was maintained the bribes and kickbacks paid to Indonesian 
officials was to ensure the Government would purchase aircraft only from Lockheed 
which meant that national income was diverted from the purchase of products vital to 
the country’s growth and survival (United States 1973a). These “fat wads of money” 
would make the sales of military products more attractive as it would make the 
Government officials rich quicker (United States 1973a, Part 12, p.375). Bribery 
payments can also affect and persuade a country’s decision on the type of military 
commodities they require. They might be persuaded to buy advanced military weaponry 
that is not needed or that is “more advanced than they can use effectively” (United 
States 1976i, p.40). The next chapter will explain the outcome of the above 
107 | P a g e  
 
investigation and findings. It will also demonstrate the failure of the presumed Senator 
Church network in enacting new legislation as his network goal. 
 
2. Senator William Proxmire Actor-Network 
Senator Proxmire, a Democrat from Wisconsin, served in the Senate for 32 years. He 
was known for his efforts to curb corruption and “irritated presidents and lawmakers 
from both parties because of his contempt for the mutual back-scratching most 
politicians engage in” (Severo 2005). During 1976, Senator Proxmire held a series of 
hearings before the subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of the 
Joint Economic Committee. Based on the theory adopted by this study, the hearings can 
be viewed as Proxmire’s initiation in creating a network to investigate the problem of 
corrupt practices and defining identities and interests of other actors in establishing 
itself as indispensable to them. Proxmire’s network was solely related to the problem of 
illicit payments that had surfaced in the hearings held by the other Senators and the 
SEC’s voluntary disclosure program. In comparison, Senator Church’s network, as 
previously explained, predated the Watergate revelations to early 1970 inquiries which 
initially focused on the lack of CIA and FBI accountability. Church’s interest in 
examining foreign policy issues, led him to investigate the allegations of the ITT 
kickbacks to influence Chilean presidential elections and further on the other 
multinational corporations investigated by the Ervin Committee.  
 
The initial hearings by Proxmire were held in January and March in 1976. These 
hearings were referred to as the ‘abuses of corporate power’. For Proxmire to attain 
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continued support from the public, and politicians, he held several other hearings as part 
of the subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government during 1976. The latter 
hearings were held in April 1976, titled ‘the foreign and corporate bribes’, and later on 
in May referred to as ‘prohibiting bribes to foreign officials’ hearings. The details of the 
hearings are explained later in this chapter. The purpose of the hearings and Proxmire’s 
network was to focus on corporations that had “wrongfully used their funds as a matter 
of policy, with the approval and active participation of top management” leading to a 
“loss of consumer confidence” (United States 1976a, p.1). 
 
The impetus for these hearings originated from the previous hearings that were held in 
regards to the Watergate scandals, multinational corporations’ corporate crimes and 
Watergate Special Prosecutor’s convictions. Bribe payments to foreign officials were 
seen as a “disgrace of … [the] free enterprise system …[in] which the most efficient 
producers with the best products are supposed to prevail” (United States 1976i, p.1) but 
inferior products with higher cost were being traded. Ball32 argued it “is asking too 
much of human credulity” to claim that the lifeblood of the system is based on 
competition, “while slipping money under the table to foreign purchasers” (United 
States 1976i, p.75). Free enterprise was a system that the U.S. prided itself on and 
touted its benefits to the public, however, its competitive success depended “not on 
market forces but the debauching of Government officials” (United States 1976i, p.41).  
 
                                                             
32 The former Under Secretary of State and senior partner of Lehman Bros. 
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2.1 Problematisation Moment of Proxmire’s Network 
Proxmire, as the principal actor, identified the problem to be first, the private sector’s 
lack of ability to monitor itself. He argued “the private sector is a house of marked 
cards, composed of kings of corruption, jacks of all illicit trades, and aces of political 
influences” (United States 1976a, p.1). In this regard, Senator Proxmire questioned the 
SEC’s reaction to companies’ lack of keeping faithful books and records, as from his 
standpoint “the system hasn’t worked so far. That is why we are in this difficulty” 
(United States 1976a, p.20). The system Proxmire was referring to was maintenance of 
books and records and corporations governing themselves by their independent audit 
committee communicating with external auditors.  
 
The second problem was in relation to Government’s lack of reaction towards 
international illegal and questionable payments. Senator Proxmire claimed that 
“[b]ribery flourishes in this kind of environment” (United States 1976a, p.112). An 
environment, as observed by Proxmire, where Government’s high officials advise on 
paying “attention not to what Government officials say but rather to what they do” 
(United States 1976a, p.151), since the Government’s statements were regarding their 
condemnation of bribery but the actions of their officials were contradictory. As argued 
before, the Government publicly denounced the payment of bribes but the Pentagon had 
been “tutoring its contractors on how to make foreign payoffs” (United States 1976a, 
p.112) in order to promote arms sales even if this meant “outrageously high sales 
commissions” and bribery payoffs (United States 1976a, p.151).  
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The Defense Department was also encouraging, directing and instructing “corporations 
on how to make these illegal payments” (United States 1976k, p.87). Lockheed was one 
of the corporations that was coordinated by the Pentagon and was also pushed by the 
Pentagon to “increase their sales of arms to foreign governments” (Proxmire 1976, p.2; 
United States 1975b). A former U.S. ambassador to Argentina and Cuba, Braden, 
testified at the “foreign and corporate bribes” hearing arguing the same point from his 
experiences with illicit payments. He had prevented U.S. corporations from being 
extorted by announcing his intolerance of corporations getting involved in these issues. 
In one instance he even requested a manager of a company to be fired when he found 
out that bribe payments were involved in their dealings abroad. The ambassador 
believed there was no need to pay bribes to perform business in another country. His 
policy also extended to the foreign Government by announcing his intolerance for this 
behaviour. From his point of view,  
there must be complete acceptance of responsibility and self-discipline by the 
State Department, … [U.S.] embassies and by private corporations and 
individuals operating in or dealing directly or indirectly with foreign affairs 
(United States 1976i, p.25). 
 
2.1.1 Translinear Inc Case  
The following case was presented during the March hearing that focused on the lack of 
Government and State Department attention to corporations who were under pressure 
from foreign Governments to make illicit payments. Proxmire stated that the 
Translinear case represented the consequence of honest and responsible business refusal 
of becoming “part of the bribery system” in an environment which foreign payoffs were 
encouraged (United States 1976a, p.111).The case can be said to help Proxmire to make 
the network indispensable and assure the vitality and success of his network’s 
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translation process. Translinear Inc was a corporation operating in Haiti, and was 
pressured by the officials’ of the Haitian Government to pay bribes. Translinear had 
started a mutually beneficial project with Haiti to build “hotels, golf courses, tennis 
courts, [and] a beach” on an island (United States 1976a, p.182). During their 
construction they discovered water that was known to be economically valuable on the 
island. This discovery led to an alteration in the government’s behaviour towards this 
project. 
 
The corporation’s officials were “threatened with the blockage of the contract” unless 
the requested payment was made (United States 1976a, p.140). When they contacted the 
U.S. Embassy for assistance and advice, no action was taken to protect or assist them in 
their negotiations “except offer[ing] them a cup of coffee” (United States 1976a, p.178). 
Non-responsiveness of the U.S. embassy was observed as meeting “with nothing but a 
blank wall” (United States 1976a, p.180). The reaction from the Haiti President was to 
restrict Translinear’s operations and block their access to its equipment. The Haiti 
Government even changed a law that was relevant to Translinear’s lease of land in 
Haiti. The State Department was also notified of the events that had taken place, and the 
reaction was similar to the U.S. Embassy. When the State Department representative 
was present at the following day’s hearing, it was claimed their “responsibility [was] to 
assist American businessmen who are treated unfairly” (United States 1976a, p.153). 
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3. Initial Hearings and Their Outcomes 
Relevant Government agencies such as the SEC, and the General Accounting Office 
(GAO) testified at the hearings. However, “no signs of activity by the FBI, Justice 
Department, or IRS” were apparent, and “the State Department’s actions … [had] not 
been helpful” (United States 1976a, p.39). The absence of these bodies was the focal 
point of the January hearing. The GAO, in relation to this matter, argued that the bribe 
and kickback cases which had been referred to the Justice Department 33  were not 
prosecuted or even investigated further. Even though there was a possibility that Federal 
law such as the Anti-Kickback Act of 1934 was violated. This fact was apparent in 
cases the SEC had referred to the Justice Department at the time, but no criminal action 
had taken place.  
 
The Justice Department played an important role as it had the investigatory 
responsibility and authority to prosecute the cases at hand. Ralph Nader34, a consumer 
advocate, claimed the Justice Department’s low priority and lack of attention to 
“corporate economic crimes or crimes involving Government-corporate relationships” 
was related to funding and allocation of their time. He said “the Justice Department … 
[had] been expanding the huge bulk of its funds in the area of crime in the streets” and 
shying away from corporate crime cases as they were “extremely time consuming or 
complex” (United States 1976a, p.91). One of the cases that was under investigation by 
both the SEC and GAO was the Lockheed case which is briefly explained below. 
 
                                                             
33 Department of Justice is responsible for investigating violations of criminal laws 
34 Among his other accomplishments, he was “one of the most astute observers of corporate ethics and 
crime in the suites” (United States 1976i, p.3). 
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3.1 Lockheed Bribery Case 
Some light was shed on the Lockheed case as part of the arguments earlier in the 
chapter dealing with the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations held by Church. 
The case was quite distinct, as Lockheed’s corrupt sales were supported by the U.S. 
Government and for this reason it was enrolled by Church as a non-human actor, to 
maintain and recruit new actors to his network. Following the subcommittee hearings 
and investigations of the Lockheed case, Senator Proxmire became interested in the case 
as well. Proxmire wanted to further his own and his network’s political aspirations by 
using Church’s successful case. As the case had helped Church to pass his network 
through phases of the translation model, Proxmire also wanted to initiate investigations 
in relation to the Lockheed case, to utilise it as his network’s obligatory passage point. 
The case “[t]o Church’s dismay” was stolen by Proxmire even though this committee 
and network “lacked the documentation that Church’s staff had been gathering” (Ashby 
& Gramer 1994, p.462). Because the Lockheed bribery case was the most prominent 
and front and centre case during this period, Proxmire investigated this case to persuade 
and recruit other actors to enrol in his network. During August 1975 he held a one day 
hearing on ‘Lockheed Bribery’ as part of the Committee on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs. The purpose of the hearing was to investigate “[t]he exact nature and 
purpose of …[illegal] payments” as well as the guarantee loan that was given to 
Lockheed by the Congress (United States 1975b, p.1).  
 
Members of the Lockheed board of directors were among the witnesses who testified on 
the day. Their rhetorical testimony concerned the benefits of Lockheed’s operation for 
the U.S. economy and tax payers. It was claimed that Lockheed had “not used corporate 
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funds to make political contributions in the United States”, had not “violated any U.S. 
criminal laws in connection with its activities here or sales abroad” and as far as their 
financial statements were concerned “no material changes” were required (United States 
1975b, p.27). Bribery was identified as necessary “to compete successfully in many 
parts of the world” (United States 1975b, p.27) and it was perceived as a “cost of 
winning the competition” (United States 1975b, p.45). 
 
Lockheed was the sole corporation that had borrowed from the Government under the 
Loan Guarantee Act. The act enabled Lockheed to borrow money from a “consortium of 
banks … [which] the United States was authorized to guarantee that the banks would 
not lose money on these loans” (United States 1975b, p.25). The guarantee loan was for 
“$250 million of the taxpayers’ money” (United States 1975b, p.4; Yockey 2013). The 
loan was approved by the Congress on the basis that Lockheed was able “to achieve its 
projected sales figure” (United States 1975b, p.1). Based on the GAO representative 
testimony during this hearing, the act had directed the GAO to periodically undertake “a 
detailed audit” of “the books, records and transactions of any borrower under the Act” 
(United States 1976a, p.56). GAO responsibilities, based on their interpretation of the 
details of the act, were limited to auditing Lockheed to confirm its ability to repay the 
loan using its assets. The GAO representative explained that the “nature, intensity and 
extent” of the details of the law was interpreted by the GAO differently and contrary to 
the laws intent and principals, partly due to their lack of experience and authority 
(United States 1976a, p.56). This was also related to the GAO’s unfamiliarity with 
required specific investigative techniques (United States 1976a). Furthermore, the GAO 
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had no authority to take action in the event misconduct was discovered or suspected. 
Criminal or civil fraud cases had to be referred to the Department of Justice. 
 
Senator Proxmire was concerned that the Government was not interested in 
investigating Lockheed’s laundering money and establishment of “off the books” 
accounts, although bribery and other illegal activities were condemned by the 
Government. Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary Simon35, in his opening statement at 
the Lockheed bribery hearings stated:  
[l]et there be no misunderstanding: The Emergency Loan Guarantee Board 
does not and will not condone illegal and unethical activities by American 
business, here or abroad … [it] condemns such actions in the strongest terms 
and is deeply concerned about the possible improper use of Lockheed’s 
corporate funds and its impact on the guarantee program (United States 1975b, 
p.5). 
The reason being, the Government was mainly interested in Lockheed’s financial 
position, their ability to secure sales, and increase their revenue to repay the Guaranteed 
Loan. Proxmire felt “we are put in the position of, if not condoning it, at least not taking 
any action to stop it” (United States 1976a, p.58). He later argued  
Secretary William Simon condemns the Lockheed bribes and other payoffs in 
the strongest terms. But … has failed to exercise his authority as Chairman of 
the Loan Guaranty Board to require Lockheed to disclose full details of the 
bribe (United States 1976a, p.151).  
However, the State Department representative at the ‘Abuses of corporate power’ 
hearings described the matter as “being pressed with vigor” by the Department of 
Justice who had at times made inquiries into Lockheed’s payments (United States 
1976a, p.156).  
                                                             
35 He was also chairman of the Board in charge of investigating Lockheed’s bribe payments. The SEC’s 
then chairman, Ray Garrett was also a member of this Board (United States 1975b). Garrett was the SEC 
chairman from 1973 to 1975. 
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The Emergency Loan Guarantee Board (ELGB) had also required Lockheed’s board of 
directors to establish “a definitive corporate policy” in relation to prohibiting illegal 
foreign commissions and payments, by controlling “the company’s relationship with 
foreign consultants … as a condition to the continuance of the guarantee program” 
(United States 1976i, p.89-90). The policy was to be closely monitored by the ELGB to 
ensure no illicit payments were made in the future (United States 1976i). Then again the 
concern was that the additional requirements of the ELGB would only be “paper 
promise and token procedures that purport to prevent future bribery” (United States 
1977d, p.145). Secretary Simon assured Proxmire and his committee that the bribes and 
kickbacks would not continue in the future and if so, the loans would be stopped 
(United States 1975b). Nonetheless Proxmire was not satisfied as “Lockheed did not tell 
its board of directors or the Loan Guarantee Board or their accountants” about these 
payments (United States 1975b, p.19).  
 
Until 1975, Lockheed had provided Congress with “incomplete and unverified” 
information from which “the names of the recipients, the specific contracts and the 
names of the countries” were missing (Dardess 1979; United States 1975b, p.3). The 
SEC was also denied access by Lockheed and the State Department36 to Lockheed’s 
accounts as well as releasing any information to the public or foreign governments. 
Even “after lengthy negotiations with the SEC … Lockheed [would] agree to make 
partial disclosure of the information it had on its foreign payments” (Dardess 1979, 
                                                             
36 Secretary Kissinger intervened in the SEC/Lockheed court case and limited the SEC’s access in relation 
to public disclosure of bribery information. 
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p.650). Lockheed in an arrogant reply to the request for detailed information said that 
since the SEC is  
not able to assure confidentiality of the information being provided … to avoid 
unnecessary risk and potential harm to Lockheed’s shareholders and creditors 
… we do not feel it prudent to provide all of the data which you have requested 
(cited in United States 1976k, p.10). 
 
The main reason for this behaviour was that publicly available information was 
perceived by the Government and State Department to be jeopardising their foreign 
policy interests. The “premature disclosures of allegations” was furthermore claimed to 
“be used to create problems for both innocent and possibly guilty” parties (United States 
1976i, p.116). Disclosure of the identity of the people involved in payments of bribes 
was viewed by Proxmire as an effective action to stop these payments (United States 
1976k). However, he found the arguments by administration witnesses “rather 
persuasive because nobody wants to smear an innocent person” (United States 1976i, 
p.116). Further Proxmire, in his newsletter wrote the reason for Lockheed not disclosing 
the details of its bribery was its dependence “on the same sales agents who were 
involved in past bribery” (Proxmire 1976, p.2). Former Ambassador, Braden, and Under 
Secretary of State, Ball, were in agreement with Proxmire’s comment. Braden and Ball 
both had formed an alliance with Proxmire and his actor-network. Ball interpreted the 
State Department’s position as “a kind of conspirator in collaborating and maintaining 
the practice or at least in covering it up” (United States 1976i, p.43). This issue was 
viewed to be a future problem in relation to enforcement and criminal prosecution under 
new legislation that was to be enacted. Further illustrations and details will be provided 
in chapter five.    
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3.2 Interessement Moment of Proxmire’s Network 
The several hearings held by Proxmire can be demonstrated using ANT, as a way of 
assuring other actors in the network of his central role and goals. The main focus of the 
hearings was twofold. Firstly expanding and securing Proxmire’s network through 
engaging the SEC and secondly, enacting legislation which required disclosure of illicit 
payments. The section below provides details of the twofold focus. 
 
The first focus of the hearings was the SEC’s voluntary program and engagement of the 
SEC as a representative of the accounting standard setting body in the actor-network. 
By establishing a role for the SEC, Proxmire was able to assure the existence of his 
network. Cases of bribery and illegal payments had demonstrated the need for 
enrolment of a body, such as the SEC as the corporate regulator, that could reveal the 
deficiencies of accounting regulation. The SEC could assist Proxmire in forming new 
legislation that contained sections relevant to corporations’ disclosure of their financial 
information. 
 
As briefly explained in chapter two, the SEC’s program was initiated mainly because of 
the Watergate hearings and investigations into corporations’ lack of disclosure of illegal 
political contributions and payments. Watergate gave the SEC grounds to request some 
of the corporations to prepare reports to disclose their illicit payments, through the 
voluntary disclosure program. As already discussed in chapter two, the Gulf Oil Special 
Review Committee, chaired by McCloy, was a response to the SEC’s voluntary 
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disclosure program. The McCloy report provided details of illicit payments and 
recommendations for formation of future guidelines for companies. McCloy had 
suggested a thorough examination instead of an early “rush to statutory remedies before 
the whole case … and all the factors [were] weighed” (United States 1976i, p.5). One of 
his suggestions to the subcommittee was establishment of a comprehensive definition of 
bribery. The reason being, bribery was defined generally and broadly and was not, 
according to lawyers, “within the mischief” of what the committee wanted to achieve 
(United States 1976i, p.9). The other issue addressed by McCloy, was for Proxmire to 
consider implementing the ‘materiality’ concept in his bill in relation to disclosure of 
illegal contributions. McCloy’s arguments and reported outcomes were on the same 
page as Proxmire, as explained in chapter two and will be explained in the following 
chapter, since McCloy had observed a need for future guidelines for companies. Hence, 
it could be argued that he was enrolled into the network as a new actor.  
 
At the request of Proxmire, and the Senate subcommittee, the SEC prepared a report 
based on the voluntary program outcomes. The report found “[m]ore than 400 
corporations…admitted making questionable or illegal payments” and “reported paying 
out well in excess of $300 million in corporate funds” (United States House of 
Reresentatives 1977, p.1). These funds, according to the program report, were not 
recorded accurately in the records and books of the corporations and were concealed 
from external directors and auditors who were themselves linked to the circumvention 
of the system of corporate accountability (Securities and Exchange Commission 1976b; 
United States 1976n). Senator Proxmire applauded the SEC’s efforts on this subject by 
saying “if all agencies were as diligent as you are, and as competent as you are, and as 
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concerned with the public interest and with ethical conduct by American business, we 
wouldn’t have the problems we have” (United States 1976a, p.38). 
 
The other focus of Proxmire and the Senate subcommittee was establishment of new 
legislation requiring public disclosure of illicit payments. For this reason, Proxmire 
needed the support of the SEC as the corporate regulator. He wanted to “act forthwith” 
and without delay (United States 1976i, p.14), since he was concerned that “like so 
many other things that happene[d] in Washington and the country, … [concern over 
illicit payments would be] likely to die down as time goes on and”, the practice was 
likely to be accepted (United States 1976i, p.10). Ralph Nader shared the same view 
arguing for a push for reform combined with disclosure requirements,  
[o]therwise, we will see an attitude spread in this country … where no matter 
how abusive both governmental and corporate and other institutions may be, the 
people just shrug their shoulders and say, ‘Well, what else is new?’ (United 
States 1976i, p.16). 
 
The proposed bill by Senator Proxmire was S.313337. The intent of the bill was to 
require corporations registered with the SEC to file reports pertaining to their foreign 
payments and contributions. The bill made it a criminal offence for corporations to 
accept or offer/make foreign political contributions. One of the reasons he introduced 
this bill was “corporate abuses were accompanied by false or inadequate corporate 
books and records and that most of the cases involved illegal or improper domestic and 
foreign payments” which did not “constitute a violation of [the] SEC’s laws or 
regulation … constitut[ing] criminal violation” (United States 1976a, p.33). From 
                                                             
37 The details of the bill are provided in the following chapter. 
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Proxmire’s point of view, criminal injunctive was by far more effective than civil, as 
civil actions “are slaps on the wrist” with no fine, punishment or dismissals. It could 
only lead to defendants arguing “they will be good boys” (United States 1976a, p.33) 
while not halting reoccurrence in the future. Chapter five will detail the proposed bills 
to the Senate. 
 
3.3 The SEC’s Voluntary Program 
Even though Proxmire applauded the SEC’s efforts in revealing the violations of the 
federal securities law, falsification of corporations’ financial records and use of secret 
payments, the voluntary program had its shortcomings. The shortcomings were 
demonstrated by Senator Proxmire and Congressman Moss (explained later in this 
chapter) in the hearings they held and even future hearings held in 1977. By 
demonstrating the shortcomings, it can be explained by ANT that Proxmire was able to 
comprehend the reliability of the outcome of the voluntary program. In order for the 
program to be effective and to overcome its problems, Senator Proxmire’s suggestion 
was the establishment of regulation prohibiting bribery and having the requirement of 
“systematic disclosure of all foreign consultants’ fees” (United States 1976i, p.3). This 
was a way of promoting Proxmire’s solution to the problem of illicit payments as well 
as reinforcement of his network’s existence. Meeker, from the Center for Law and 
Social Policy and former ambassador to Romania, agreed with Proxmire on the need for 
the SEC “to adopt regulations requiring disclosure of all bribes, payoffs, questionable 
foreign payments, and … the disclosure of all commissions to agents and consultants 
and fees” (United States 1976i, p.71). 
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Adams, director of Military Research, Council on Economic Priorities, had stated that 
the initial problem with the program was that it had gradually developed “out of 
individual investigations and injunctions directed at specific companies whose 
questionable payments at home and abroad had caused widespread public comment” 
only (United States 1977g, p.28). So when the magnitude of the problem became 
apparent, the SEC took the voluntary option of collecting relevant information. The 
amount of information that was provided by the companies was “less detailed than those 
which … resulted from court orders” (United States 1976a, p.11). This was partly due to 
the SEC’s lack of power in “keeping the disclosures completely confidential” because 
of “the Freedom of Information Act and newspaper reporting” and to some extent 
making corporations “reluctant to comply with” the program (Adler 1982, p.1744).  
 
The other fact was that the guidelines provided by the SEC were loose and flexible and 
lacked detailed mandatory rules and procedures (United States 1977g). McCloy, in the 
April hearings of the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee said “I have been 
told quite authoritatively that the SEC has been unable or unwilling, as yet, to come up 
with any guidelines as to corporate behavior in … foreign payments” (United States 
1976i, p.6). The SEC’s position in relation to the program and lack of having defined 
guidelines was viewed by one of the members of the AICPA advisory group as not 
being responsible (Hanson 1976), because it could have long term effects on the ability 
of the SEC to effectively deal with illicit payments (Hanson 1976). The lack of 
definitive guidelines, rules and procedures led to corporations defining questionable 
payments in their own terms leading to selectively reporting or ignoring the facts 
available. As discussed in chapter three, the SEC in its investigations had relied on these 
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reports prepared by managements with the assistance of their independent auditors. 
Harrington, Massachusetts Congress representative, was also concerned regarding 
corporations’ reluctance in revealing “even most general information about their illegal 
activities” (United States 1977d, p.145). The adequacy of companies’ disclosures to the 
SEC was doubtful and was questioned by Senator Proxmire and Congressman Solarz. 
Solarz, as an actor in Proxmire’s network, said that the “proof is in the pudding” since it 
was uncertain that corporations would voluntarily disclose “substantial illegal payment 
in such a fashion that it was clear to anybody who read the statement that they had made 
an illegal payment” (United States 1975a, p.77).  
 
Proxmire questioned the ability of the companies “to police themselves effectively 
under any circumstances” (United States 1976a, p.19). His argument was that, 
corporations had disclosed their illicit payments to “get easier treatment” which had 
undermined “the tough question [of] … how pervasive and widespread” the problem 
was (United States 1976a, p.21). Congressman Solarz also observed that even if a 
corporate executive’s cover up of bribe payments come to the SEC’s attention  
the worst that can happen is he will get an injunction requiring him to disclose 
it, which is what he would have done in the first place if he had wanted to … 
there is literally no incentive … to disclose these payments (United States 
1975a, p.77).  
 
The program had also relied on the boards of directors to conduct investigations and 
prepare reports for the SEC. Even the auditing procedures by auditing firms, were not 
extended “to uncover improper payments” (Hanson 1976, p.1). As argued by Adler 
(1982, p.1744) “the program overestimated the power of independent directors and 
124 | P a g e  
 
outside counsel to compel disclosure of payments”. These directors, as claimed by 
Ralph Nader and Proxmire, were friends such as McCloy, and relatives of the executive 
officers, who were handpicked to dominate the board, possibly leading to a lack of 
“external accountability that encourages responsible and lawful decisionmaking” 
(United States 1976a, p.97). Lockheed was one of the corporations that had used its own 
board of directors to perform the investigation and Proxmire was “not sold” on that 
(United States 1976k, p.68). Some of the corporations had employed independent 
compliance officers. However, Nader felt the independence of these officers could have 
been undermined by the corporations’ executives as they were under their “direct 
thumb” (United States 1976i, p.21). 
 
Senator Proxmire was also concerned with the number of corporations that had come 
forward as part of the voluntary program. The public only knew of corporations who 
had come clean and not the ones who did “not volunteer their guilt” (United States 
1976a, p.91). The Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee also raised concern about 
the SEC’s lack of effective enforcement, since the “essential complement to the 
corporate recordkeeping and auditing system is” its enforcement action (United States 
1976m, p.484). The subcommittee argued the SEC’s “lack of will to run an adequate 
enforcement program” (United States 1976m, p.485) meant “that there may be many 
other companies which have not come forth” (United States 1976h, p.41).  
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As stated in the SEC report submitted to the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 
Committee, more than 9000 corporations under SEC authority, at the time only 10038 
had disclosed questionable and illegal payments. The SEC believed “the present 
evidence of corporate abuse, while indeed serious, does not support any general 
condemnation of American business” (United States 1976n, p.54). Parsky, Assistant 
Secretary for International Affairs, had also argued that “[o]nly a relatively few firms 
appear[ed] to have engaged in making questionable payments abroad” which meant that 
the “vast bulk of … firms conduct their businesses ethically and completely in accord 
with the laws of the United States” (United States 1977d, p.84).  
 
In the SEC’s view, the disclosure system, initially established by the Congress in 1933 
and 1934, was sound and did not require “radical reform or renovation” (United States 
1977e, p.2), and even though the problem was widespread, it was controllable and did 
not “represent an inherent defect in … [the] economic system” (United States 1976n, 
p.56). The SEC was playing a dual role, one as a spokesperson of the Proxmire network 
and the other as an actor of the accounting profession’s network. The SEC believed in 
the accounting profession’s responsiveness and had observed that major changes were 
being undertaken in auditing practices. It had encouraged the Congress to give the 
AICPA “time to regulate the professional practices of its members” (Hohenstein 2009). 
The lack of alertness of the accounting profession in the past was claimed by the 
Commission’s chairman, Hills, “to be immaterial today” as the accounting profession 
were seem to be “moving forward” (United States 1976l, p.6). However, this point of 
                                                             
38 Before the program was over “more than 500 companies” had disclosed questionable payments to the 
SEC (Biegelman & Biegelman 2010, p.10) 
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view was not shared by Senator Proxmire. He referred to a court case in 1962 where the 
person had  
got a cease and desist order …and yet for 10 years they went right on doing 
exactly what they were doing before and nobody did anything about it. They 
really made no attempt to enforce the cease and desist order and that was a 
formal court order (United States 1976a, p.23). 
 
Senator Proxmire was also concerned with the SEC’s ability to take action against 
corporate management or executives who had made the decision to authorise the illicit 
payments thereby violating laws. His argument was, despite the SEC’s “startling and 
dramatic disclosures” to the Senate subcommittee, “there … [was] not a record of many 
resignations or firings” (United States 1976a, p.20). Harrington, Massachusetts 
Congress representative, perceived the U.S. reaction to be “charitably characterized as 
glacial at best” (United States 1977d, p.145). The crime by executives was seen as  
crime at the highest levels of these corporate institutions, [which] has a rotting 
effect through the society. Society is very much like a fish in this respect, it rots 
from the head down (United States 1976a, p.95). 
 
The political concern was the cost of regulation to businesses and its indirect effect on 
society and the market. Most cases were concluded with consent decrees and 
Corporations’ promises to obey the laws and rules in the future. In relation to the 
Lockheed case, for instance they even “went so far as to reward the officers involved by 
voting its former president and vice president each $65,000 a year in pensions” (United 
States 1977d, p.145). This was while the Japanese Prime Minister was “imprisoned and 
released only after posting $680,000 bail” (United States 1977d, p.145). In the U.S. 
even if a company was fined, the amounts were “insignificant compared to the amounts 
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illegally garnered” (United States 1976a, p.95). The fines were referred to by Ralph 
Nader as corporations’ “debt to society” which were minor (United States 1976a, p.96). 
Most corporate executives who had admitted to their wrong doings to the Watergate 
Special Prosecutor were  
still presiding over their companies … only two went to jail. They served a few 
months and were freed. Most are still ensconced in their panelled corporate 
offices with platoons of lawyers and public relations men at their disposal 
(United States 1976a, p.96).  
Proxmire further feared  
even though the issue is settled in theory, … many companies will continue 
paying bribes if they can get away with it, because the potential rewards are so 
great and the risks are minimal. Nobody has gone to jail. Only three 
corporations have fired their chief executive officers. At most, there has been 
some unfortunate publicity. Even Lockheed is reporting increased profits 
(United States 1976i, p.1). 
 
Proxmire arguments took place while in Japan, Italy, and Netherlands and other 
countries exposures of illicit payments had “produced strong public and governmental 
reactions” (United States 1976i, p.69). For instance in the Netherlands the royal family 
“was rocked by allegations that Prince Bernhard had received over a million dollars in 
‘unofficial payments’ from Lockheed” (Church 1985, p.100). Professor Ratner as an 
actor within Proxmire’s network, in a separate hearing, agreed to Proxmire’s argument, 
and explained that U.S. courts were reluctant to send managers to jail as U.S. “criminal 
sanctions and procedures were originally thought of as punishment for murderers and 
robbers; people don’t feel comfortable applying them to corporate executives” (United 
States 1976f, p.387). Ratner further maintained U.S. courts considered it was the 
corporations that had violated law rather than corporate executives. The problem was, 
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corporations “can’t be sent to jail. They can be fined, but in many cases the fines are 
insignificant given the size of the corporation” (United States 1976f, p.387).  
 
The lack of concrete response was partly due to the uncertainty and indecisiveness of 
the SEC in continuation of the voluntary program. As some of the commissioners 
wanted “to put the cap on this volcanic situation” and there was “a split among the 
commissioners” (United States 1976i, p.20). As Ralph Nader stated this situation was 
“not all encouraging” in relation to the extensiveness of the corporations’ disclosures 
(United States 1976i, p.20). He argued that even the SEC’s chairman, Hills, was 
“leaning towards lessening the rigors of disclosure for … overseas payments” (United 
States 1976i, p.20). The other issue was the SEC’s lack of power to penalise or “even 
slap wrists” and the power mainly resided with the Justice Department (United States 
1976a, p.109).  
 
However, the Justice Department’s efforts in this regard, as explained by Proxmire were 
“not a very reassuring record under either party … of Justice prosecuting top officials of 
corporations or … top officials in government. They seem to be allergic to that kind of 
action” (United States 1976a, p.28). Ralph Nader believed that “this reluctance … [was] 
as significant as the corporate abuses themselves” (United States 1976a, p.109). So, 
Proxmire wanted the SEC, as the network’s spokesperson, to directly take over the 
power of criminal enforcement “because the Justice Department has been so timid about 
prosecuting prominent corporate criminals” (United States 1976i, p.2) and white-collar 
crimes compared to prosecuting hoodlums (United States 1976i, p.15). He reflected his 
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assertion about the SEC’s extension of authority in his proposed bill which will be 
explained further in chapter five.  
 
Based on the above arguments, Ralph Nader’s recommendation was also the 
establishment of laws that would make the responsible individuals in corporations 
accountable for their actions. By quoting a law professor that  
we have arranged things so that the people who call the shots do not have to 
bear the full risk, that is, it is difficult to pinpoint and punish individual 
violations within that collective body called the corporation (United States 
1976a, p.96).  
His endorsement had reinforced the centrality of the primary actor's own role, and 
validating the proposed solution/goal. As well as strengthening Proxmire’s actor-
network.  
 
For an effective enforcement action in relation to corporate abuse of their power, Nader 
argued two points. One was in relation to jailing and disqualifying of “corporate officers 
or directors in any American corporation or partnership for 5 years” and the other was 
calibrated fines based on the size of the corporation and the “size of the violation” 
(United States 1976a, p.97). The second point was argued to be vital, as with  
penalties which are the equivalent of wrist slaps, the result is predictable. If we 
make the cost of a conviction sufficiently high, it should discourage many 
violations which now are profitable to pursue (United States 1976a, p.97).  
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3.4 Congressman John Moss and SEC Shortcomings 
Due to the investigations surrounding the improper corporate payments problem and the 
SEC voluntary disclosure program, during 1975, the Congress became interested in 
“accounting standard-setting, the accounting profession and oversight by the SEC” 
(SEC Historical, Congress Gets Involved) as well as auditors’ duties and their 
effectiveness. Congressman John Moss was amongst the first to hold investigations and 
hearings in relation to the break down in the system of corporate accountability and the 
SEC oversight and enforcement role. Congressman Moss was the author of the Freedom 
of Information Act, giving the public the right to government records. He led the 
hearing that produced the Securities Acts Amendments of 197539 which was the most 
comprehensive securities legislation passed by the Congress since the passage of the 
original securities laws in the 1930s by President Franklin Roosevelt’s call for 
legislation after the great stock market crash of 1929 (Markham 2006). 
 
Moss became the chairman of the House of Representatives Oversight and 
Investigations Subcommittee known as the Moss Subcommittee. The Moss 
Subcommittee examined the materials filed by corporations as part of the SEC’s 
voluntary program as well as reviewing the program itself (United States 1976h; United 
States 1976o). The hearings held by the Moss committee were heightened by the 
Watergate scandal investigations that were taking place at the same time. Questions 
were raised with respect to the auditing system and its failure to discover or report the 
political campaign contributions or the questionable payments. In this context, 
Congressman Moss argued “[s]ome accountants and auditors, surprisingly, contend that 
                                                             
39  The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, amended the Securities Act of 1933 and 1934. The 
amendments removed the barrier to competition by establishing a National Market System which 
encouraged fair and efficient handling of securities transactions (United States 1976h). 
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they are not responsible for detecting fraud. The public wonders what their real 
responsibility is and to whom they are responsible” (United States 1976m, p.484). 
 
The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, initiated its investigations of 
governmental regulatory agencies such as the SEC since it was felt “that the Congress 
really … [had] never in the past exercised its proper oversight role” (United States 
1977d, p.147). The criticisms were in relation to “the assumption that government … 
[had] lost touch with the governed … [and] that the regulatory agencies are responding 
… to their own need to survive” (United States 1976h, p.2). The investigations led to a 
comprehensive report of the study of federal regulatory bodies in relation to their 
“independence, performance, and economic effects of [their] … activities … under the 
Subcommittee’s jurisdiction” (Chapin & Gramling 1996, p.7; United States 1976h, p.4).  
 
Moss wanted to ensure the establishment of “tighter government regulation of financial 
reporting” (Clikeman 2008, p.73). He wanted to ensure financial statements were 
accurate and truthful, taking into account that the accounting profession were able to 
lobby the government. Because from the committee’s review, the SEC had not fulfilled 
its statutory responsibility in relation to enforcement and establishment of accounting 
and auditing standards (United States 1976h). For this reason it can be said that Moss 
was enrolled as the new actor in Proxmire’s network. Moss’ aim was similar to 
Proxmire’s intent of improving the accuracy of books and records of corporations in 
protecting shareholders and increasing their confidence in the system of corporate 
accountability. From the perspective of ANT, the Moss investigations secured the 
existence of Proxmire’s network, by forming recommendations about the SEC 
voluntary program and their accountability and responsibility towards the public. 
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3.4.1 The Federal Regulation and regulatory Reform 
The Moss Subcommittee argued that they have  
found most clearly … that regulation cannot be summed up in catch words, 
simple phrases, or rhetoric. It is a many-faceted process [which] is a dynamic 
process, like our government itself and like our society (United States 1976h, 
p.1).  
In relation to the SEC, as per the subcommittee report, it had partly failed in its 
responsibility of exercising “its standard-setting and enforcement authority earlier 
regarding accounting practices” (United States 1976h, p.17). It had, in addition, failed in 
not exercising “fully its statutory authority to remedy deficiencies in generally accepted 
auditing standards” (United States 1976h, p.38). Even after the SEC took action 
concerning questionable payments, through their voluntary program, the sufficiency of 
their action, and “thorough follow-up investigations” were questioned by the 
subcommittee (United States 1977d, p.151). In some instances the SEC had failed to 
require corporations to disclose the detail of their specific questionable payments, while 
in other cases “to permit only generic disclosure” (United States 1977d, p.151). 
 
From the Moss Subcommittee’s perspective, the breakdown of the system of 
accountability was related to the key stages of  
internal corporate conduct and financial controls; board of directors; 
independent accountants, auditors, and legal controls; public disclosure of 
corporate practices and finances; and enforcement by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (United States 1976h, p.31; United States 1977d).  
The SEC’s role in this break down was partly due to its doubtful reliance on the private 
standard setting bodies which were created by the American Institute of Certified Public 
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Accountants (AICPA) such as the Accounting Principles Board (APB) and its 
successor, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)40. This is while  
[t]he FASB … had accomplished virtually nothing towards resolving 
fundamental accounting problems plaguing the profession … and the 
manifestations of private accountant’s lack of independence with respect to their 
corporate clients (United States 1976h, p.32).  
The breakdown was also related to the “SEC’s reliance on the private accounting 
profession alone to assure that corporate records are examined by independent auditors” 
which was “insufficient to protect public investors and accomplish the objectives of the 
Federal Securities laws” (United States 1976h, p.38). The above subcommittee’s 
findings led Congressman Moss to doubt “the Commission’s success in securing 
cessation and remedial action” in this regard in the future (United States 1976h, p.41). 
 
4. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
As explained in previous sections, the enforcement of pre-existing laws such as the 
Corrupt Practices Act were part of the problematisation process instigated by the 
principle actors of the networks. The Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) was one of the governmental agencies responsible for investigating 
corporations who had paid political contributions and had recorded them as expenses, 
prior to the 1970s. Back then due to the Department of Justice (DoJ) lack of 
enforcement and prosecution of many of the IRS cases in relation to corporations’ tax 
violations, “the Intelligence Division lost interest in pursuing” these investigations 
(United States 1975c, p.773). The DoJ, in some cases took “guilty pleas under the 
Corrupt Practices Act which gave them a slap on the wrist” and according to the IRS it 
                                                             
40 Details of these bodies are discussed in chapter three. 
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did not deter corporations from engaging in these contributions in the 1970s (United 
States 1975c, p.773). The argument was that if “the Government had followed through 
and continued these investigations”, Watergate would not have occurred (United States 
1975c, p.773). 
 
Apart from the DoJ’s attitude towards prosecution of corporations, if the IRS, according 
to Proxmire, had exercised its power and conducted its duties to its full, the problem of 
illicit payments would not have occurred (United States 1976a). IRS activities and 
operations were supervised and directed by the Secretary of the Treasury Department 
and the GAO was responsible for “regularly auditing … [the IRS’s] routine operations 
and records” (United States 1975c, p.10). The IRS written mission was “to encourage 
and achieve the highest possible degree of voluntary compliance with tax laws and 
regulations” (United States 1975c, p.1). Prior to August 1975, it did not require 
“taxpayers to furnish information as to payments of bribes or kickbacks” nor did it 
investigate corporations’ slush funds or “illegal deductions of questionable payments to 
foreign officials abroad” (United States 1976j, p.188-189).  
 
The IRS received huge amounts of information relating to illegal political contributions 
from the Ervin Committee and the Special Prosecutor’s investigations. During 
December 1974 and August 1975 the IRS issued two separate guidelines related to 
“political contributions made abroad” and later regarding slush funds and “payments 
made through foreign subsidiaries” (Biegelman & Biegelman 2010, p.10). Due to the 
volume of information, the IRS had used computers “to collate it and ultimately to 
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disseminate the information to the field”. Afterwards the computers were removed and 
disbanded by White House interference (United States 1975c, p.777). Without the 
computers, the IRS was unable to retrieve the information at a later time which was 
critical to their investigation of illegal payments.  
 
The Director of Intelligence Department of the IRS was ordered “to keep out of that 
activity” without any reasoning from the Office of the Assistant Commissioner of 
Compliance (United States 1975c, p.778). The Department did not have adequate power 
to detect and investigate serious criminal tax violations “as far [as] the revenue system 
… [was] concerned” (United States 1975c, p.787). The majority of the IRS time was 
spent on small violations while giant violators were “responsible for the real aggregate 
losses of revenue to … Government” (United States 1975c, p.787). Giant violators were 
described as the bigger fish with “more resources … at … [their] disposal in order to 
frustrate any efforts that might be undertaken to assess proper penalties” (United States 
1975c, p.787). 
 
The SEC voluntary program and the reports that were produced due to the program also 
triggered the IRS to review and investigate corporate practices in relation to foreign 
payments and indirectly becoming part of Proxmire’s network by testifying at 
Proxmire’s hearings. The IRS was also working with the Justice Department in assisting 
them in their investigations. The IRS involvement in the investigations “satisfied some 
critics’ view that the SEC investigations failed to monitor privately held companies” 
(Broehl 1998, p.325). The focus of the IRS was on issues that had significant tax effects 
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such as uncovering tax evasion and avoidance schemes. It was also concerned with the 
“bribes [that] were being charged off as legitimate business expenditures” (Broehl 1998, 
p.325).  
 
5. President Ford Task Force 
Gerald Ford became the U.S. president upon the resignation of Nixon in August 1974, 
and in the wake of the Watergate scandal. He was the only politician to take up the vice-
presidency and later presidency without being voted into office. Subsequently, like 
Church, he was running for the 1976 presidential election. Partly to assist him in 
winning the Presidency, in March 1976 he officially established a “10 member Cabinet-
level Task Force on Questionable Payments Abroad” to perform a “full-scale 
investigation” regarding questionable payments abroad (Greanias & Windsor 1982; 
United States 1976c, p.136). The task force chairman was the then Secretary of 
Commerce, Richardson, and was directed by the President. In terms of ANT, Ford was 
creating a network consisting of agencies of the federal Government, such as Secretary 
of the Treasury, Defence and State to name a few, to handle the problem of questionable 
payments abroad to “meet the public demand for action without causing undue 
disruption to carefully crafted and already fragile international relationships” (Greanias 
& Windsor 1982, p.60). From Proxmire’s perspective it had taken such a long time for 
the task force to be established by the administration, “in view of the seriousness of the 
problem” of illicit payments (United States 1976i, p.119). He was sceptical that the task 
force like the SEC and the Congress would be able to devote any considerable amount 
of time to investigate and study the problem. Proxmire noted that  
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[d]espite the excellence of the men appointed to the task force, it … [was 
going to] be a stall. The Cabinet committee to study a problem is, by 
definition, a prescription to delay making hard decisions. Cabinet members, 
heads of Government departments are busy men and they have many duties 
and I’m frankly sceptical as to how much time they have to devote to the study 
of bribery (United States 1976i, p.119). 
 
To secure his network, he argued that this task force was different from other 
investigations as it was “a coordinated program to review” the questionable payment 
cases and “to explore additional avenues … in the interest of ethical conduct in the 
international marketplace and the continued vitality of … [the] free enterprise system” 
(Ford 1976). Ford’s purported aim was to develop a comprehensive government policy 
to address these payments due to its impact on the economy. Whereas, as explained in 
the previous sections, the aim of Proxmire’s and Church’s network was imputation of 
“American morality into the conduct of American business abroad” (Greanias & 
Windsor 1982, p.60).  
 
The purpose of the task force was partially similar to the SEC’s voluntary program and 
the subcommittees’ hearings held by Church and Proxmire, “to conduct a sweeping 
policy review … and to formulate a coherent national policy” with clear and 
enforceable criteria on the illicit and foreign payments (United States 1976i, p.77) but 
“not to punish American corporations” (Greanias & Windsor 1982, p.50). The SEC, 
however, was not part of the task force but the chairman of the task force argued that if 
required, the SEC would “be invited to participate in the efforts of the task force” 
(United States 1976i, p.77). The task force was in charge of developing a policy “to 
understand the character and scope of the problem” and not investigating cases only as 
138 | P a g e  
 
opposed to the SEC’s voluntary program (United States 1976l, p.40). The President on 
this matter had said  
[a]lthough the Federal Government is currently taking a number of 
international and domestic steps in an attempt to deal with this problem, I 
believe that a coordinated program to review these efforts and to explore 
additional avenues should be undertaken in the interest of ethical conduct in 
the international marketplace and the continued vitality of our free enterprise 
system (United States 1976l, p.58).  
The President wanted the U.S. to take the lead in advocating “free, honest, and 
competitive economic behaviour” in the international marketplace (President Ford 1976, 
p.1). In the view of the task force, the questionable payments were conceived to be “a 
diplomatic problem” (McManis 1976, p.220) and the current law was insufficient to 
address the problem and initially there was a need for an international treaty. This 
argument was supported by the President himself and was reflected in the bills proposed 
by the Task Force in 1976. As will be detailed in the following chapter, the proposed 
bills “treated all questionable expenditures as extortion payments and the entire problem 
as primarily one of foreign relations” (McManis 1976, p.221). The bills were not 
considered by the Congress during 1976, as it was in recess during June and August for 
the Republican and Democratic conventions and also it was an election year (United 
States 1976i, p.109).As such, the Congress was going through a difficult year. For this 
reason as well as the underlying purpose of the bills not being approved by the 
congressional hearings and their members, the bills were not approved by the Congress 
and it led to eventual breakdown of the Ford network. 
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6. Conclusion  
The need for new legislation was apparent from the hearings and investigations that 
were led by the Senate, House of Representatives, the SEC and the President’s task 
force. Networks were created as a result of these congressional hearings to put an end to 
the problem of questionable payments by corporations and politicians, domestically and 
internationally. The hearings assisted with shedding light on corporations’ disclosure 
and record keeping of their political and international affairs. Similar to the Ervine 
Committee, corporations were found to be using their subsidiaries to conceal the 
political contributions. Advertising, marketing or research accounts were used for this 
purpose while the board of directors, shareholders and sometimes independent auditors 
were not advised of the payments and how it was recorded in the books of the company. 
The lack of transparency and accountability was prevalent in the cases presented. 
 
Accordingly, Senator Church and Senator Proxmire, as the proponents in establishing 
their networks, as well as President Ford, independently presented different bills to the 
Senate and House of Representatives to regulate U.S. corporations in relation to these 
payments. The bills presented had different approaches to the problem of corrupt 
payments. The following chapter will explain the details of the bill’s that were 
presented to the Congress and the success or the failure of the described networks in this 
chapter. Since the existence and indispensability of the networks are directly linked to 
the ability of principal actors to persuade actors within and outside network that their 
solution is the only possible way to halt illicit payments occurring in the future. The 
next chapter will explain the political and personal challenges the principle actors of 
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each network faced in getting the endorsement for their bill’s presented to the members 
of the Congress.  
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Chapter Five: The Tale of 
Shakedowns and Passage 
of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act 
 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is a classic example of the ills that can be engendered by 
legislation shaped over a short period of time, under stress conditions, which draws support 
from different groups with different purposes, and which passes, ultimately, in the heat of a 
moment when something noble sounding must be done (Greanias & Windsor 1982, p.5). 
 
By examining the hearings explained in previous chapters, it can be said  
[t]he reports of illegal domestic contributions that flowed from Watergate 
suggest that the problem may not be one of lower standards abroad, but low 
standards in general for U.S. corporate behaviour (United States 1977g, p.35).  
This was highlighted as one of the key conclusions of the SEC report, as argued in 
chapters two and four, that  
the almost universal characteristic of the cases reviewed to date by the 
Commission has been the apparent frustration of our system of corporate 
accountability which has been designed to assure that there is proper accounting 
of the use of corporate funds (Bathen 1978; United States 1976n).  
The key element that makes the accountability system function is the disclosure and 
record keeping requirements to which corporations have to adhere. Some of the bills 
presented to the Congress during the 1970s included sections pertaining to disclosure 
requirements and corporate accountability. However, as will be noted in this chapter, 
some of the networks were not able to pass their bills through the Congress. The 
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absence of these requirements in the enacted bill and lack of enforcement of the passed 
provisions, as will be explained in the following chapters, led to similar problems 
resurfacing in 2000. The SOX act, as reasoned in chapter one, was enacted as the 
solution to the then identified and pre-existing problem of illicit and questionable 
payments. This chapter will refer to the SOX act where relevant. 
 
The pattern of unethical and illegal payments explained in Chapter four and by Senator 
Church at the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations’ hearings was 
that Gulf [Oil] invested heavily in Korea at the explicit urging of the U.S. 
government … Northrop was carrying out U.S. government policy in 
promoting U.S. exports … [in the Exxon case] the U.S. government played a 
critical role in influencing Italian legislation to favor the private foreign-
American-oil companies. … [T]he U.S. Department of State adopted a policy 
of hear no evil, see no evil (United States 1973a Part 12, p. 240). 
The general consensus of the need for new legislation or guidelines was apparent from 
the hearings held by committees and subcommittees during 1975 and 1976. A review of 
previously held hearings demonstrate that this was the preferred solution by the 
principal actors to the problem of illicit payments, even though “there was a wide 
divergence of opinion … on how the problem should be handled legislatively” (Dardess 
1979, p.637). Nevertheless, the need “to restore public confidence in the integrity of the 
American business system” was apparent (Dardess 1979, p.637). This view, based on 
testimonies presented at the hearings, can be argued was not shared by the majority of 
corporations, actors outside the existing networks. For instance Bowen, chairman of 
Booz Allen and Hamilton consultants stated “A bunch of pip-squeak moralists running 
around trying to apply U.S. puritanical standards to other countries” and domestically 
(United States 1977g, p.33). He further even argued that he would not fire an employee 
making bribe payments abroad as this was part of his duties and job.  
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From the perspective of McCloy, as an actor in Proxmire’s network, Government 
agencies could not “sit back and simply say, [l]et conscience be your guide but woe 
betide you if you make what we consider to be a misstep. … [P]erhaps the Congress-
should bite the bullet and give some helpful guidelines” (United States 1976i, p.6). 
Public disclosure as a non-human actor and a preliminary deterrent system was seen as 
imperative. It was a common remedy proposed by actors testifying at the hearings and 
in proposed legislation by the created networks, explained in the previous chapter. 
Ralph Nader referred to this system as an “early alert-type system … [that] makes the 
corporate executives think twice before” engaging in illicit activities (United States 
1976i, p.18). A similar perspective was shared by Meeker, from the Center for Law and 
Social Policy and former ambassador to Romania, noting disclosure would stop 
corporate officers from engaging in corrupt practices due to the power of “public 
scrutiny” (United States 1976i, p.66).  
 
Based on Callon’s translation model, the Church and Proxmire networks were both at 
the mobilisation stage. The networks required spokesperson/people to communicate and 
represent the principal actor’s solution to the Congress and the public, in order to gain 
further support for their solution. Both Senators Percy41 and Garn42 were playing the 
role of spokesperson for their network, the former representing the Church network and 
the latter, Proxmire’s. Their role in terms of Callon’s model could be “described as the 
progressive mobilization of actors who render the following propositions credible and 
indisputable by forming alliances and acting as a unit of force” (1986b, p.216). They 
                                                             
41Senator Percy was a member of the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations. 
42 Senator Garn was a member of the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. 
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both were in agreement with formation of new legislation that would curb corruption 
and bribery. At the same time, both were advising the networks not to rush into “this 
highly complex problem”, and to start to propose legislation and orbit it around to start 
the dialogue, comprehending the reactions and pros and cons (United States 1976i, 
p.38).  
 
From the perspective of both principal actors’, disclosure requirements alone “may not 
be enough to protect all the interest that the United States has” and an appropriate level 
of penalty was necessary to be included in the proposed legislation by their networks 
(United States 1976i, p.70). Since the matter of concern was international, as 
transactions were performed in foreign countries, they were advised to frame an 
international code of conduct. This chapter will explain in detail the proposed 
legislation of the created networks of Church, Proxmire and Ford, and where possible 
reformation and breakdown of the networks or dissidence of the actors. The following 
section will explain the international resolution that was cosponsored by Senator Church 
and the issues surrounding acceptance of the proposed resolution by the actors 
enrolled/unenrolled in the networks.  
 
1. International Resolution  
Public disclosure can act as a major governing tool for companies (Senator Percy 
United States 1973a Part 14, p.322), as well as for stakeholders managing their 
economic decisions and protecting their interests. Percy quoted from Justice Brandeis 
(1914, cited in United States 1973a, Book 12, p.15) that  
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[p]ublicity is just commended as a remedy for industrial disease. Sunlight is 
said to be the best disinfectant. A corporation avoids conduct that will prove 
embarrassing if disclosed; the possibility of future disclosure constitutes a 
major element in shaping current decisions.  
Senator Church’s outcome from the hearings he convened was that there was a need for 
a national and international solution with the focus on enforceable disclosure 
requirements, as the problem was argued to be worldwide. Companies were competing 
globally and corporate disclosure and anti-trust procedures were to be internationally 
harmonised and to be discussed in international forums, such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations, and the OECD, so that the companies would not 
be disadvantaged in their dealings.  
 
This position was also shared by the Department of State which argued “it would not be 
advisable for the United States to try to legislate the limits of permissible conduct by 
our firms abroad” (United States 1975a, p.24). It was mainly concerned about the U.S. 
efforts to legislate and impose a peculiar standard regarding corporate political 
contributions without an international code of conduct which would have been 
presumptuous and counterproductive (United States 1975a). As “the United States 
cannot police the internal affairs of foreign states” and “the only solution to corruption 
lies in the societies concerned” (United States 1975a, p.24).  
 
Without international disclosure law, foreign companies and Governments would be 
willing to accept secret and unethical payments which would disadvantage American 
corporations. Senator Ribicoff argued this point saying  
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[i]t hurts us competitively to see that the American companies are the only ones 
being traduced, the only ones being blamed, the only ones being pilloried when 
we know that companies all over the world are engaged in the exact same 
practice (United States 1975d, p.35).  
In this context, Senator Percy compared corruption to pollution since corrupt and bribe 
payments have “[polluted] … democratic processes and free enterprise processes” 
(United States 1973a, Book 12, p.357). He stated you are not able to pass laws in 
relation to pollution in just one state of the U.S. or even national laws, as other states or 
nations still are able to pollute the lakes and the oceans (United States 1973a, Book 12).  
 
Simultaneously, in October 1975 a “multilateral trade” (United States 1975d, p.31) 
resolution, Senate Resolution 265, was submitted to the Senate Committee on Finance 
with the purpose of protecting “the ability of the United States’ [to] trade abroad” 
(United States 1975d, p.24). Also, to “serve to dot the “i”s on laws that” were in place 
such as the 1974 Trade Act (United States 1975d, p.28). The aim was establishing 
“stronger laws that … [would] force complete and accurate disclosure” internationally 
(United States 1975d, p.2). The resolution sought an international solution to not only 
prevent American corporations from participating in payments of bribes, kickbacks and 
political contributions in their international commercial dealings but also international 
corporations (United States 1975d).This would, create a fair ground for corporations to 
compete effectively in foreign markets. The Senate adopted the resolution “by a vote of 
93-0” in 1975 (United States 1976i, p.79). 
 
Senator Percy, as a member of the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, along 
with other senators had also urged the Government on the matter of enacting legislation 
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(United States 1976i). The United States Secretary and Treasury Secretary had started 
discussions with different countries and international forums, mainly the OECD, in 
relation to “business-government dealings”43 and establishment of international “ethical 
guidelines” (United States 1975d, p.16). The discussions had started at a time when the 
OECD had initiated “the 1975-76 revelations of corrupt international sales practices” 
movement (United States 1976i, p.71). The OECD guidelines were to be “applicable to 
business firms [which] is an agreement among governments to prohibit international 
bribery” (United States 1976i, p.79). The U.S. had recommended the OECD include a 
provision in their guidelines specifically requiring corporations to perform their duties 
“within the framework of the laws and regulations of their host country” in relation to 
avoidance of any bribe or payoff payments (United States 1976i).  
 
The discussions were partly influenced by U.S. corporations losing business 
internationally after the publicity of corporations’ bribery and illegal payments abroad 
and SEC’s investigations. Lockheed, for example, had “lost a substantial contract” to a 
French company as Lockheed did not pay bribes (United States 1975d, p.34). In this 
regard, the 1974 Trade Act provided the opportunity for the U.S. president to negotiate 
the extension of conditions of international trade by “bring[ing] international trade 
agreements into conformity with principles promoting the development of an open, 
nondiscriminatory, and fair world economic system” (United States 1975d, p.34).  
 
However, the government’s international move was questioned in different hearings. 
McCloy on one hand was skeptical in respect of establishment of an international code 
                                                             
43 OECD had initiated a working party regarding restricting corporations practices (United States 1975d).  
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of conduct. His argument was, in order to enact an effective code, there is a need for 
creating a group which could study the situation and provide for a “far greater 
awareness” internationally (United States 1976i, p.8). Braden44, Assistant Secretary of 
State, also indicated his disagreement with the way the State Department was initiating 
the fight against corruption internationally. He argued that their proposal which 
contained “international treaties, bilateral or multilateral” was “futile and puerile” 
(United States 1976i, p.25). Likewise, Senator Ribicoff questioned the Government 
approach by arguing that the “OECD is a debating society. When has OECD ever 
accomplished anything?” (United States 1975d, p.21). The issue with the OECD was its 
lack of enforcement power since it was a study group issuing voluntary codes of 
conduct for only multinational corporations. A similar argument was made in relation to 
the United Nations. Proxmire, for example, said “[t]he U.N. has never impressed me as 
a very effective enforcement organization … in countries that do not seem to have the 
will now to act against crimes of this kind” (United States 1976a, p.157). 
 
The other concern was with the way the U.S. administration was negotiating and 
debating with the international forums. Their interest was only in talking with these 
forums and lacked actions and power to implement any rules or regulation. Senator 
Ribicoff stated, “[n]ow, if you are going to use your power, for heaven’s sake use it. It 
is not just a question of using your arguments and using geopoliticis, but using 
ecopolitics” (United States 1975d, p.22). The argument was also about not only making 
proposals and negotiations with the OECD but also with GATT (General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade)45. The GATT was a body in which the U.S. had power and as well 
                                                             
44 Former U.S. ambassador to Argentina, Cuba, Colombia, and Chaco Peace Treaty. 
45 GATT was replaced by the World Trade Organisation in 1995. 
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had greater enforcement powers than other forums. The U.S. powers were explained by 
Senator Ribicoff as  
every country in the world marks time until the United States takes a position, 
and they know where they stand, and here is an opportunity … to place 
American business on the same basis (United States 1975d, p.35).  
 
Another concern was regarding the content of the discussions that were taking place in 
international forums. The argument in the Senate hearing was to separate and avert 
morality and ethics from debates and move to arguments with reference to 
“discriminatory practices towards American industry” that needs to be abolished 
(United States 1975d, p.28). Senator Gravel said to not lecture  
the world community. As … they will be only empty words until the world 
matures to a higher level. We want to be the driving force to that maturity, and 
the best way to do that is to make these nations pay in terms of dollars and 
cents46 (United States 1975d, p.28).  
 
Proxmire was concerned with the length of time it would take to establish and enforce 
an international treaty. The State Department in their testimony to the Banking, Housing 
and Urban Affairs Committee announced that it would take considerable time, up to ten 
years (United States 1976i). The concerns became realised when by 1977 and 1978 the 
OECD issued a voluntary corporate code of conduct consisting of “nonenforceable 
documents that most observers agree[ed] did little to effect change in corporate behavior 
or public opinion” (Broad 2002, p.71). Also, according to Transparency International, 
the Anti-Bribery Convention of the OECD which became enforceable on members in 
                                                             
46 Senator Gravel was referring to a penalisation method. 
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1999 was not “consistently enforced”(Heimann et al. 2011, p.5) as a “result of lack of 
political commitment by government leaders” (Heimann et al. 2011, p.2; Yockey 2013). 
 
2. Bills Presented to the Senate and House of Representatives 
The following sections of the chapter will explain in detail the different bills which 
were presented to the Senate and the House of Representatives by different Senators, 
Congressmen and the SEC in relation to questionable payments, from 1975 to 1977. 
Ultimately the Senate and the House separately decided on a bill to be passed as the 
FCPA. However, as will be discussed in this chapter and the following, 
[t]he House version of the bill did not contain the accounting provisions at all, 
and … were never debated on the House floor or in a House committee. In the 
Senate, the accounting provisions were overshadowed by the looming issue of 
overseas payments (The Committee on Corporate Law and Accounting 1978, 
p.309). 
Accordingly this study’s main focus is on the bills presented to the Senate, with slight 
discussion regarding the House of Representatives bills. Since, the majority of the 
House bills were identical to Senate bills specifically those of Proxmire or Church. The 
ANT is primarily utilised for explaining the proposed Senate bills and the arguments for 
and against these bills that were created during the 1970s. The following sections will 
initially analyse the relevant bills presented to the House of Representatives and then 
bills formed by Senator Church, Senator Proxmire and President Ford.  
 
2.1 Congressman Stephen Solarz’s Bills 
Stephen Solarz, a Democratic Congressman was elected to the House of Representatives 
in 1974, obtaining a seat on the Foreign Affairs Committee (Martin 2010). As part of 
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the House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Economic Policy hearings 
in 1975, Solarz introduced H.R. 7563. The significance of this bill was that it was the 
first bill presented to the House of Representatives concerning monitoring the overseas 
business activities of corporations by the Secretary of State to detect “any activities 
which may violate any Federal Law” (United States 1975a, p.4). It was initiated to deal 
with the problem of the failure of “the private sector and the executive branch … to take 
the initiative to monitor overseas business activities and to bring a halt to these 
unacceptable business activities” (United States 1975a, p.4). Solarz argued that the time 
for taking effective measures was “long overdue” (United States 1975a, p.4) and that 
the plea of Gulf Chairman Bob Dorsey that they need laws to protect them 
from being importuned by foreign politicians for donations and other financial 
considerations falls far off the mark and rings very hollow. One would hope 
that American business firms would have the foresight and mettle to police 
their own activities without the need for government control (United States 
1975a, p.3). 
 
He also had referred H.R. 7539 to the Judiciary Committee which had similar goals to 
the first bill as well as specifically prohibiting “the bribery of any foreign government, 
foreign official, or foreign political organization by any American company” (United 
States 1975a, p.4). The bill addressed, inter alia, criminalisation of payments of bribes 
and gifts to foreign officials or organisations, by including a section imposing “a fine of 
$10,000 or 1-year imprisonment or both” for breaches of the act (United States 1975a, 
p.4). The bills did not include any sections pertaining to accounting matters such as full 
disclosure of events in financial records. However, no major actions were taken on these 
two bills and they were not referred to any other committee or the Senate. As the bills 
had died, Proxmire, Church and President Ford individually and in agreement with the 
actors of their network, presented bills to the Senate and the House of Representatives 
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during 1976. The details of the bills are as set out in the following sections, and are 
presented in chronological order.  
 
2.2 Proxmire and His Proposed Solution 
Senator Proxmire introduced S. 3133 to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing 
and Urban Affairs in March 197647, as the only solution to his proposed problem as part 
of his network’s problematisation stage. His rationale for the timing of presenting this 
remedy at the hearing was that investigations that had taken place had established 
sufficient evidence to initiate a move on this issue. He wanted to confirm the existence 
of his network and avoid his network being contested by outside actors. 
 
The Lockheed documents, the SEC report to the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs Committee and the McCloy report were seen to be helpful. While “some, who 
rhetorically condemn bribery as roundly as the rest, want[ed] Congress to delay a 
remedy until the entire fortune 500 … [had] been investigated” (United States 1976i, 
p.76). Proxmire felt this delay was reasoned by Congress in a similar fashion to “an 
agency in the bureaucracy that was short on bureaucrats … hired a talking parrot … 
[and] taught him to say only one phrase: ‘Very complex, very complex’” (United States 
1976i, p.76).   
 
                                                             
47 Two identical bills to S. 3313 were reported to the House of Representatives during May 1976. The 
bills were H.R. 13870 introduced by Moss and Stark and the other one was H.R. 13953 introduced by 
Pickle. Both bills were also identical (United States 1977d). 
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The bill amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, requiring “issuers of securities 
registered pursuant to section 12 of such act to maintain and to furnish reports relating 
to certain foreign payments” (United States 1976i, p.2). One of the sections of the bill 
specifically required public disclosure and “periodic reports relating to any payment of 
money or furnishing of anything of value in an amount in excess of $1,000” as well as 
the details of the purpose of the payments and person or entity to whom the payments 
were made (United States 1976i, p.2). Proxmire had set a precise amount to avoid 
vagueness for corporations and Government. Also, to make it certain to corporations on 
what they should or should not report (United States 1976l).  
 
Hills48 feared that having a set threshold would “be a license for someone who will say 
‘All right, up to that I can get away with it’” (United States 1977d, p.30). On the other 
hand, the SEC was reluctant to impose a “hard-and-fast rule”, as it might have affected 
the Commission’s “necessary flexibility to vary its disclosure requirements to fit the 
precise circumstances involved” (United States 1976n, p.60). Also, setting a certain 
amount would imply that corporation’s payments below that amount would be 
immaterial while in some cases it would be the opposite (United States 1976l). Hills 
arguments and concerns were similar to McCloy’s suggestion to Proxmire, as briefly 
detailed in chapter three, in implementing a concept similar to materiality doctrine 
rather than having a specific threshold. The bill as explained required disclosure of the 
identities of recipients of the payments, to effectively deter them from illegal activity. 
This was opposed by the SEC, as it was argued that their “primary function is not to try 
to cause changes in behavior”, but to “require a fair presentation of material facts” 
(United States 1976l, p.25).  
                                                             
48 Roderick Hills served as the SEC’s chairman from 1975 to 1977. 
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The SEC had only supported the bill’s underlying philosophy of “need for remedial 
legislation” (United States 1976l, p.1). The SEC was mainly interested in extending the 
current available laws to include guidelines on disclosure of questionable foreign 
payments and not penalising corporate officials. Proxmire wanted to retain the SEC, as 
the spokesperson, in his network and avoid this actor becoming dissident. So, Proxmire 
agreed to the SEC drafting a modified version of S. 3133 and elimination of the 
disclosure requirement of his bill, since the SEC was not in support of the current 
version of the bill (Jacoby et al. 1977; United States 1976l). Accordingly, the SEC’s 
modified version of S. 3133 that included their proposed accounting and financial 
reporting recommendations was presented to the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 
Committee. The modified version included “a prohibition against the making of false 
and misleading statements by corporate officials or agents to those conducting audits” 
and management establishment and maintenance of an internal accounting control 
system (United States 1976n, p.58). Further details of the modified version will be 
explained in the ‘SEC’s Bill’ section of this chapter.  
 
The Department of Commerce and other public witnesses, as part of the Proxmire 
network, who testified at the foreign and corporate bribes hearings, such as Ball, Nader, 
Senator Percy, and Braden to name a few, supported the public disclosure requirements 
of the bill. Meeker, from the Center for Law and Social Policy, supported the legislation 
rather than any guidelines established by the SEC or any other body as the guidelines 
would not have any validity (United States 1976i). As was explained by Ball, it was 
essential to firstly “put our house in order … to make this illegal” and then move 
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towards an international agreement (United States 1976i, p.102). Proxmire too agreed 
on this point and was “convinced it will be effective” to pass legislation influencing 
corporations domestically. In addition, an international move towards a treaty was going 
to take extensive time, the outcome was uncertain and enforcement would be feeble as 
argued in the previous section (United States 1976i).  
 
Even though actors of the Proxmire network were in general in agreement with the bill, 
they had different opinions in relation to his proposed solution. Different arguments and 
ideas by these actors could have either strengthened the bond between actors or vice 
versa. Proxmire, as the principal actor and chairman of the hearings, was the 
authoritative actor in charge of keeping the network intact. For example, Ralph Nader’s 
suggestion was the addition of a provision to the bill whereby the SEC would require 
the appointment of a “compliance officer … by the board of directors”, to monitor the 
disclosure requirements of corporations (United States 1976i, p.19). He also argued for 
tighter language as corporations could “escape the embrace of this bill through elaborate 
intermediaries” (United States 1976i, p.21). While the State Department, during their 
appearance at the ‘Foreign and Corporate Bribes’ hearings, was more in favour of an 
international remedy than unilateral action by Congress or Government agencies. Since 
already the SEC required “substantial disclosures” from corporations (United States 
1976i, p.101). Accordingly, a disclosure requirement at that time would have been 
premature. 
 
The bill had its shortcomings as argued by its opponents, which led to actors analysing 
and criticising it. The inherent limitation of the bill was that it only encompassed 
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corporations coming within the SEC rulings and did not cover privately held 
corporations (United States 1976i). The argument was that illicit payments offered by 
private companies or partnerships are not dissimilar to payments paid by publicly held 
corporations. Another weakness was that the bill mainly focused on foreign payments 
and not small gifts that were paid domestically by corporations. Both Proxmire and 
Nader agreed that “mere gifts” were extremely corrupting as it was “more difficult to 
trace” and would “tailor itself beautifully to the particular individual in the company” 
(United States 1976i, p.20).  
 
A third issue was with the bill extending the SEC’s authority to “initiate … , prosecute, 
and appeal any criminal action arising” from foreign payments (United States 1976i, 
p.3). Public witnesses at the hearing where Proxmire presented his bill opposed this 
section. The SEC was an administrative government agency with abilities to adjudicate, 
make rules, and investigate, consequently, criminal prosecution authority was 
dangerous (United States 1976i). The Justice Department, as explained in chapter four, 
held this authority. Even though the Justice Department was not responding to criminal 
prosecution requests due to  
political indifference, lack of adequate resources dedicated to these corporate 
violations, and the U.S. District Attorneys around the country … [had] not 
been instructed by the Justice Department to pay sufficient attention to these 
problems either (United States 1976i, p.22). 
Proxmire recommended, in agreement with Nader, extension of an existing SEC power. 
Which was a more effective remedy “to empower the SEC to remove officers or 
executives who … engaged in corrupt practices” (United States 1976i, p.23). This was 
perceived by Proxmire and a few actors of the network to be similar to the SEC’s power 
“to suspend broker-dealers for bribery” (United States 1976i, p.23). However, this 
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endorsement was not agreed upon by all the actors of the network, as argued by 
Proxmire in his ‘Foreign and Corporate Bribes’ hearings. McCloy had contested this 
issue in his appearance in the Senate hearings as well (United States 1976i). The SEC’s 
extension of power was discarded in the modified versions of S. 3133. 
 
2.3 Senator Church’s Network Outcome 
In May 1976, Senator Church along with Senators Clark and Pearson, as actors of the 
Church network, referred a bill, S. 3379, to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing 
and Urban Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The title of the bill 
was the International Contributions, Payments, and Gifts Disclosure Act. The major 
thrust of the legislation and the network’s solution was public disclosure of payments 
made to foreign government officials, entities or agents (United States 1976i). Since his 
committee and network were mainly investigating and scrutinising multinational 
corporations’ accounts and financial records. The vitality of his network was striving to 
achieve formation of a bill with the focus on corporations’ adequate disclosure of 
information in relation to illicit contributions. An identical bill to S. 3379 was presented 
to the House of Representatives by Solarz. The bill was H.R. 14340 which was 
introduced in June and focused mainly on the disclosure of contributions made by 
companies abroad. The following section will demonstrate the details of S. 3379 and 
Church’s network, which demonstrates the details of the House bill as well.  
 
The provisions of the bill were similar to S.3133 and called for amendment to the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. It “was an extremely comprehensive measure” 
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(Bathen 1978, p.1254) with a twofold focus. On the one hand, the bill’s emphasis was 
on the shareholders, potential investors, and boards of directors and auditors of the 
company, by requiring corporations to disclose detailed information pertaining to 
foreign and political contributions, payment and gifts in their financial reports. On the 
other hand, it included provisions relating to corporate governance. The proposal 
included “criminal penalties for failure to comply with its disclosure provisions” 
(Bathen 1978, p.1254). The Bill provided private rights for action by shareholders and 
competitors who could prove actual damages as a result of improper payments (United 
States 1976l). If the damages were proved to be correct, “treble the actual damage” and 
“costs of the action and reasonable attorney’s fees as determined by court” could be 
recovered by shareholders and competitors (United States 1976l, p.36). This was 
because some U.S. corporations were found to be paying bribes in order to compete 
with other U.S. corporations entirely and placing them at a competitive disadvantage. 
This section provided corporations with a right of action against their competitors 
(United States 1976l). The importance of the bill, based on the findings of the 
subcommittee, was that bribe payments and kickbacks could lead “corporate interests to 
take precedence over United States foreign policy objects” that could “create and foster 
an anti-American sentiment in individual foreign countries” (United States 1976l, p.32).  
 
S. 3379 required sworn disclosure statements of fees, commissions and gifts paid “to 
[an] agent or employee of a company or its parent … in connection with … direct and 
indirect political contributions to foreign governments [and] … nongovernmental 
purchasers and sellers” (United States 1976l, p.33). Disclosure statements were to be 
detailed and issued annually. The bill’s provisions were required to include details of 
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the amount, the names of the parties involved, the purpose of the contribution or the 
payment as well as the “identification of relevant foreign law” and to be recorded and 
kept for 5 years. The aggregate values of such payments were also required to be 
included in a company’s financial statements. The SEC was required to present this 
information to the State Department for their analysis in terms of their foreign policy 
(United States 1976i). 
 
The bill also contained a section in relation to the board of directors and audit 
committee composition and their duties. The main focus of this section was 
independence of the members of the board of directors that could constitute the audit 
committee of the company as well which was similar to section 301 of the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act (SOX) that was enacted later on in 2002 (as briefly pointed out in the 
introduction chapter of this thesis).  
 
A similar statement was made by Phillips, the representative from the Centre for Law in 
the Public Interest and a new actor in the Church network during the Commerce 
Committee hearings held in June 1976. The Centre was working on “a new litigation 
project on corporate responsibility” which involved lawsuits against corporations 
involved in illegal payments such as Northrop Corporation and Lockheed (United States 
1976f, p.438). From their close analysis, they found weaknesses in the structure and 
responsibilities of the boards of directors of the corporations. The purpose of the board 
was, in their experience, “more illusory than real. Directors … [had] become 
management appointees and shareholders … [were] an amorphous mass lacking 
effective representation or the machinery to organize” (United States 1976f, p.443). As 
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happened subsequently in WorldCom and other cases, for example, in the Northrop case 
“the Board was essentially rubber stamp[ing]” decisions of the CEO since he had 
“hand-picked Board members who were either his social or business contacts” (United 
States 1976f, p.440). This example also brings out Church’s argument in relation to 
independence of the members of the board, which from Phillips’ point of view was one 
of the basic problems in their cases. 
 
The other focus of Senator Church’s bill was the duties of the audit committee and their 
involvement in the internal systems of the company and internal investigations which 
was again parallel to subsections of the SOX section 301. The bill stated it was “the 
responsibility of any independent auditor hired [by the audit committee] to inquire fully 
into any illegal, unusual, or questionable activities” (United States 1976l, p.35). This 
particular focus of the bill was partly linked to investigations of corporate accounts 
about illicit payments as explained in chapter two and partly chapter four. Philips also 
testified that audit committees can help in ensuring “all the information will be 
presented to the board in some responsible form” (United States 1976f, p.445). Phillips 
emphasised that from their experiences having a mandated statement by the SEC or the 
Congress would require the board to adopt these requirements. However, only if 
corporations are non-responsive to these requirements, then the “regulation option … 
must be vigorously pursued” (United States 1976f, p.443). 
 
Proxmire and Hills, in their speeches during 1976 both agreed that it was essential to 
have audit committees in place that would understand the scope of audit and 
management. Hills also claimed that to have an effective internal control system and 
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accurate records it is necessary to ensure boards of corporations include independent 
members (United States 1977d). However, having this section as part of the legislation 
was perceived to be unnecessary and was something the SEC could mandate through 
public accountants and auditors. This difference in opinion was the major factor in 
differentiating between the accounting provisions of the bills presented by Church and 
Proxmire. Also as far as the theory is concerned it demonstrates the role of the SEC as 
the spokesperson of Proxmire’s network as well as the success of the principal actor in 
pursuing his solution. Chapters six and seven will detail whether the SEC was able to 
mandate these requirements and if the requirements were passed as legislation imposing 
requirements on corporations, since the Church bill was claimed to be “complicated and 
far-reaching” (Greanias & Windsor 1982, p.64). 
 
Church’s bill was presented at the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee in 
1976, where the SEC chairman and commissioners were testifying. The SEC’s then 
chairman, Hills, considered the bill would impose “far more of the role of being a 
governing body, setting accounting standards, setting accounting principles” on the SEC 
and would “dramatically change the role the commission … serves in relation to private 
industry” (United States 1976l, p.22). He further argued, this “kind of dramatic change 
is not needed to meet the problems we have uncovered” (United States 1976l, p.22). 
The above arguments clearly explain the ability of Proxmire’s network in mobilising its 
actors and spokespeople.  
 
The Senate “elected to drop the disclosure requirement and go the criminalization route” 
(United States 1977d, p.178). S. 3379, as the preferred solution by Church’s network 
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was rejected49. The bill was the main focal point of the network and it was the only 
reason that had kept the network transforming. The rejection of the bill on the basis that 
it was not “carefully tailored to what the genuine problems were and to go too far” 
meant that the network was falling apart and was contested at its mobilisation moment 
(United States 1977d, p.178).  
 
William Kennedy, Co-chairman of the Special Committee on Foreign Payments50 was 
in agreement with rejection of the bill, stating the SEC would have been “flooded with 
… useless reports, and, because they would be published, you would have had some 
unhappy commercial consequences for the businesses involved” (United States 1977d, 
p.183). Portions of the bill “offered as floor amendments during Senate consideration of 
S.3664 [as will be explained in the following sections], … were not adopted” and the 
bill was rejected (United States 1977g, p.91). The other reason the Church network was 
defeated and never reformed was that during this period, as previously detailed in 
chapter four, Church was also running for the 1976 presidential election as the 
Democratic nominee. He was also chairing another committee investigating secret 
agents, the CIA and the FBI, in the hope of reaching reforms in the existing government 
(Olmsted 1996)51 . Furthermore, he was criticised by one of the Foreign Relations 
Committee staff, Holt, regarding his efforts in boosting “his presidential stock” by “just 
chasing more scandals rather than digging deeper into the causes of problems” (Ashby 
& Gramer 1994, p.465).  
                                                             
49 The identical House of Representatives bill, H.R. 14340, was also rejected. 
50 The special committee on foreign payments of the association of the bar of the city of New York. 
Kennedy was also the counsel for General Electric company (United States 1977g). 
51 The detail of these investigations by Senator Church are beyond the scope of this study for future 
readings refer to the following readings as a starting point, “Fighting the Odds: The Life of Senator Frank 
Church” and “Challenging the Secret Government: The Post-Watergate Investigations of the CIA and 
FBI”. 
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2.4 SEC’s Proposed Bill 
As argued before, the SEC redrafted S.3133 to embody their proposed legislative 
recommendations which was “a response that fit[ted] the problem” that was advised by 
Proxmire during his network’s problematisation moment (United States 1977d, p.28). 
The revised legislation, S.3418, at the request of the SEC, was presented to the Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs Committee in May 1976 as part of their hearings on 
‘prohibiting Bribes to Foreign Officials’. The commission chairman argued the proposal 
was “a measured one, one that meets the problem we perceive”, and representing “a 
responsible reaction to the real problem of questionable and illegal foreign payments 
and practices” (United States 1976l, p.9).  
 
The bill amended section 13 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act by adding three new 
clauses with “fairly standard language” (United States 1976f, p.310) to encourage 
accountability in corporations. S.3418 requirements consisted of corporations’ 
establishment and maintenance of adequate accounting books and records, as well as a 
system of internal control. Under the Federal securities laws, “no [such] explicit 
requirement” existed (United States 1976l, p.19). The SEC was putting “more emphasis 
on the accuracies of the reports … [than] on the fairness of the overall bottom line of the 
company’s financial reports” (United States 1976f, p.310). These requirements from the 
SEC’s view point were to place a “new sense of responsibility … upon the system to 
make it accountable” (United States 1976l, p.6). Moreover, to  
provide the teeth to assure that problems of this nature … [were] brought to 
appropriate levels of corporate management, and recorded in a manner that … 
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[made] it far easier for … [the SEC] to discover them (United States 1976l, 
p.19).  
However, the bill did not contain any provision prohibiting illegal payments like the 
bills presented by Proxmire and Church. 
 
The SEC’s proposed legislation was based on a “straight-forward effort to deal with the 
problem that was uncovered” (United States 1977d, p.25) and required public 
corporations registered with the SEC to  
(A) make and keep books, records and accounts, which accurately and fairly 
reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer; and  
(B) devise and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls 
sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that  
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's general or 
specific authorization;  
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (1) to permit preparation of 
financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and (2) 
to maintain accountability for assets;  
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's 
authorization; and  
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing 
assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with 
respect to any differences (United States 1976n, p.63-64). 
 
The phrase ‘accurately and fairly’ was used in section A to put “the responsibility where 
it belong[ed]” which was corporations who were fooling their auditors and not “any 
accounting firm” (United States 1977d, p.26). Holton, the chairman of the committee on 
SEC regulations of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), 
had an opposing view asserting that this phrase was connoting “a concept of exactitude 
that is simply not obtainable, and there is no standard against which achievement of that 
precision can be measured” (United States 1977d, p.161). 
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Section B’s objectives of a system of internal control was defined based on the 
accounting profession’s definition. The generalised objectives were adopted from the 
Statement of Auditing Standard (SAS) 1, section 320.28 (Gary 1990; The Committee on 
Corporate Law and Accounting 1978) a rule that was developed for guiding auditors 
regarding accounting controls. It was stated that the profession’s definition was “the 
authoritative accounting literature” from the AICPA (United States 1976n, p.65). While 
the AICPA was unclear in what way the SAS 1 “objectives harmonize with the 
proposed statutory command required to be implemented by the registrant” since it was 
oversimplified “to excerpt a particular audit concept” (United States 1977d, p.167).  
 
The SEC believed by strengthening internal control, it could promote the corporation’s 
responsibility to their shareholders in disclosing material facts (United States 1976l). 
Since the purpose of this section was  
fostering and maintaining a control environment which [would] … enable 
directors and managers to rely on the corporate information system in fulfilling 
their responsibilities - not merely on preventing bribes (Williams 1980, p.42).  
This section was viewed by Congressman Moss to be necessary in restoring confidence 
in corporate accountability. He stated the “accounting gimmicks” such as off-the book 
slush funds were indicated “to be part of the underlying problem” and would have been 
avoidable if corporations had effective internal control systems in place (United States 
1977d, p.153). In other words, a system which is tested by independent auditors and 
assures shareholders of the protection of their assets (United States 1977d). However, 
this recommendation by the SEC based on the Oversight and Investigations 
Subcommittee and Congressman Moss  
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stop[ped] short of assuring necessary corollary protection: a requirement that 
independent accountants, who already must test management’s system of 
internal controls for purposes of performing a valid independent audit, attest to 
the quality of the system of internal controls (United States 1976h, p.34). 
Congressman Moss requested amendment to this section by adding a new subparagraph 
“requiring management’s independent accountant … to attest that management’s 
internal controls are adequate to protect shareholders’ assets” (United States 1977d, 
p.154).  
 
The third paragraph was in relation to corporations’ employees’ actions, “directly or 
indirectly”, in falsifying “any book, record, account or document … for any accounting 
purposes”. The SEC’s aim was to prohibit “affirmative false statements” presented to 
auditors and shareholders, as well as failure in making, obtaining or creating 
“documents, necessary for proper accounting records” (United States 1976n, p.66). This 
addition to the Securities Law was based on the SEC’s findings that the falsification of 
records was partly related to companies’ accountants or external auditors who had not 
followed the leads or performed “their professional responsibility” (United States 
1976m, p.550). This requirement was set in a way to “provide the basis for civil and 
criminal liability” and prosecution (United States 1976l, p.19).  
 
The fourth paragraph was in relation to prohibiting “management from lying or 
deceiving its independent public accountant” (United States 1977d, p.154). It 
specifically stated that  
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly  
(A) to make, or cause to be made, a materially false or misleading statement, or 
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(B) to omit to state, or cause another person to omit to state, any material fact 
necessary in order to make statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading 
to an accountant in connection with any examination or audit of an issuer (United 
States 1976n, p.64). 
However, Congressman Moss detected that the problem was also in relation to 
independence of outside accountants from management as was also detected by Metcalf 
in his study of the federal government’s role in establishing accounting practices which 
was explained in chapter three. From his perspective, public accountants as independent 
assurers of the accuracy of the financial reports are to be primarily loyal to the 
shareholders, “whose assets are at stake”, rather than management (United States 1977d, 
p.155), since the costs of their services are being paid from shareholders and investors’ 
funds. He further argued, public accountant’s responsibility  
goes beyond … [just] loyalty to the shareholder and his role of maintaining the 
confidence of public investors in the securities market. It goes to the heart of 
our economic system and the total society (United States 1977d, p.155).  
He argued for an amendment of this paragraph by including a section  
to provide that an independent public accountant who knowingly falsifies or 
contributes to the falsification of books and records or recklessly fails to 
ascertain all pertinent facts is suspended from participating before the SEC for 
at least some period (United States 1977d, p.154).  
 
The third and fourth paragraphs took into account falsification by “aiding and abetting, 
and joint participation” (United States 1976n, p.66). Holton had concerns in relation to 
the wording of these paragraphs arguing that a court might hold a view “that negligent 
mistake in a book or record or a negligently made misstatement is a criminal violation” 
which could have the person going to jail for it (United States 1977d, p.159). However, 
in early 1977 these two paragraphs of the bill were issued as a series of rules by the 
SEC rather than being included in the network’s legislation (Dundas & George 1979-
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1980). The SEC subsequently adopted these paragraphs as “SEC rules specifically 
related to the recordkeeping provisions of the FCPA” (Lacey & George 1997-1998, 
p.135). 
 
In addition, the SEC required corporations to establish audit committees comprised of 
independent directors “to work with outside auditors” to supplement this legislation 
(United States 1976n, p.67). This requirement came about from the SEC’s 
investigations of corporations’ books and records for illicit payments as well as a 
requirement of the bill proposed by Senator Church. It was revealed that some of these 
corporations had no audit committee or the committee was not fully independent of 
management, even though the SEC had advised corporations to establish an audit 
committee. Since the 1940’s52, the SEC required corporations to make “the role of the 
board of directors more meaningful and separat[e] the critical aspects of the functions of 
the board and independent counsel” (Schornack 1979; United States 1976n, p.67). 
However, these requirements were not part of the proposed bill as corporations, during 
the course of the voluntary program, were perceived to have already changed their 
governance and structures.  
 
The SEC was confident that it would be adequate for the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) to take action in this regard by modifying its policies and practices. The NYSE 
requirement for audit committees was modified to include the independence of their 
members from management and any “significant financial ties to the company” 
                                                             
52 In response to the McKesson and Robbins, Inc. investigation during 1940, the SEC recommended the 
establishment of audit committees by issuing Accounting Series Release No. 19 (Birkett 1986; Klein 
2002; Securities and Exchange Commission 1940). 
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(Schornack 1979, p.73). Corporations were to commit to the Exchange’s listing 
agreements and code of performance to be able to list their securities (United States 
1976n). Hills, therefore, was “optimistic that this concept … [would] be implemented” 
(United States 1977d, p.19) while the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee 
perceived this action to be limited in its effectiveness (United States 1976h). This action 
was perceived by the SEC as a way of maintaining “the credibility of … [the] system of 
corporate self regulation” (United States 1976n, p.B-30), the system which was 
established to protect investors and dependent on independent professionals such as 
auditors and outside directors (United States 1976f; United States 1977d). In addition, it 
would eliminate the “need for further direct government regulation” and set “an 
important example for other self-regulatory organizations” (United States 1976n, p.69).  
 
The SEC’s proposal, S.3418, from Senator William Proxmire’s point of view, was “the 
weakest” of the proposals introduced to the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Senate 
on May 18, 1976. The record keeping requirement was advised by Sporkin, head of the 
SEC’s Enforcement Division. The requirement was “a very simple one-line statute” and 
was suggested by him to Senator Proxmire as “all that was necessary” which Proxmire 
“was sceptical” about (Sporkin 1997, p.275). Professor John Burton53 recommended the 
addition of the internal control provision, and Proxmire was “still not satisfied that such 
a seemingly benign-sounding provision would be effective” (Sporkin 1997, p.275).  
 
                                                             
53 Professor John Burton, was dean of the Columbia business school from 1982 to 1988. He was away 
from this position from 1972 until 1977, when he served as the chief accountant of the SEC. 
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The goal of the principal actor and network was not satisfied with the content and 
purpose of the bill and could have led to collapse of the existing network. As it was 
“merely codify[ing] the requirement that a corporation keep honest records, a 
requirement that is at least implicit in the entire system of corporate accountability” 
(United States 1976l, p.1). The proposal was based on the assumption that by requiring 
companies to accurately reflect all their transactions on the books and records of the 
company, including the questionable and illegal payments, corporate officials would be 
discouraged from becoming involved in such practices (Bathen 1978; Securities and 
Exchange Commission 1977). Hills argued that  
[n]o accounting firm, no outside director, no lawyer, is going to risk his 
professional career, risk criminal penalties or civil litigation, simply to permit 
somebody to continue a questionable payment or practice. The important thing 
is that it gets disclosed (United States 1976m, p.549). 
 
The SEC believed their program, that required disclosure of the facts, as detailed in 
chapter two, had in most cases changed the corporate behaviour which showed “the 
wisdom of … [their] disclosure policy … [as] a better alternative than direct regulation” 
(United States 1976l, p.25). S.3133 and S.3379 both required mandatory disclosure of 
all questionable foreign payments, while S.3418 had discarded the public disclosure 
requirement. S.3418 requirements demonstrated that the SEC was no longer the 
spokesperson and was becoming dissident. The bill relied on the SEC’s “authority under 
existing law” (United States 1976l, p.2) and not “forcing more disclosure than” the SEC 
required based on the materiality concept (United States 1976l, p.22). The disclosure 
system relied on maintaining “the integrity of the corporate books and records” and not 
distorting the self-regulation system (United States 1976l, p.15). Since in their view, 
while the problem was “serious and widespread” it was controllable and did not 
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“represent an inherent defect in … [the] economic system” (Rubin 1976, p.622). 
Requirements of the two bills were anticipated by the SEC as “distorting the main thrust 
of … [their] activities to do something else that … [was] not … perceived to be 
necessary” by the SEC (United States 1976l, p.15). 
 
Due to Proxmire and some of the actors’ lack of support for S.3418 because of its 
shortcomings, the network was breaking down. Proxmire wanted to resolve the issue of 
illicit payment and to have the SEC enrolled in his network. His aim was to adjust the 
SEC’s weak bill. Since, the SEC was “spending a great deal of effort to put a finer point 
on a requirement that already exist[ed] while ignoring the more obvious need for new 
authority” (United States 1976l, p.19). These requirements were exercised before by the 
Commission, since its primary function was to develop “appropriate disclosure policies 
designed to assure … investors have access to all material information relating to 
securities offered to them” (United States 1976m, p.510). Kennedy also was advocating 
the same view point that  
[t]here was never a lack of law applicable to the situation. What there was, was 
a lack of law enforcement … . This doesn’t mean that you shouldn’t have new 
laws, but your new law should be tailored to the genuine problem and not to the 
optical one (United States 1976l, p.178; United States 1977d, p.178).  
 
From the SEC’s perspective, and contrary to Proxmire’s opinion, the then system of 
self-regulation that was well enforced by the Commission, as the most effective and 
efficient means of achieving corporate self-restraint in the marketplace, was adequate 
(Weismann 2008). This perspective was based on the SEC’s “regulatory philosophy … 
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of corporate accountability via self-regulation” (Barbara et al. 2010, p.784). Hills 
claimed the SEC had  
by any standard in the world, the most honest reporting system. … We have 
eight major accounting firms and a number of smaller ones. We have every 
confidence and belief that those professional people are doing their job (United 
States 1976m, p.549).  
 
The problem as perceived by the SEC was that the self-regulation system was 
frustrated. Therefore, with the adoption of S.3418 it was likely “to restore the damage 
done to the integrity of the system” as the SEC had “faith in the system of self-
regulation that has existed all these years” (United States 1976l, p.4). The argument 
from the SEC was that the problem was around corporations who had “totally ignored 
the system” (United States 1976l, p.4) and believed self-regulation had “the potential 
significantly to enhance the reliability and accuracy of issuer financial reporting” 
(Securities and Exchange Commission 1977, p.11). As the system had also assisted the 
SEC in pursuing its voluntary program and requesting corporations to disclose their 
illicit payments. 
 
Until then, as reported by Hills, the system had “worked remarkably well by any 
standard. It is the finest enforcement mechanism for business practice” (United States 
1976l, p.15). While it was not “as draconian a fashion as other measures”, the SEC felt 
confident with their bill’s approach and were pushing for its approval (United States 
1976l, p.11). It can be argued the S.3418 approach was potentially safeguarding and 
protecting the SEC and perhaps the accounting profession. As noted by Senator 
Proxmire, in a response to Hills “[y]ou see, what bothers me about that is, as you say, 
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you have faith in the system that it will work and I would like to have as much faith as I 
can; but the fact is it has not worked” (United States 1976l, p.6). Proxmire’s argument 
was related to the aftermath effect of the proposal, when the exposure on the illicit 
payments “dies down” (United States 1976l, p.6). When corporations and Government 
go back to their old ways of doing business and the lack of ability of the proposal to put 
an end to these payments. The argument was that self-regulation was insufficient to 
curb corrupt practices as company managers believed that there was a need to pay 
bribes to remain competitive or to conduct business.  
 
The S.3418 requirements, conflicting with Proxmire’s proposed solution, were designed 
in a way to encourage the private sector to correct the problem, with SEC supervision, 
and without Government involvement in business practices. It was “the least costly way 
of attacking the problem” by relying on “a flexible materiality concept” to have 
corporations meeting “a responsible standard as determined by the society around them” 
(United States 1976l, p.12). The securities law already had a rule in place to disclose 
material payments by asking corporations for honest records, and it would be in their 
best interest to disclose the illicit payments “so people realize that a company is not one 
of the ‘bad guys’” as argued by Evans, the SEC’s then commissioner (United States 
1976l, p.12). Nonetheless, Proxmire argued for enactment of legislation that went 
further than the SEC’s proposal which was investor protection and disclosure of 
material facts (United States 1976l). As part of the ‘Corporate Rights and 
Responsibilities’ hearings, Professor Stevenson from George Washington University, 
expressed the same views as Proxmire that the SEC requires “to expand their disclosure 
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requirements to take care of other social problems” rather than just protecting investors 
(United States 1976f, p.422). 
 
3. The Outcome of the Above Hearings 
After all the representations made by different actors at the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on the above bills, and failure of the Proxmire 
network, the committee met in June 1976 (U.S. Senate 1977) and “agreed to report a 
clean bill”54 by Senator Proxmire, S. 366455, to the Senate in July 1976 (United States 
1976p, p.30). The bill was a combination of the S. 3313, S. 3379 and S. 3418 bills 
which, based on Proxmire’s speech on the senate floor, was “a compromise bill … [and 
t]he disclosure provision was dropped” to which Proxmire objected (United States 
1976e, p.30332). Senator Tower56, in addition stated that the SEC’s bill when it was 
presented to the Senate committee, “no private witnesses” testified other than the SEC 
Commissioners and Chairman (United States 1976e, p.30332). He further on argued 
that while the SEC’s proposal was favourably reported, the nature of the proposal raised  
serious questions … . Questions have also been raised as to the advisability of 
making it a crime to orally lie to or to mislead an auditor. It is contended that 
the actual effect may be to reduce the effectiveness of the independent auditing 
process (United States 1976e, p.30332). 
 
By reporting S. 3664, Proxmire had initiated a new network to resolve the issue of 
questionable payments as well as enrolling the SEC as the spokesperson. The new 
                                                             
54 Based on the glossary of Congressional terms, a clean bill is “a bill which has been revised in mark-up. 
Amendments are assembled with unchanged language and the bill is referred to the floor with a new 
number” (http://innovation.cq.com/media/congressional-glossary?ref=CQ). 
55 Senator Poxmire had introduced S. 3664 to the Senate. 
56 John Goodwin Tower was Republican senator from Texas. He was assigned to the Senate Committee 
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs. 
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network was being established on the grounds of Proxmire’s compromises and 
divergence to a weaker proposed bill by the SEC, S. 3664. The SEC bill had 
disregarded most of the provisions in S. 3379 and S. 3133. In this regard, the accounting 
provision of the new bill incorporated almost “verbatim all of S. 3418” (United States 
1976g, p.2). This was partly due to Proxmire’s interest in continuation of the SEC’s 
enrolment in his new network, even though the above arguments in relation to S. 3418 
demonstrate its shortcomings.  
 
It appears Proxmire had capitulated. Nonetheless, the electorate could perceive 
Proxmire’s approval of even a weakened bill as doing something constructive for 
society and, thereby, achieving his original goal of legislation addressing illicit 
payments. In forming the new network, however, Proxmire was facing difficulties. As 
will be illustrated, Proxmire was in favour of strengthening S. 3664, by adding Senator 
Church’s amendment that was presented on the Senate floor. The amendment was based 
on the disclosure requirement of the Church bill which was similar to Proxmire’s 
original bill as well as establishment of audit committees with independent members. 
Ultimately, the accounting provision, did not include requirements pertaining to audit 
committees, even though questionable payments were seen as “symptoms of weak 
corporate accountability and governance mechanisms” (Goelzer 1979, p.6). The SEC 
then Executive Assistant chairman, Goelzer, argued that “the concepts of … 
independent audit committees are inherent in the accounting provisions” (Goelzer 1979, 
p.12).  
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The disclosure requirement amendment focused on routine report and “disclosure of 
fees and payments to insure that information with respect to questionable payments by 
… corporations” are available to the Congress and shareholders (United States 1976e, 
p.30334). Church claimed that this requirement was already accepted by the Congress 
and the President as part of the Arms Sales Act. The disclosure statement amendment 
would have complemented and strengthened Proxmire’s bill, as the reporting 
requirement was “the teeth that would make this reform bill effective” (United States 
1976d; United States 1976e, p.30421). In his judgement “[a] wider application of the 
disclosure provision is … necessary to make this bill do the job that … Senator 
Proxmire wishes it to do” (United States 1976e, p.30334). While the amendments were 
strongly supported by Senator Proxmire as “a logical and sensible supplement”, it was 
defeated by Senator Tower, the Department of State, the SEC and Secretary Richardson, 
the Chairman of Ford’s Task Force (United States 1976d; United States 1976e, 
p.30334).  
 
On the Senate floor during September 14 and 15, these actors had the common goal of 
persuading other Senators and actors that S.3664 and the SEC’s recommendation was 
the best solution to the problem of questionable payments and that there was no need to 
add a disclosure requirement to the bill. Senator Tower asked for a critical analysis of 
the content of the amendment and stated “the Senate appears to be once again embarked 
on a course of legislating first and asking questions later” (United States 1976d, 
p.30419). Richardson, also argued that the disclosure requirement “could create a 
serious paperwork burden for both American business and for the Securities and 
Exchange Commission” (United States 1976d, p.30419). While the amendment 
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language clearly gave the SEC “the discretion necessary to eliminate the need to report 
minutiae” (United States 1976d, p.30421). Hills, the SEC chairman, in a letter to Tower 
raised his concerns stating, 
[t]that such an amendment which impacts so significantly on the 
Commission’s work should be considered at this time and in a manner 
inconsistent with the careful approach of the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs in its consideration of S. 3664 is a matter of 
gravest concern (United States 1976d, p.30420). 
Hills believed that in the long term, the lessons will be learned and  
the new mechanisms of corporate accountability which have resulted in the 
judgement of the Commission [would] serve to strengthen the quality of 
corporate management, public confidence in the business community and the 
integrity of … [the] Nation’s capital markets (United States 1976d, p.30420). 
 
Proxmire argued this addition would be “a substantial strengthening and improvement 
of the bill” (United States 1976e, p.30332). Church concluded that “[i]f we want to get 
to the root of this problem, we must require these companies to disclose publicly the 
fees and commissions they pay to their agents abroad” (United States 1976d, p.30421). 
The proposal, however, was argued by Hills to be significantly departing “from the 
traditional flexibility of the federal securities laws” (United States 1976d, p.30420). 
Tower believed that the amendments were “well–motivated” but would have “far-
reaching implications not just for American businesses that are doing business abroad 
but also it could have some foreign policy implications” (United States 1976e, p.30335). 
Tower felt as the matter was important it was not sufficient to just spend a few minutes 
on the Senate floor, but to hold hearings and debates on this issue to provide other 
Senators with an opportunity to consider the proposal in the legislative process (United 
States 1976d; United States 1976e).  
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Hills, the key actor in Senator Proxmire’s network, did not approve of the addition of 
the disclosure statement amendment introduced on the Senate floor by Senator Church. 
The addition of a detailed statement in relation to corporations’ contributions as part of 
S. 3644, was stated by Hills to be constraining the SEC “to urge that the President veto 
the legislation” (United States 1976d, p.30420). In other words, if the bill including the 
amendment was enacted, the SEC would lobby the President to veto the entire bill. If 
the SEC was successful, Proxmire’s initial goal would not be achieved. Percy, an actor 
of Church’s network, also supported S. 3664 without any amendment, since it could 
“stand on its own feet, will be supported, and … will be signed by the President” 
(United States 1976d, p.30424). Accordingly, the amendments were dropped due to its 
complexity, the possibility of placing “an intolerable burden on American business” and 
Proxmire’s desire to continue the existence of his new network Bill To Ban Overseas 
(Bill To Ban Overseas Corporate Bribes Dies  1977; cited in The Committee on 
Corporate Law and Accounting 1978, p.333; United States 1976e).  
 
The transcript of the meeting about formation of S. 3664 was not published for public 
distribution (The Committee on Corporate Law and Accounting 1978, p.331). This 
represented a lack of transparency surrounding the new proposed bill and Proxmire’s 
change of heart. There was a perceived “broad consensus in the Senate on this issue” 
and the proposed solution by the SEC and Proxmire (United States 1977g, p.167). 
However, Tower expressed his concern regarding the committee acting in “such haste” 
and “that the internal accounting controls provisions though laudatory in concept may 
prove troublesome in its implementation” and raises questions about its ability to 
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“significantly contribute to resolving the bribery dilemma” (United States 1976e, 
p.30332). Senator Church also argued if S. 3664 was  
really sufficient to provide a remedy for this immense amount of corruption … 
we could be sure that this place would be buzzing with lobbyists. They are not 
concerned about this bill. They have no reason to be concerned about it. That is 
why these corridors are not filled with the lobbyists of any companies coming 
here to tell us that we must not pass this bill (cited in Siedel 1981, p. 450). 
 
Despite the above criticism and Proxmire’s attempt to strengthen the bill, the new 
network was intact. By September 15, the Senate passed the bill without any 
amendments and the bill “was referred to the House [of Representatives] Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce” (United States 1976p, p.30). The SEC was 
successful in persuading actors of the Proxmire network to pass the bill. Proxmire was 
defeated in his attempt, but managed to avoid the new network from falling apart again 
in its initial stage. As S. 3664 was identical to the House of Representatives bill, H.R. 
15481, the details of the sections of the bill are explained in the following section. 
 
3.1 Congressman John Murphy’s Bill 
Bill H.R. 15481 was introduced to the House of Representatives Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce in September 1976. Section one of the bill was similar 
to S.3418 amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 since it required “reporting 
companies to create and to maintain accurate books and records” as well as 
establishment of  
internal accounting controls sufficient to assure that transactions will be 
executed in accordance with management’s instructions, that transactions will 
be accurately recorded, that access to corporate assets is carefully controlled, 
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and that the representations on company books will be compared at reasonable 
intervals with actual assets, and any discrepancies resolved (United States 
1977d, p.2-3).  
The first section, as is evident, was identical to the four requirements of S.3418. Neither 
the language nor any of the provisions were changed by the Senate or the House, after 
several hearings were held in this regard. The SEC’s then chairman, Hills, as the 
spokesperson of Proxmire’s new network had appeared at this House of Representatives 
hearing to persuade and recruit other actors to assume roles in the network as well as 
seeking continued support for their underlying goal. During his testimony regarding this 
section, Hills expressed his satisfaction with the bill as it provided “correction of the 
system” that had led to “failure in corporate accountability” (United States 1977d, p.18). 
He further on said, “[t]he lesson to be learned … [was] that increased corporate 
accountability to the board of directors and to stockholders will strengthen quality and 
morality of corporate management” (United States 1977d, p.20). Accordingly, the 
passage of the legislation that was weakened by the SEC and Proxmire, was urged by 
the SEC. 
 
Hills’s flowery speech, on behalf of Proxmire’s network, favouring the legislation, 
pointed to the “extraordinarily effective enforcement record of the Commission staff” 
throughout their voluntary program and how their enforcement would favour this 
approach (United States 1977d, p.18). The newly proposed legislation was preferable to 
“tougher and stronger laws” which were proposed by commentators and members of the 
Congress, who were concerned by the public and the press losing interest “in the matter 
of corporate bribery” (United States 1977d, p.22). Upon enactment of the legislation, it 
would “demonstrate a strong affirmative congressional endorsement of the need for 
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accurate corporate records and effective internal control measures and of the 
unacceptability of deception or obstruction of auditors” even though public witnesses or 
some of the senators had argued otherwise (United States 1977d, p.18). 
 
Members of the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee of the American Bar 
Association (ABA) had “grave concern about H.R. 15481” as it was drafted (The 
Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities 1977, p1903). Congressman Murphy 
questioned the internal control requirement since in reference to the SEC’s experience 
the problem was not “lack of adequate internal accounting systems, but … rather, the 
circumvention of adequate, or seemingly adequate systems” (United States 1977d, 
p.25). The chairman of the committee on SEC regulations of the AICPA, Holton57, in 
his testimony argued that from careful analysis of illicit payment cases, it was clear 
most of the companies had great internal control systems in place, at least on paper 
(United States 1977d). Accordingly, corporate governance practices which were defined 
by the state corporation law, had proven to be inadequate, in promoting ethical 
corporate behaviour (Hohenstein 2009).  
 
Holton, also, had the same concern with the wording of section B. Since the wording 
was not explaining a “definitive standard … to judge what is or is not an adequate 
system” among accountants and independent auditors (United States 1977d, p.158). It 
was not assuring that the root of the problem was going to be removed. The word 
adequate was “much like ‘beauty’: for the most part, it is only in the eyes of the 
beholder” (United States 1977d, p.158). Holton stated, most corporations had internal 
control systems in place and the issue was  
                                                             
57 Represented the AICPA and testified on the proposed House of Representatives bill during September 
1976 hearing. 
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that illegal or improper corporate activities can and will occur regardless of the 
strength of internal accounting controls, because no system has yet been 
devised that can withstand collusive behavior or circumvention by corporate 
officials (United States 1977d, p.158).  
Nevertheless the SEC chairman, along with Proxmire’s network, insisted on passage of 
the bill “in its present form” and without any changes to section one (United States 
1977d, p.30), even though the requirement was insufficient to fulfil the objectives of the 
bill. Proxmire wanted to speed the action of Congress on this bill and avoid the bill 
going through the lengthy process of being presented at the House of Representative’s 
hearing (United States 1976d). He proposed to link his bill “as an amendment to a 
minor House-Senate conference group” that was already passed by the House (United 
States 1976d; Wall Street Journal Staff Reporter 1976, p.7). However, this was rejected 
by Senator Tower on the Senate floor as he was certain that the House of 
Representatives were able to “pass the bill before adjournment” (Bill To Ban Overseas 
Corporate Bribes Dies  1977; Wall Street Journal Staff Reporter 1976, p.7). The above 
arguments demonstrate the ability of this network’s spokesperson and partly its actors in 
using effective language and methods in persuading others that their bill was the only 
solution to the problem of lack of disclosure and accountability of management to the 
issue of illicit payments. 
 
The other two sections of H.R. 15481 were in relation to payments made to foreign or 
domestic officials. These sections were mainly similar to S.3313 related provisions. The 
bill also included criminal penalties which were only “up to 2 years imprisonment and 
[or] a fine of up to $10,000” (United States 1977d, p.3). The amount of fine was alleged 
by Eckhardt as being “not much punishment to a corporation that is going to make a 
billion” (United States 1977d, p.149). While the SEC was in agreement with these 
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sections, it stated their preference of not being “involved even in the civil enforcement” 
as “disclosure is a sufficient deterrent to the improper activities … concerned” (United 
States 1977d, p.20).  
 
The bill was presented to the House towards the closing session of the Congress and 
during the last hearing held by the House. The Massachusetts member of House of 
Representatives, Harrington, feared the rush of the House for passage of the bill “as if it 
were a definitive solution and total absolution of American corporations and this 
Congress from any further responsibility for corrupt business practices” (United States 
1977d, p.144). He argued that the Congress has “let the illusion of action substitute for 
dealing substantively with problems in a more meaningful way” (United States 1977d, 
p.148). Congressman Moss felt similarly about the delay of the approval of the bill until 
the next Congress since the proposal needed more changes and amendments to fully 
achieve its objective of protecting shareholders’ assets (United States 1977d). 
 
3.2 The Task Force Bill 
As argued in chapter four, the task force, as Ford’s network, was mainly in favour of an 
international treaty which was aligned with President Ford’s efforts. In a letter to 
Senator Proxmire as well as testifying in different hearings, the task force had outlined 
their thoughts on the bills that were presented to the Senate and House, as discussed 
above. From their point of view the problem was “too serious to settle for what might be 
a passing symbolic gesture” (United States 1977d, p.82). In addition, the private sector 
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had the “basic responsibility to come to grips with this problem themselves” (United 
States 1977d, p.85). 
 
In relation to S. 3133, Proxmire’s previous network’s solution, the task force 
“unanimously” rejected this bill as it included a “disclosure-plus-criminalization 
scheme” (United States 1976l, p.61). The Ford network was distancing itself from the 
other networks such as Proxmire or Church by arguing that the problem was a 
diplomatic problem (McManis 1976). This was probably their strategy in strengthening 
the network, as well as enrolling new actors to their network. In their opinion, the two 
approaches could not “be compatibly joined” (United States 1976l, p.61). Also, they 
had “rejected the approach of direct, unilateral criminalization under U.S. law of corrupt 
payments made abroad, the approach … contained in H.R. 15481” and the identical bill 
that was adopted by the Senate (United States 1977d, p.32). The rejection was based on 
the problem of “lack of enforceability” of the provisions of the bills domestically and 
mainly internationally (United States 1977d, p.107).  
 
The task force was in favour of the disclosure approach albeit “flat criminal prohibition” 
would pressure corporations to resist questionable payments (United States 1977d, 
p.109). Harrington was distressed that the Congress and the task force had been 
debating the criminal or disclosure approach, while paying “little attention … to what 
lies at the heart of the entire issue: Public confidence in our national institutions” and 
principles (United States 1977d, p.144). Eckhardt also agreed that the solution was not 
just to enact new legislation but mainly the enforcement of new or existing legislation. 
Introducing new legislation from his point of view was “a means of simply brushing the 
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question under the rug without future oversight respecting the agencies” in charge of 
enforcing the legislation (United States 1977d, p.151). 
 
So the task force rejected the proposed bills as “such legislation would represent the 
most forceful possible rhetorical assertion by the President and the Congress of our 
abhorrence of such conduct” (United States 1976l, p.61; United States 1977d, p.32). 
Also, they felt that there would be difficulties with enforcing such legislation as 
prosecutions of the issue involved investigations in other countries resulting in possible 
resistance rather than assistance from these countries. The same case was argued to be 
possible in the U.S. in relation to limited access to “key witnesses or documents” which 
would “preclude proof beyond a reasonable doubt” (United States 1977d, p.33). The 
President had opposed this approach “as essentially unenforceable, legislation which 
would seek broad criminal proscription of improper payments made in foreign 
jurisdictions” (United States 1976l, p.63). Accordingly the task force opposed 
“unilateral criminal prosecution [which] would represent little more than a rhetorical 
assertion” (United States 1977d, p.33). In this regard, the task force urged the Congress 
“not to substitute tokenism for real action to deal with the questionable payments 
problem” which would lead to Congress washing “its hands of an important problem 
without having taken meaningful, enforceable action” (United States 1977d, p.33). 
 
To validate their network, the task force was supporting the new legislation such as the 
SEC’s proposal, that would “require more systematic and informative reporting and 
disclosure” than what was included in S.3133 or S. 3664. It was perceived that requiring 
corporations to prepare “additional disclosure[s]” such as “the name of the payee” was 
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putting a burden on “American businesses” (United States 1976l, p.62). Taking into 
account the above arguments, with the direction of the President the task force had 
drafted legislation focusing on “full and systematic reporting and disclosure of 
payments made by American businesses” (United States 1976l, p.63). In August 1976 
the task force developed two bills, S. 3741 and H.R. 15149, both called the Foreign 
Payments Disclosure Act. The bills were based on a disclosure approach “with 
appropriate seriousness … [to] the role of law itself as a positive force in the domestic 
and international community” (Rocco 1999; United States 1977d, p.82). Greanias and 
Windsor (1982, p.59) stated that the task force bills “thanks to Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger, included a strong measure of realpolitik”. The bills were designed  
to deter improper payments in international commerce by American 
corporations and their officers … to encourage foreign nations to enforce their 
own criminal laws against official bribery and corruption; and to set a forceful 
example to … [their] trading partners and competitors regarding the imperative 
need to end improper payments (United States 1977d, p.33). 
 
The Secretary of Commerce under the provisions of the bill would have had the 
authority to enforce and promulgate rules and regulations of the act while not “affecting 
or conditioning the authority of the Securities and Exchange Commission” (United 
States 1977d, p.63). It would have authorised the Department of Commerce not to 
disclose the facts to the public until one year had elapsed, for the reason of national 
interest. This meant the bill was proposing another type of cover-up by the Government 
while Watergate scandals were mainly about this same issue.  
  
The network was not successful in moving from problematisation to the next translation 
moment, since the bills until mid-1976 “were not considered in hearings in either the 
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Senate or in the House” (Bill To Ban Overseas Corporate Bribes Dies  1977; Dardess 
1979, p.638; United States 1977d; United States 1977f). One reason was that the bill 
was presented late in the year which was around the time when congressional sessions 
were closing and the presidential election was approaching. The other reason was that 
the Senate had already endorsed the Proxmire bill, S. 3664 and was reluctant “to reverse 
course” as Proxmire’s network was successful in capturing, enrolling and interesting a 
majority of the Senators as the actors of their newly established network (United States 
1977d, p.83). As well as bringing actors together and consequently helping in 
diminishing the threat of predators and actors from other networks. Senator Proxmire 
was successful in making his network indispensable and assuring the vitality and 
triumph of the translation process.  
 
The task force chairman presented the bills to the Consumer Protection and Finance 
Subcommittee by September urging the “Congress not [to] act in haste to adopt an 
essentially rhetorical, token solution in lieu of the more meaningful proposals put forth 
by President Ford” and the task force (United States 1977d, p.34). Not everyone was in 
agreement with this statement. For example Congressman Moss stated that “H.R. 15481 
… [was] far superior to the administration’s proposal” concerning safeguarding of 
shareholders assets (United States 1977d, p.155). As well as the ability of the 
Department of Commerce in conducting its duties based on the proposed bill by the task 
force. The Moss Subcommittee’s experience with the Department was that it had 
implicitly condoned activities which were “against national policy or simply by looking 
the other way” (United States 1977d, p.156). Consequently, Ford’s network and his bills 
were defeated by the Senate and the House. This was partly because Carter was winning 
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the election and driving Ford to side step the illicit payment issues and mainly serving 
on corporate boards. He had no incentive to re-establish his network in 1977, when the 
new Congress was in full swing. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The bills presented to the Senate or the House of Representatives were either supporting 
the disclosure or criminalisation approach or both. Proxmire’s bill was favoured by 
those who wanted to make bribery illegal in the U.S. as it would deter the practice. 
Alternatively, Church was in favour of disclosure of the details of illicit payments. 
Consequently, Proxmire’s approach prevailed in the Senate which became the main 
vehicle for the passage of the FCPA (Colby 2013). The criminalisation approach was 
mainly resisted in the Congress and by witnesses. By the closing session of the 
Congress in 1976, two distinct bills were outstanding. One was the Senate bill 
“incorporating verbatim all of the SEC’s legislative proposal and including a direct 
criminal prohibition against foreign bribery” (United States 1977d, p.207). The other 
one was the administration’s bill which only included disclosure requirements and was 
defeated by the Congress. 
  
The senate bill was passed in the Senate, but died in the House of Representatives as the 
work on this bill was not completed prior to adjournment of the Congress. Accordingly, 
as will be argued in the next chapter, the only bill that was reintroduced to the Senate 
and the House of Representatives during 1977 congressional hearings was an identical 
bill to S. 3664. As per the translation model, Proxmire was the only primary actor 
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successful in keeping his network together and persuading the other actors that his bill 
was the only solution. The following chapter will focus only on the Proxmire network 
and the ability of this network in contesting criticisms about their proposed bill and 
finally enacting it as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.  
 
  





The previous two sections detail the political events that led to the 
formulation of legislation condemning corruption and bribery. Section 
III aims at demonstrating that not only was the enactment of the FCPA 
controversial, but so too were the enforcement. 
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Chapter Six: The Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act 
 
Corruption charges! ... Corruption is government intrusion into market deficiencies in the form 
of regulations … We have laws against it precisely so we can get away with it. Corruption is 
our protection. Corruption is why we win (cited in Biegelman & Biegelman 2010, p.1) 
 
As demonstrated in previous chapters and in the context of ANT, the FCPA was “the 
child of political scandal” (Gary 1990, p.12). The act was prompted by a series of 
scandals including Watergate involving bribery of domestic and foreign governments, 
politicians and corporations that had raised concerns about the integrity of the U.S. 
business community (Darrough 2010; Gary 1990) and for some, existing suspicions 
were confirmed (Securities and Exchange Commission 1981a, p.6). As detailed in 
chapter four, the scandals took place during a time when bribery and illicit payments 
were prohibited by law in the U.S. and other countries such as France and Germany. 
The laws in place, however, lacked enforcement, precision and coherence, as it was full 
of loopholes” (United States 1971, p.114). 
 
The Congress was compelled to respond to the events that had unfolded and shaken 
public confidence and trust in the integrity of the free enterprise system. The FCPA 
allowed Congress to demonstrate a commitment to ensuring the integrity of U.S. 
corporations. Integrity according to Clausen, President of the Bank of America:  
Is not some impractical notion dreamed up by naïve do-gooders. Our integrity 
is the foundation for, the very basis of our ability to do business. If the market 
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economy ever goes under our favourite villains, socialist economies and 
government regulators, won’t be to blame. We will (cited in United States 
1977d, p.2). 
 
Senator William Proxmire58 (United States 1976l, p. 3) argued “the fact that so many 
companies have been able to elude the system of corporate accountability strikes us as a 
matter requiring significant action”. As discussed in chapters two, four and five, a series 
of hearings in response to these scandals were held. The evidence given at these 
hearings, made it obvious that legislation, as the preferred solution by the principal 
actors’ of the networks, was required to address corrupt activities. The principal actors 
were successful in minimising the effect of outside actors who did not believe in the 
favoured solution. The proposed bills were not “officially opposed” by the business 
community, as outside actors to Proxmire’s network, since they did not want “to be 
heard opposing legislation which seemed to support all the best elements of morality” 
(Bialkin & Atkeson 1979, p.625). The Chamber of Commerce, also as one of the 
outside actors, for instance, was “not convinced that new legislation is needed to 
confront the problem caused by questionable overseas business payments” (United 
States 1977g, p.235). The need for this piece of legislation was apparent as “evidence of 
questionable payments … [had] become so voluminous … that the American public … 
[was] becoming immune to the serious issue of corporate performance and public 
policy” (United States 1977g, p.25). Also, questionable payment disclosures concerning 
corporations were “no longer front page news” and had been downgraded to “other 
news columns of the business sections of even the most thorough papers” (United States 
1977g, p.25).  
 
                                                             
58 A primary author of the original Act 
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There were differences in the content of the bills presented by each of the networks 
assumed for purposes of this study, to the Senate and House of Representatives. As 
previously argued, the bills either supported the disclosure or criminalisation approach 
or both, depending on the principal actor’s aim and goal. Actors in President Ford’s 
network for instance, shared a view point that was different to the congressional activist 
in relation to enacting a law that required only disclosure and not prohibiting payments 
outright (Greanias & Windsor 1982). However, Ford and his network were “moving at a 
snail’s pace to put a stop to bribes overseas by American corporations” (Journal 
Washington Bureau 1976, p.2).  
 
By the closing session of the ninety-fourth Congress, the division between the White 
House and the Congress led to failure in passage of remedial legislation (Greanias & 
Windsor 1982). This chapter will explain the bills that were presented and supported by 
Proxmire’s newly constructed network during 1977 that led to passage of the FCPA. 
This chapter will explain in more detail the influence of the SEC on the proposed bills 
and Proxmire as the principal actor leading to approval of the Senate bill with “very 
little floor debate” (Bialkin & Atkeson 1979, p.626). The SEC was able to influence the 
accounting provisions of the bill even though these provisions were viewed as only 
requiring corporations to keep honest books and records (United States 1976l). The 
Commission stated  
[t]he prevention of fraud and the altering of corporate conduct are necessary 
consequences of “disclosure” as a regulatory technique. This effect of the 
disclosure concept is one reason it was chosen as the means to protect 
investors. … Nonetheless, the committee does not believe that disclosure 
requirements should be imposed, regardless of the materiality of the 
information to be elicited, because of the effect they will have on corporate 
conduct (United States 1977e, p.318-319). 
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For this reason, it can be argued, the bills had taken “a cautious approach to this 
immense problem” (United States 1977g, p.28). 
 
1. New Congress but the Same Old Mentality 
By March 1977, Senator Proxmire along with Senator Harrison Williams59, as a new 
member of Proxmire’s network, had introduced S.305 to the Senate Committee on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs to keep the network viable. The bill was 
described as providing “one answer” to the problem of illicit payments made by “any 
corporate officer or employee of any corporation … to bribe a foreign government 
official to obtain business or to affect the outcome of legislation or regulation of that 
Government” (United States 1977c, p.2). Senator Proxmire during his opening 
statement said “[l]et’s not kid ourselves. This bill is not home free. It was stopped last 
year in the House by the opposition of those objecting to the provisions of the bill” 
(United States 1977c, p.2). 
 
The aims of the bill were supported by the newly enrolled actor, the Carter 
Administration, since they believed in the need for “strong government action in the 
form of … [new] legislation” (United States 1977c, p.67). The re-established network 
successfully being at its mobalisation stage, needed “strong support from the 
administration” and the ones in the Congress who believed in getting the bill passed 
(United States 1977c, p.2). Along the same line, the Administration as well did not want 
to either weaken “the thrust of the bill” (United States 1977c, p.71) or delay the passage 
                                                             
59 Senator Williams was Democrat and during 1977, was part of the Committee on Banking, and Urban 
Affairs. 
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of the bill. They wanted to support and enact a bill that was enforceable and effective 
domestically and internationally. The disclosure requirement was perceived to outweigh 
its burdens as it provided a “highly effective deterrent” mechanism (United States 
1977c, p.72). The administration was concerned with the enforcement of provisions of 
S. 305 by the SEC as it was drafted, since the primary responsibility of the SEC was 
“securing adequate disclosure to protect investors of registered securities” (United 
States 1977c, p.71). 
 
1.1 Details of S.305 Bill 
The bill comprised two titles. Title I, the foreign corrupt practices was an exact replica 
of S. 3664 which consisted of the accounting provisions pertaining to internal control 
systems and integrity of corporations’ books and records. The accounting provisions of 
S. 305 were not modified or changed based on the AICPA recommendations made 
during the hearing held in relation to H.R. 15481 in 1976, as was detailed in chapter 
five. Title II called the disclosure, was in relation to determination of ownership and 
controlling percentage of investors and shareholders in a U.S. corporation (United 
States 1977c). The provision required corporations to report “additional information 
concerning the residence, nationality and nature of beneficial ownership” (United States 
1977c, p.2). This title was an addition to the Domestic and Foreign Investment 
Improved Disclosure Act due to “dramatic growth in foreign investment in the United 
States in recent years” (United States 1977c, p.2). The majority of the discussions 
during the hearing held for S. 305 was in relation to this title, since the first title was 
already passed by the Senate in 1976 and Proxmire’s newly built network was based on 
title I. However, title II was dropped out of S. 305 due to wide-ranging disagreements 
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by the witnesses such as Senator Metcalf and the then Secretary of the Treasury at the 
Senate hearing regarding its effectiveness. 
 
The recommendations by the AICPA in relation to title I, as explained in chapter five 
and later on in this chapter, were pertaining to identified “deficiencies in the proposed 
statutory language … to make the legislation effective” (United States 1977c, p.225). A 
similar comment was submitted to the Senate by Price Waterhouse and Co requesting a 
change in the wording of this provision. The chairperson of the Ad Hoc Committee on 
Foreign Payments60, Von Mehren, also stated that the accounting provision was broad, 
“so general and vague” that if enforced in this fashion would “be of little practical use in 
implementing the intended objective” (United States 1977g, p.121). The proposed bill 
did not “furnish any additional protection against wilful circumvention” (United States 
1977g, p.96). He further argued that the problem was in relation to corporations 
“deliberately and intentionally” disregarding and circumventing their internal control 
systems and not about existence of the system (United States 1977g, p.96). 
 
The cases, such as Gulf Oil Corporation that is briefly explained in chapters two and 
four, represent this issue. The language of this provision appeared “to be mere jargon” 
and for it to be useful and effective there was a need for further definition (United States 
1977g, p.122). Nonetheless, these suggestions as well as the ones by the AICPA during 
their testimony in the 1976 hearing, as explained briefly in chapter five, were not 
promulgated by the SEC or Proxmire when the bill was reintroduced as S.305 (United 
                                                             
60 The committee was established in 1975, at the suggestion of the then President to prepare a report in 
relation to the problem of questionable payments (United States 1977g, p.62). 
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States 1977c). From the translation model, it can be argued that the SEC as the 
spokesperson was able to obtain the trust and confidence of the network’s actors 
regarding the language of their solution and to be able to exclude the accounting 
profession from their network.  
 
Williams, as the then newly appointed SEC chairman in April 1977, testified in relation 
to the accounting profession’s criticism of the accounting provisions, during the House 
of Representatives hearing in 1977 to guarantee the validity of Proxmire’s network in 
the Congress. For instance, Williams argued that the objection to the use of the term 
‘accuracy’ was “somewhat perplexing in light of the fact that the IRS presumably 
expects that the same information be “accurately” reflected in corporate tax returns” 
since the term did not mean “exact precision as measured by some abstract principle” 
(United States 1977g, p.220). The accounting provisions were viewed by the SEC as a 
way of creating “a climate which would significantly discourage repetition of the 
serious abuses” while “not directed solely to the problem of questionable or illegal 
corporate payments and practices” (Securities and Exchange Commission 1977, p.1). 
His testimony also, assured the enrolment and mobalisation of the network between 
newly enrolled actors during 1977. 
 
1.2 The Bills Presented to the House of Representatives 
Out of the bills presented to the House of Representatives in 1977, Eckhardt’s bill, H.R. 
3815, House of Representatives counterpart of S. 305, called the Unlawful Corporate 
Payments Act, was the one that was primarily debated. H.R. 3815 was solely taking a 
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criminalisation approach which differed from the S. 305 dual approach of disclosure 
and criminalisation (Rocco 1999). The bill’s aims were supported and favoured by the 
Department of State and the Carter Administration, as Proxmire’s new spokesperson. 
Enactment of the bill was recommended by both after implementation of their proposed 
changes to the wording of the bill and expansion of its scope.  
 
The other bill presented, H.R. 7543, had adopted a disclosure approach to the foreign 
bribery problem. It was in relation to the establishment of an “Office of Foreign 
Business Practices within the Department of Commerce” (United States 1977b, p.7) to 
take the responsibility of educating and informing multinational corporations “with 
respect to proper foreign business practices” (United States 1977b, p.36). Eckhardt 
stated “[d]isclosure can never be an effective deterrent so long as the anticipated benefit 
of making a bribe, such as winning a multimillion-dollar contract, exceeds the adverse 
effect” (United States 1977b, p.9). The bill was taking the enforcement authority and the 
ability to investigate the corporations’ books and records from the SEC, and transferring 
it to a new body under the Department of Commerce.  
 
The new body was to handle “paperwork and enforce the sanctions for failure to 
disclose” (United States 1977b, p.10). The SEC had already proven its expertise in this 
area as they were able to “track down the misuse of funds through corporate accounting 
procedures [which] is an extremely important tool of enforcement that virtually no other 
agency has any experience in” (United States 1977b, p.13). Eckhardt was also in 
disagreement with this body, since in comparison, the SEC had “an unmatched 
reputation for political independence in its enforcement efforts” and was “likely to be 
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more immunized from political influences than other departments of the executive 
branch” (United States 1977b, p.10). Partly due to the above reasons and other 
shortcomings of the bill, it was nevertheless, not passed by the House of 
Representatives. 
 
The Carter Administration favoured H.R. 3815 as some of their recommendations 
pertaining to S. 305 were dealt with in this bill. From the point of view of the 
Department of State, this bill along with the existing law and regulations were to 
“provide an effective framework for dealing with the problem of foreign bribery by U.S. 
firms” (United States 1977b, p.7). The other reason was that this bill was similar to part 
of S. 305 which made “it a crime under U.S. law for domestic concerns to use bribes of 
foreign officials in furtherance of U.S. commerce” (United States 1977b, p.7). The 
slight difference between these bills was that the House version “extended coverage to 
United States-controlled foreign subsidiaries” (Lesser 1979b, p.168; United States 
1977g). 
 
H.R. 3815 was based on the criminalisation approach which was perceived to be “the 
most effective deterrent, the least burdensome on business and no more difficult to 
enforce than disclosure” (United States 1977b, p.9). The argument made in the House 
was since “foreign bribery is a reprehensible activity, it should be outlawed rather than 
legalized through disclosure” (United States 1977b, p.9). Accordingly, the accounting 
section of S. 305 or preceding senate bills were excluded from this bill. The bill was 
mainly in relation to dealing with the crime itself rather than relevant accounting 
provisions. These requirements were “strongly opposed by the accounting industry as 
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going far beyond the question of protecting against foreign bribery” (United States 
1977b, p.13).  
 
The House bill, HR. 3815 was mainly rejected by the witnesses during the hearings held 
on the bill. A common argument was the criminalisation approach on which the bill was 
based, was perceived to be ineffective in its enforcement, prosecution, and 
counterproductive. The SEC, representing and promoting the Proxmire network, 
favoured the Senate bill as H.R. 3815 prohibited certain payments to foreign officials 
that were “designed to proscribe … conduct which is not supported in our society and 
tends to erode not only ethical standards but the free, competitive and effective 
marketplace” (United States 1977g, p.196). Recommendations of Moss and the then 
SEC chairman, Williams61, as advocates of the Proxmire network, accordingly were the 
addition of the accounting provisions, disclosure approach, into this bill to be acceptable 
and effective. They were both more in favour of the provisions embodied in H.R. 1602 
and S. 305 than HR. 3815, which was introduced in January 1977 by Congressmen 
Murphy and Solarz. H.R. 1602 was in favour as it was in agreement with the Proxmire 
network’s goal, of prohibiting bribery by increasing corporations’ accountability to their 
stakeholders, and identical to title I of S.305 which was already approved by the Senate. 
The SEC’s new chairman supported this bill, as he “was willing to have the SEC 
undertake criminal-enforcement responsibilities under the new law” (Greanias & 
Windsor 1982, p.71).  
 
                                                             
61 Harold Williams became the chairman of the SEC by April 1977. He served as the chairman from 1977 
to 1981. 
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Proxmire, by agreeing to the SEC’s recommendations and compromising his proposed 
bill, was successful in mobalising the actors of his network. They were now 
representatives of their network. The actors were seeking support and alliances in the 
Congress by demonstrating the shortcomings of the proposed bills in the House of 
Representatives. For instance, in relation to H.R. 3815, Moss stated that the bill only 
held “American business to a higher standard of conduct by prohibiting outright bribes” 
without eliminating or discouraging “American corporate interference in the political or 
economic affairs of foreign countries” (United States 1977g, p.167). Schell, Co-
Chairman of the Ad Hoc Inter-Professional Study Group on Corporate Conduct62 , 
believed “the criminal sanctions proposed will not provide the strong medicine needed” 
(United States 1977g, p.140). Von Mehren also argued along the same line of reasoning 
regarding the approach that was taken in this bill. From his point of view, this approach 
required proof of “the corrupt nature of the payment … to prove a state of mind” 
(United States 1977g, p.152). The language of the bill was perceived to be following 
“the conventional bribery language” which required determining subjective intent or a 
corrupt motive (United States 1977g, p.153).  
 
The disclosure approach, on the contrary, would require corporations only to prove the 
facts and “to report all payments made directly or indirectly to government officials [or] 
be subject[ed] to prosecution for failure to report” (United States 1977g, p.152). The 
other argument was that the crime defined “in a reporting and disclosure provision is a 
much simpler crime with fewer elements of proof” to be used by a U.S Attorney “to 
                                                             
62  The group was formed in 1977 “by the chief executive partners of the nine large independent 
accounting firms of the United States and ten active members of the Bar from Washington and New 
York” (United States 1977g, p.135). Schell and Kennedy both were the co-chairperson and Von Mehren 
was the chairperson of this committee. 
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frame an indictment and develop his case” (United States 1977g, p.152). Von Mehren 
urged the House to “give the most careful consideration as to whether the criminal 
provisions will really do the job that so desperately needs to be done” (United States 
1977g, p.149). The recommendation was to seek help and advice on this matter from the 
chairman of the corporations’ audit committees. 
 
2. Passage of the FCPA 
The above bills, S. 305 and H.R. 3815, were both supported by the White House. This 
reflected a change in the White House attitude since the election of Jimmy Carter. The 
Administration had very little to do with the actual passage of the Act and were only 
representing Proxmire’s network. This was partly due to the hearings being conducted 
by the Congress and the SEC, and President Carter and his cabinet being affected by the 
actors of Proxmire’s network (Rocco 1999). Carter and his administration were “guided 
by a high moral obligation” (Caron & Electric 1981, p.21). The Vietnam War and 
Watergate Scandal had led to moral outrage and an urgent moral reform in the U.S. 
(Cragg & Woof 2002). Ford, former President, was only in favour of the bills his task 
force had introduced to the Congress, which were never debated in the Congress. The 
Carter presidency had ended this division and led the Congress to move towards 
passage of a law by the end of 1977. 
 
By September, H.R. 3815 was passed by the House Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce (U.S. House of Representatives 1977b) However, due to the bill’s 
shortcomings, and the power that actors’ of Proxmire’s network had in mobalising and 
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enrolling their allies, it was “never considered on the floor of the House” (Greanias & 
Windsor 1982, p.63). The shortcoming of the bill was that it solely took a 
criminalisation approach and lacked the accounting requirement. In relation to S.305, 
while the debates were dominated by the anti-bribery and title II provisions, little 
attention was given to the accounting provisions (Greanias & Windsor 1982). By May 
1977 the Senate passed S.305, and the House passed this bill in lieu of the H.R. 3815 in 
November (Greanias & Windsor 1982). 
 
By December 1977, S. 305 was referred to a conference committee. The committee’s 
main recommendations were to incorporate the Senate title of the bill, the Senate 
Section A and B of the accounting provisions and the House bill’s penalty provision 
(U.S. House of Representatives 1977a). The conference committee amended the 
accounting provisions to include the wording “in reasonable detail” as part of section A 
of the bill, integrity of accounting records and reports (U.S. House of Representatives 
1977a). The emphasis on terms “in reasonable detail” and “reasonable assurance” were 
to distinguish the Act requirements from the materiality concept and demonstrate that 
“[t]he statute does not require perfection” (Securities and Exchange Commission 1979a, 
p.1151). Also, it deleted the wording “adequate” as per the AICPA reasoning, as 
explained in chapter five. 
 
Bill S. 305 was approved by the Senate “without debate after minor amendments” 
(Rocco 1999, p.167). The accounting provisions had only “focused on enhancing the 
accuracy of corporate accounting procedures and the reliability of the audit process” and 
adopting “neither the criminalization nor the disclosure approach” (Rocco 1999, p.167). 
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Hence, the FCPA was passed by the Congress “with unusual speed and surprising 
unanimity” (Lacey and George 1997-1998, p.132), despite Senator Church’s assertion 
during 1976 on the Senate floor regarding the bill not being an appropriate remedy since 
lobbyists of companies were not opposing it (Siedel 1981). This explained the ability of 
Proxmire’s new network in effecting and enrolling the outside actors and persuading 
them in approval of their solution.  
 
The Act was described as “in many ways the most important act affecting accounting 
since the Securities Act of 1933 and 1934” (Auerbach 1978 cited in Bathen 1978, 
p.1261). Williams in one of his speeches, as spokesperson of the Proxmire’s network, 
described the Act as the “major auditing development of recent years” (1981, p.1). The 
Act was initially known as the “Lockheed Law” due to involvement of corporations 
such as Lockheed in the investigations and hearings, as was explained in chapters two 
and four (Biegelman & Biegelman 2010, p.4). The claimed purpose of the FCPA was to 
protect investors as well as to regulate the accuracy of financial information of the 
companies.  
 
2.1 Sections of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
The Act consisted of four sections: Section 101 containing the title of the Act, section 
102 covering accounting standards, and sections 103 and 104 dealing with foreign 
corrupt practices. The accounting provisions were passed as a series of amendments to 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which increased “the degree of federal 
involvement in the internal management of public corporations” (Lacey and George 
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1997-1998, p.133). These provisions of the act “incorporated only [the first] two of the 
four rules proposed originally by the SEC” (Dundas and George 1979-1980, p.518) 
which required registered and reporting issuers under the Securities and Exchange Act 
to: 
• maintain books and records accurately reflecting the transactions and 
dispositions of assets of the issuer; 
• maintain an adequate system of internal accounting controls designed to 
provide reasonable assurance that specified objectives are satisfied (Securities 
and Exchange Commission 1977, p.1). 
The above sections were explained by Williams, SEC chairman, as being “consistent 
with, and supportive of, precepts of good management” (1980, p.41). From the 
commentators’ viewpoint also the above sections were demanding “a tighter degree of 
management control of corporate expenditures and were designed to make it easier for 
the SEC to detect when a firm failed to disclose the required information” (Sheffet & 
Calantone 1993, p.368).  
 
The FCPA placed new and significant obligations on issuers to make and keep accurate 
records and to maintain a system of internal accounting controls (Deming 2010), as 
perceived to be strengthening controls which would putatively enhance corporate 
accountability and ultimately public confidence in the corporate sector (cited in 
Williams 1979b). These sections were viewed by the Congress “as a measure to foster 
managerial accountability and corporate integrity by eliminating the weaknesses in 
corporate financial control and recordkeeping which permitted corrupt payments” 
(Goelzer 1979, p.4). As stated by Cragg and Woof (2002, p.123), this view was not 
shared by American corporations who could not “afford to treat their overseas 
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operations as a minor theatre of operations where experiments in morality could be 
conducted” as overseas operations’ profits were huge “at a time when domestic profits 
at home were under siege”. 
 
Despite all of the criticism, the provisions were a self-regulatory measure to allow the 
companies “in conjunction with its outside accountants and counsel” to self-discipline 
their affairs without Government involvement as the primary administrator (Williams 
1979b, p.3). Williams (1981, p.1) believed the criticisms were partly related to the 
perception that the accounting provisions “were considered truisms” and that the FCPA 
“was passed without congressional dissent”. He argued these arguments were raised as 
the accounting provisions were viewed “from an abstract perspective” which merely 
seemed to “codify a basic and uncontroversial management principle” (Williams 1981, 
p.1).  
 
2.2 The FCPA’S Accounting Provisions 
2.2.1 Maintenance of Accurate Records 
Subsection A of the accounting provisions (section 102) of the FCPA required “Every 
issuer … shall … make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable 
detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the 
issuer” (emphasis added The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act  1977, p.214). This 
requirement was later included in the SOX Act section 404 as well (Biegelman & 
Biegelman 2010). Members of the AICPA were concerned, as argued in chapter five, 
about the generality of the provision and the use of the word “accurately and fairly” as it 
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relates to being exact. It was maintained this was not achievable by companies as “there 
is no standard against which achievement of that precision can be measured” (United 
States 1977d, p.161). The issue was not addressed by the Congress or the SEC in 
rewording the provision based on the AICPA’s proposed amendments to H.R. 15481 
and S. 305 which was to change the wording to ‘appropriately’.  
 
2.2.2 Maintenance of a System of Internal Accounting Controls 
Subsection B of the accounting standard provisions of the act obliged companies to 
employ a system of internal control by stating that  
Every issuer … shall … devise and maintain a system of internal accounting 
controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that  
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's general or 
specific authorization;  
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial 
statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any 
other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain accountability 
for assets;  
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's general 
or specific authorization; and  
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(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets 
at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any 
differences (The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act  1977). 
This subsection of the accounting provisions, represented “the most significant intrusion 
of Government into corporate affairs since the original enactment of securities 
legislation in the 1930’s” (Siedel 1981, p.444). In corporate history “[i]t was the first 
time the federal government imposed standards of corporate governance upon public 
companies” (Giudice 2011, p.351) as there was “a profound and pressing need to seek 
ways to raise the levels of conduct of corporate management” (Lacey & George 1997-
1998, p.129). This requirement of the federal law was established long before the SOX 
act “was ever envisioned” which required “strict internal controls within publicly traded 
U.S. companies to prevent fraud” (Biegelman & Biegelman 2010, p.4). However, due to 
political influences and lack of government agencies’ power to enforce the FCPA, as 
explained in this chapter and the following chapters, it was reintroduced in more detail 
in the SOX act. 
 
This subsection as well as not detailing a clear meaning for a good internal control 
system, did not require the external auditors to “attest to whether an enterprise was in 
compliance with the FCPA’s internal control reporting requirements” (Moeller 2014, 
p.9). The AICPA addressed these issues by forming an independent commission in 
November 1974, called the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities. As the chairman 
of the commission was Manuel Cohen63, it was known as the Cohen Commission. The 
Cohen commission was “only an advisory group without authority to implement” their 
                                                             
63  He was a member of the staff of the SEC from 1942 to 1961 and after was appointed as a 
commissioner. From 1964 to 1969, Cohen was appointed as the SEC’s chairman. 
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recommendations, with the purpose of improving the future of the auditing environment 
and the nature of the services they offered in society (Cohen 1977, p.3; The 
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 1978).  
 
2.2.2.1 Cohen Commission Recommendations 
The Cohen commission recommendations and conclusions were released after three 
years in a report titled ‘Report of Tentative Conclusions’ (Cohen 1977; Moeller 2014). 
The report was released “about the same time as the release of the FCPA … [and] ran 
into a torrent of criticism” (Moeller 2014, p.9). The criticisms, mainly provided by 
external auditors, were related to the report’s recommendations about lack of precision 
in definitions and the role of external auditors in assessing internal control systems. For 
example, one of the recommendations was based on the premise of “[t]he study and 
evaluation of internal control is an important aspect of an audit” in “the prevention and 
detection of fraud” (The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 1978, p.39). The 
recommendation required auditors to allocate resources for assessing the condition of 
this control system, which was “not explicitly recognized in professional standards” 
(Cohen 1977; The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 1978, p.39). Addressing 
this shortcoming in audit standards was important because, “[a]ccounting information is 
… controlled by an entity’s internal control system” which is under the review and 
supervision of the management (The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 1978, 
p.7). As a result, the external auditors as “supported by empirical studies” were 
recommended to prepare a comprehensive report which was quite different from the 
then standard “one or two paragraph report” that served “merely as a symbol” and was 
“rarely read” (Cohen 1977, p.6). 
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The Cohen commission’s report also included recommendations in relation to clarifying 
the responsibility of independent auditors for detection of fraud, because “the nature and 
extent of that responsibility have been unclear” (The Commission on Auditors' 
Responsibilities 1978, p.31). This was explained to be a major and important aspect of 
the independent auditor’s function that had caused difficulties partly due to their 
inability “to assume greater responsibility in this area” (The Commission on Auditors' 
Responsibilities 1978, p.31). Auditor’s responsibilities were suggested to include 
“reasonable assurance that the financial statements are not affected by material fraud 
and also to provide reasonable assurance on the accountability of management for 
material amounts of corporate assets” (The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
1978, p.36).  
 
The AICPA had included several of the recommendations in relation “to the substance 
of the standard of care for fraud detection” on their agenda (The Commission on 
Auditors' Responsibilities 1978, p.37). Also during the same time period, the Auditing 
Standards Board of the AICPA was in the process of issuing an auditing standard 
requiring auditors to search for management fraud. The two exposure drafts issued by 
the AICPA were, Statement on Auditing Standard (SAS) 17, ‘Illegal Acts by Clients’ 
and SAS 16, ‘The Independent Auditor’s Responsibility for the Detection of Errors or 
Irregularities’. SAS 16 provided  
guidance on the independent auditor’s responsibility for detecting [material] 
errors or irregularities … such as deliberate misrepresentations by management 
… or omission of the effects of events or transactions; manipulation, 
falsification, or alteration of records or documents  
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while examining financial reports and evaluating internal accounting controls (The 
Auditing Standards Executive Committee 1977b, p.1-2).  
 
Another recommendation of this report was related to managements’ and external 
auditors’ failure in recognising and exercising a “crucial element of judgement required 
by generally accepted accounting principles” (The Commission on Auditors' 
Responsibilities 1978, p.17). The Cohen Commission recommended a report by 
management to acknowledge their responsibilities for the financial statement and 
assessment of the internal control system. External auditors were advised to make “an 
evaluation of the cumulative effect of management’s judgement in the presentation of 
financial statements”, since financial statements as a whole might be “biased or 
misleading” (The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 1978, p.17). Based on its 
report, some of the recommendations were adopted by the AICPA and the SEC (The 
Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 1978). Also, the recommendations re-
emerged during the congressional hearings in relation to the SOX act as briefly pointed 
out in other chapters.  
 
2.2.2.2 FCPA Subsection B Language 
As mentioned in chapter five, the language of subsection B was very similar to the 
AICPA auditing standard which raised concern that the “language that may provide 
guidance to accountants and auditors may not be sufficiently precise to define conduct 
that could result in civil or criminal sanctions” (AICPA cited in Bathen 1978, p.1262). 
On this point it was argued by Dundas and George (1979-1980, p.877) that “[t]he 
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language of subsection (B) closely reflects the accounting profession’s own objective”, 
since this standard was  
originally developed … to assist independent auditors in evaluating a firm’s 
internal accounting controls to determine whether errors that could materially 
affect the reliability of the firm’s financial statements could be prevented 
(Bathen 1978, p.1262).  
The AICPA had feared that the adoption of this subsection would lead to auditors facing 
serious problems (United States 1977d). Partly because the role of the independent 
auditor did not extend to evaluating the adequacy of internal control systems “for the 
purpose of compliance by the issuer with legal standards, but rather … to form 
judgements relative to the scope of the audit” (United States 1977d, p.210). Some 
commentators accordingly, regarded the act's accounting provisions, particularly the 
internal control standards, as excessively vague (Securities and Exchange Commission 
1981; Siedel 1981) and lacking in clarity (Roberts 1989).  
 
The AICPA concern with the language used to explain the requirement of the internal 
control system was not reflected in the act. As explained in chapter five, their argument 
was, most of the companies “had very good systems” and there was no indication of 
“lack of adequate systems of internal accounting controls” but “circumvention of 
internal accounting controls” (United States 1977d, p.158). The language they were 
proposing was to amend the act by making unlawful “avoiding or circumventing … 
internal accounting controls” (United States 1977d, p.165). The AICPA also had argued 
companies seeking guidance on the compliance requirements for an adequate internal 
control system may turn to the legal profession for advice and that they might consider a 
“checklist-type approach” (United States 1977d, p.163). In this regard, companies may 
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attempt “to attain a system that meets a minimal legal standard rather than to attain the 
best system suitable to the circumstances” (United States 1977d, p.163).  
 
However, the SEC endorsed the language as being acceptably clear for businesses to 
follow by arguing that these objectives provided “a reasonable basis for the 
implementation of the required system of controls, and that such objectives are already 
familiar to the business community” (The Committee on Corporate Law and 
Accounting 1978, p.337). Williams, SEC chairman, stated the term reasonable 
assurance was mainly “a cost-benefit criterion” that management were familiar with in 
implementing internal control systems within their organisation (1980, p.43). This 
would ultimately lead to management systematically reviewing the internal control 
procedures and accuracy of the corporate records to “enhance public confidence in the 
corporate sector” (Williams 1980, p.46). 
 
2.3 Guidelines Supplementing the FCPA Provisions 
“The SEC and DoJ consistently refused to issue guidelines concerning the application 
of this Act” (Gustman 1979, p.382). Siedel (1981, p.459) argued “[t]hroughout the 
legislative history, there was little attempt to define the specific words and phrases used 
in the internal control provisions”. The reason being, the SEC and the DoJ, both 
believed “the ambiguities of the Act were desirable for deterrence and that clarifications 
would provide incentives [for managers] to circumvent the Act’s prohibitions” and find 
its loopholes (Lochner 1980; Longobardi 1987, p.462). As previously explicitly 
demonstrated, this was partly due to Proxmire wanting to have the SEC acting as the 
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spokesperson of his network as well as keeping his network flourishing. For this reason, 
the accounting provisions were sponsored by Senator Proxmire and his network twice 
during late 1976 and early 1977 and were unanimously passed in May 1977 and were 
unchallenged in congressional debates and hearings (Bialkin & Atkeson 1979; Siedel 
1981). Bialkin, chairman of the Federal Regulation of Securities Committee, in a 
program presented by the Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities of the Section 
of Corporation, Banking and Business Law stated the same argument that “the force 
behind the legislation was too much to overcome and the bill went through … [with] 
very little legislative history” (1979, p.626).  
 
As addressed by Harold Williams, the then chairman of the SEC, during a conference in 
1981,  
Indeed, it is the lack of more specific guidelines which, since the act became 
law, seems to have generated the greatest concern. Some commentators regard 
the act's accounting provisions as excessively vague (Securities and Exchange 
Commission 1981, p.10)  
and lacking in clarity (Roberts 1989). This is because the FCPA adopted the generalised 
objectives from the statement of Auditing Standard (SAS) number one (Gary 1990) 
regarding the definition of accounting controls as well as the SEC’s reluctance to issue 
guidelines, as will be demonstrated in this chapter and the following.  
 
The SEC refused to issue interpretive rulings, announcing in 1978 that  
[a]s a matter of policy and in light of the legislative and administrative history 
of the act, the Commission does not intend to render interpretive advice on the 
applicability of the act's proscriptions to particular factual situations (Securities 
and Exchange Commission 1978, p.183).  
It could be argued this was partly due to the SEC chairman’s confidence in the 
accounting profession. As he stated  
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major efforts … [had] been made by the AICPA and by the accounting firms to 
develop materials and provide guidance to assist managers and directors in 
establishing, evaluating, and monitoring internal accounting control systems 
(Williams 1981, p.20).  
The Department of Justice guidelines did not also pertain to the accounting provisions 
of the act and application of these requirements which “lacked specificity to serve as an 
effective standard for enforcement purposes” (Gary 1990, p.13). Although the concept 
of audit committees were inherent in the FCPA (Goelzer 1979), it was not fully applied 
and was only “achieved after another era of corporate scandals …that resulted in the 
enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002” (Black 2012, p.1101) 
 
The SEC delegated “the task of developing compliance guidelines to the accounting 
profession” (Miller 1979, p.295). The AICPA had prepared reports addressing 
managements’ responsibilities in relation to internal control and issued two auditing 
standards, as previously mentioned. SAS 17 as one of the standards issued in 1977, 
provided guidance for auditors when discovering material illegal political contributions 
and bribes during their financial statement examination (The Auditing Standards 
Executive Committee 1977a). The standard required auditors to be “aware of the 
possibility that illegal acts may have occurred that may have a material effect on the 
financial statements” and if needed to “perform additional procedures to investigate 
such matters” (The Auditing Standards Executive Committee 1977a, p.2). Another 
standard, SAS 20, was about the auditors’ duties in relation to weaknesses in internal 
control systems. It was called “required communication of material weaknesses in 
internal accounting control” requiring  
the auditor [to] communicate to senior management and the board of directors or 
its audit committee material weaknesses in internal accounting control that come 
to his attention during an examination of financial statements made in 
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accordance with generally accepted auditing standards (Auditing Standards 
Executive Committee 1977). 
 
3. Initial Enforcement of the FCPA 
In relation to maintenance of accounting information and internal accounting controls, 
the Congress did not provide any separate criminal or civil penalties (Dundas and 
George 1979-1980). The SEC was given the civil authority to investigate the violation 
of criminal prohibitions and to cooperate with the DoJ to ensure “the evidence needed 
for a criminal prosecution does not become stale” (Black 2012; United States 1977c). 
The Senate in their final report in 1977 (1977, p.7), explained the investigative 
responsibility was not feasible to be solely given to the Department of Justice, as it was 
duplicating “the investigative capability” that the SEC already had. It would also have 
increased the cost to enforce the act to the Government. This was however, “despite the 
SEC’s statements that the provision did not fit within its mission” (Black 2012, p.1094) 
and corporations’ concerns for potentially “being investigated and prosecuted twice for 
the same offense” (Sheffet & Calantone 1993, p.368). The Senate believed the  
division of responsibility will result in a stronger enforcement effort compared 
to an exclusive assignment to the Justice Department. It is often difficult to 
assemble the degree of evidence required in a criminal action, but enough 
evidence may exist to enable the SEC to halt a continuation of the corrupt 
practices through an injunctive action. [Also], by assigning to the SEC 
enforcement responsibilities for the new prohibition, it will strengthen the 
Commission's ability to enforce compliance with the existing requirements of 
the securities laws, and with the new accounting provisions recommended by 
the Commission and included as section 102 of the bill (United States 1977c, 
p.7). 
 
As demonstrated previously, this delegation of authority to the SEC was derived mainly 
from the commission’s early concern and leadership on the questionable payment issue 
via their voluntary program when the other government agencies were asleep (United 
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States 1977b). The program had demonstrated the SEC’s apparent expertise in 
investigating these cases and their political independence from other governmental 
agencies and the executive branch (United States 1977b; United States 1977c).  
 
3.1 A Hollow Victory 
As explained in this and previous chapters, Proxmire’s network was successful in 
enacting the legislation. However, they failed in effecting the enforcement of the act. It 
can be said that the network had only achieved a minor achievement, since the goal of 
the network was only partly achieved and did not have the expected effect on 
corporations changing their behaviour towards illicit payments. Lack of enforcement 
can be translated to the ultimate defeat of the network and probably the dissidence of its 
actors. Proxmire’s network disintegrated and he was not able to re-create a network with 
the goal of governing and overseeing the SEC and the DoJ, which were responsible for 
enforcing the FCPA.  
 
Posadas (2000, p.358) argued that doubts remained about success of the act in the areas 
of compliance and enforcement. The number of prosecutions were initially few and the 
“enforcement was inconsistent” (Biegelman & Biegelman 2010, p.15). According to 
Rossbacher and Young, many of the cases “were uncovered not by the SEC or 
Department [of Justice] but almost adventitiously by the press” (1997, p.134). The press 
was more successful in revealing cases related to corruption and bribery than the 
independent auditors, the SEC or the DoJ, representing that the system was not working 
as the SEC had claimed in their arguments in the 1970s, that was explained in previous 
chapters. Concerns with lack of enforcement, were initially raised by Hills when the 
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SEC proposal, S.3418, was introduced to the Senate with the hope of providing a better 
basis for prosecutions by saying  
I share … [the] concern that the white collar crimes in this country are not 
being prosecuted with sufficient vigor, and that the sense of justice in the 
country suffers when people who engage in some of these practices are not 
incarcerated as readily as are people who engage in other kinds of crime 
(United States 1976l, p.28).  
 
The number of cases pursued under the FCPA until 1997, by the SEC was only three 
and the DoJ only brought forward thirty cases. The enforcement of the act was increased 
about 2002, in the wake of scandals such as Enron which had awakened a movement for 
new corporate reform, as explained throughout this study (Borgman & Datar 2012; 
Searcey 2009). According to Weismann the level of enforcement of the act in 2005 was 
still 
less than reasonable. Of six new cases filed...three were resolved by informal 
corporate non-prosecution agreements; ... [the] two cases ultimately resulted in 
the imposition of criminal fines and penalties (2009, p.619).  
This argument was also discussed by Koehler (2010, p.907) saying that enforcement of 
a significant majority of the FCPA cases prior to 2010 were “a façade ... resolved 
without FCPA anti-bribery charges”. 
 
No matter what the SEC and the DoJ attempted to enforce the end result would be the 
same which was “privately negotiated and subjected to little or no judicial scrutiny” 
(Koehler 2010, p.924). As such, where the FCPA was enforced by the SEC and the DoJ, 
consequences were “minimal, typically resulting in a fine less than the value of the 
economic transaction giving rise to the disposition combined with a non-prosecution 
agreement” (Weismann 2009, p.623). This was partly due to the SEC concluding the 
219 | P a g e  
 
cases with some form of settlement at the time they were filed (Securities and Exchange 
Commission 2010) leading to cases not going to trial and the SEC consenting to court-
approved settlements (Bagby 1983).  
 
The lack of prosecutions, meant the theory behind the accounting provision of the act 
“had never received a court test” which would have helped in bringing “different 
considerations into play” for the two bodies in charge (Adler 1982; Sporkin 1997, 
p.274). Courts did not have the “opportunity to define most of the key factors” in 
clarifying ambiguities and “rectify[ing] some of the grey areas in the Act” (Adler 1982; 
Pines 1994, p.196). The other issue was the lack of cooperation between the SEC and 
the DoJ, since the accounting and antibribery provisions tend to overlap in many cases. 
Pines (1994, p.193) demonstrates the “cozy interplay between the agencies”, the SEC 
and the DoJ, had never occurred and joint efforts by them to investigate and prosecute 
were “virtually non-existent”.  
 
3.1.1 A Case of the FCPA Enforcement Failure 
 
The above arguments represent the failure of Proxmire in completely implementing his 
network solution to the problem of domestic and foreign bribery and illegal payments. 
The political and legal environment that surrounded the enforcement of the act, led to 
low levels of prosecutions. The Westinghouse Corporation’s 64  “construction of a 
nuclear reactor facility in the Philippines” story, is an example of a case that was under 
investigation from 1971 to 1991 and managed to side-step FCPA prosecution despite 
strong evidence that was presented in the court (Cragg & Woof 2002, p.199). This case 
                                                             
64 Westinghouse Corporation and General Electric at the time, were dominating the U.S. nuclear industry 
domestically and internationally. 
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was described as the most infamous instance of kickback payments made by 
Westinghouse Corporation to political players to obtain a contract, even though the SEC 
and the DoJ cleared the company of any impropriety (Boyce 1993; Butterfield 
1986).The nuclear reactor had become “a major political issue in the Philippines” 
during its construction (Butterfield 1986, p.2).  
 
From the mid 1960s, foreign borrowings played a key role in the Philippine’s 
development and economic growth and supposed “improving the well-being of present 
and future generations of Filipinos” (Boyce 1993, p.245). The Government was 
substantially involved in agriculture and industry development. The World Bank was 
also requiring “export-oriented growth” from the Philippines in return for its support of 
their industrial projects the regime undertaken (Cragg & Woof 2002, p.200), even 
though these foreign borrowings “financed too little genuinely productive investment” 
in the country (Boyce 1993, p.348). 
 
The country’s growth needed a reliable electric power supply, which was only possible 
through a nuclear power plant. In 1973, proposals were submitted for the construction 
of the nuclear power plant by the Westinghouse Corporation and General Electric (GE). 
Westinghouse Corporation’s proposal was awarded the contract, as it was advised by a 
political authority65 to “hire a lobbyist close” to the Philippine’s President, Ferdinand 
Marcos, and pay him a commission, to win over GE (Butterfield 1986; Seagrave 1988, 
p.290). Their proposal was discussed privately and was accepted, even though based on 
                                                             
65 Westinghouse had hired Disini who was “married to the first cousin of Imelda Marcos [Ferdinand wife] 
and became a close friend and golfing partner of the president” (Beaver 1994, p.272). 
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the Philippine national power agency, the GE’s proposal costing was lower, detailed, 
and favourable (Beaver 1994; Cragg & Woof 2002; Seagrave 1988).  
 
The quoted prices by Westinghouse after the initial acceptance of the proposal, were 
growing and were, by far, more than similar nuclear plants constructed in other parts of 
the world such as South Korea and Taiwan. It was described by one of the then officials 
as a contract for one reactor but with the price for two reactors and half of the expected 
power output (Boyce 1993; Butterfield 1986; Seagrave 1988). The nuclear plant costing 
“was roughly double that of a comparable reactor being built in South Korea” and it was 
still financed by the Export-Import Bank since according to the chairman of the bank 
“the two big boys have agreed to it” (Boyce 1993, p.321).  
 
As described by Butterfield (1986, p.2) “the largest source of money came from a Swiss 
subsidiary of Westinghouse that funneled fees for Mr Disini into European banks”. The 
Swiss subsidiary was solely established to handle the nuclear plant contract. The cost of 
construction was questioned by the U.S. embassy in the Philippines. The U.S. embassy 
in their report to Washington, raised concerns in relation to the price being “inflated 
[and] that there were reports of payoffs and that the project would never pay for itself” 
(Boyce 1993; Butterfield 1986, p.1). From the terms of the contract it was evident that 
“the price of the equipment being sold to the Philippines was inflated, as a way to cover 
the cost of the fees to Disini” (Butterfield 1986, p.1) 
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Due to the proneness of the Philippines to earthquake and volcanic activity, the plant 
site was important. However, the company had initiated the preparation of the site 
before the safety studies were completed by the two companies in charge66. Beaver 
(1994) stated the hasty move of Westinghouse in relation to location reflected Marcos 
push for the plant to be built as soon as possible. The construction itself began while the 
“technical reports on potential risks” and safety studies were not finalised (Cragg & 
Woof 2002, p.201). Westinghouse also had difficulties with obtaining an export licence 
for the plant components. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) “had 
refused to issue the licence, which prompted Westinghouse to file a lawsuit against the 
commission” (Beaver 1994, p.275). The export licence was finally issued to the 
company to avoid any “embarrassment to the U.S. government”, while the safety of the 
plant was in question and in the process of being reviewed (Beaver 1994, p.275).  
 
At the time of construction, the Three Mile Island nuclear power accident in the U.S. 
had happened and to show his concerns, Marcos had ordered an investigation of the 
safety measures of the plant and “ordered a halt to the plant’s construction” (Beaver 
1994, p.275; Seagrave 1988). But the company responded that the plant was safe and 
after negotiations with the Government and the bodies in charge, the construction 
resumed. Beaver (1994, p.275) argued that if Marcos was “really serious about 
cancelling the project, the lack of a construction permit would have been an easy way” 
to break the contract.  
 
                                                             
66 The two companies namely, Ebasco services and National Power Corporation, were investigating the 
two possible sites for the nuclear power plant. Their investigation was assisted by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency and the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission (Beaver 1994).  
223 | P a g e  
 
The Westinghouse issues during 1978 were the centre of newspaper reports. The SEC 
and DoJ initiated a joint investigation based on the newly established legislation, the 
FCPA, and “concluded that there was no evidence of irregularities in Westinghouse’s 
relationship with the Philippine government” (Cragg & Woof 2002, p.201), despite the 
SEC findings that “a district manager for Westinghouse in the Philippines destroyed six 
volumes of documents related to the project, then retired” (Seagrave 1988, p.291). The 
bribery payments, as will be explained, were again questioned but the company was 
successful in sidestepping the FCPA prosecution. Based on Butterfield’s investigations,  
the banker calculated, the commissions from the Westinghouse project had 
netted Mr. Disini and Mr. Marcos about $80 million. This is close to an estimate 
by the Philippine National Computer Center in 1975 (1986, p.2). 
 
In 1985, the construction was completed and was rushed as the election for presidency 
in the Philippines was close and it was “sensed that Marcos’ days in office were 
numbered” (Beaver 1994, p.276). Based on an investigation by International Atomic 
Energy Agency, the plant was unsafe as “Westinghouse had cut corners”, while the 
company had announced that they were proud of the plant (Beaver 1994, p.276). When 
the new Government came on board, it filed a lawsuit against the company because of 
the alleged bribery payments to the political players and the plant being unsafe. The 
case was initially heard by the International Chamber of Commerce in Switzerland and 
was ruled in favour of Westinghouse (Beaver 1994; Cragg & Woof 2002). This was 
because the supporting “evidence was not sufficient” and not directly related to the 
allegations (Beaver 1994, p.277).  
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Later on Westinghouse was denied its request for dismissal of the case in the federal 
court and it “opted for an out of court settlement” (Cragg & Woof 2002, p.202). 
However, the amount that Westinghouse agreed to pay the Philippines’ Government did 
not even cover “one year's interest payments on the debts the country incurred to build 
the plant” (Hawley et al. 2000, p.43).The nuclear plant had cost “more than $2 billion” 
and had “never generated a kilowatt of electricity” (Boyce 1993, p.348). In 1999, the 
Philippines Government “decided to dismantle all the nuclear components of the plant” 
and turned the site into a science park (Cragg & Woof 2002, p.202). 
 
4. Conclusion 
By 1977, the Proxmire network was the only successful network in representing and 
obtaining the approval of their bill by the Senate. S. 305 was the preferred bill by the 
Carter administration. The administration did not want to delay the passage of the 
legislation. The accounting provisions of S. 305 were not widely discussed or modified 
during the 1977 congressional hearings, as it was already approved by the Senate. As 
noted, the accounting profession, the AICPA, had previously criticised the language of 
the provision and it was not implemented by the Congress or the SEC. The accounting 
provision was argued by the then SEC chairman to be clear for corporations to 
implement and be utilised. It was a self-regulatory measure for corporations to self-
discipline their affairs without Government intervention.  
 
The enforcement of the FCPA from inception, was minimal and the end result for most 
cases were private negotiations with minimal judicial scrutiny. From the early 2000s the 
FCPA enforcements increased due to “corporate scandals … and the resulting corporate 
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reform efforts” (Biegelman & Biegelman 2010, p.45). The renewed “attention to the 
FCPA and anti-corruption compliance” (Biegelman & Biegelman 2010, p.36) stemmed 
from the passage of the SOX act, as corporations had “uncovered more illegal payments 
as part of the SOX related financial reviews” (Biegelman & Biegelman 2010, p.45). The 
act’s emphasis was on strengthening “corporate accountability and governance of public 
companies” by focusing on “the importance of compliance and ethics” (Biegelman & 
Biegelman 2010, p.36).    
 
After the passage of the FCPA, no guidelines were issued by the SEC and DoJ. As 
clarification of the act would have led to corporations circumventing the accounting 
provisions of the act. The task of clarifying the legislation was left to the accounting 
profession, which was not passionately executed by them. However, due to simplified 
and perceived vague language of the provisions, the act was described to be costing 
corporations and being a roadblock for their foreign affairs and operations. As will be 
explained in the following chapter, by the change of administration and political agenda 
in the White House, the FCPA was viewed as one of the most unproductive federal 
regulations, because the act had increased the regulatory burden on business and had 
diminished their competitiveness in their international dealings. This argument was 
utilised by the Government to amend and even eliminate the act.  
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Chapter Seven: 
Amendments Made to the 
FCPA  
 
In the late 1990s, the SEC had become convinced that auditor commitment to independence had 
slipped. … The issue of auditors providing consulting services to audit clients was not new. … 
The Metcalf, Moss and Dingell Congressional committees had expressed similar fears in the 
1970s and 1980s (Fritz 2012). 
 
During 1977, the accounting provisions “were never debated in the House of 
Representatives. In the Senate…very little consideration was given to the accounting 
standards” (Dundas and George 1979-1980, p.870). As a result the language of the 
accounting section was simplistic and vague (Baker & Bettner 1997) and was argued to 
have caused corporations “to incur unnecessary costs” (United States 1981, p.111). The 
vagueness of the accounting section had been questioned since it was introduced as part 
of S.3418, as discussed in previous chapters. The lack of clarity was partly related to the 
law being a matter “of moral judgements” (Greanias & Windsor 1982, p.138). 
 
Senator Proxmire was one of the actors who had questioned the SEC’s 
recommendations and for this reason was forced to re-establish his network to 
accomplish his main goal of eliminating illicit payments. He argued that the 
corporations would not like the vagueness and stated “I think they would want the 
certainty. … to know what they have to report and what they don’t have to report” 
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(United States et al. 1976, p. 13). The accounting profession, the AICPA, as outsider 
actors to the Proxmire network, also made suggestions to clarify the provision. 
However, after minor changes, the bill was passed by the House of Representatives and 
signed off in 1977. 
 
The then U.S. trade representative, Senator Brock, in an article in the Washington Post 
claimed that the accounting provision shortcomings were due to the SEC, demand for 
“greater authority to regulate accounting and bookkeeping practices” which, “in the 
spirit of true Washington compromise, a law was produced that combined the worst of 
both worlds” (Brock 1981; United States 1981, p.82). This was due to the fact that the 
draft of the law was not challenged by “members of Congress, the administration and 
the business community … for fear of being accused of favouring bribery” (United 
States 1981, p.82).  
 
1. Review of the FCPA After One Year  
As stated by Soresen, a lawyer67, “[t]he ink was hardly dry before a steady drumbeat of 
attack on the statute began” by 1977 (United States 1981, p.414). As early as 1978, a 
White House task force and a new network comprising five working parties was 
established to undertake a study about ‘export disincentives’. This was due to the U.S. 
exports being “a high priority” of the administration and that international trades had 
become substantially “more important to the United States than in earlier years. And a 
                                                             
67 A partner in the law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and Garrison 
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strong export position … [had] become a matter of great significance to the economic 
strength and welfare” of the nation (United States 1980a, p.1) 
 
The disincentives were enrolled as non-human actors to mobilise the network and enrol 
other actors such as the corporations. The disincentives were defined as “U.S. laws, 
regulations, and policies which attempt[ed] to use exports as a lever to obtain policy 
objectives or which … [had] a secondary effect of limiting exports” (United States 
1979, p.4). The FCPA was one of the important areas and “one of the most significant 
export disincentives” identified by businessmen and attorneys (United States 1980a; 
United States 1981, p.7) that were under review in determining its effectiveness based 
on “a cost-benefit analysis” (United States 1979, p.5). The review process took into 
account the cost of the legislation for the U.S corporations and the economy. The 
accounting provisions of the act were argued to also have “significant costs on exports 
and … [corporations’] international competitiveness”(United States 1980a, chapter 9, 
p.7). 
 
Members of these working parties included agencies from the executive branch which 
indicated their interest in this study. The Department of Justice, for instance, was an 
actor of this network and involved in the task force study. But the SEC was not included 
because as part of the review process the task force had mandated “to take enforcement 
responsibilities [of the FCPA] away from the SEC” (United States 1979, p.12). A 
working party of five was in charge of making recommendations based on the review 
and reports prepared by the other four working parties. Part of their initial and 
unapproved recommendations in relation to the FCPA was issuance of written 
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guidelines by September 1979 for the business community and preparation of periodical 
reports about “the level of export loss by U.S. companies because of this law” (United 
States 1979, p.16). 
 
The news reports, such as the Times-News and Wall Street Journal, had announced that 
the task force was going to submit a recommendation, after an agreement was reached 
between different agencies involved in this review, to President Carter. Carter, who was 
initially an actor of Proxmire’s network and had signed the bill into law, called “for 
immediate weakening and eventual atonement of key provisions in the law that 
prohibits payment of bribes overseas by American corporations” (United States 1979, 
p.1). This was due to the fact that the act was described as being a roadblock for U.S. 
corporations which were exporting their products overseas. It was also creating anxiety 
among corporations’ employees of “utmost good faith” as to the implementation of the 
act (Securities and Exchange Commission 1981b, p.1467).  
 
Eckhardt, during a hearing held in relation to this matter, stated that while there was 
considerable support for passage of this legislation, “there was a strong sub rosa effort 
to scuttle the bill. People unwilling to oppose the bill tried to insure that it never be 
brought up in the House of Representatives” (United States 1979, p.2). Even though the 
Congress based on article I of the constitution had the right to make the law, the 
president on the other hand had the right to “faithfully execute those laws” (United 
States 1979, p.2). This was the main concern from Eckhardt’s view point which related 
to undermining the enforcement of the FCPA rather than trying to remove the 
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ambiguities of the act, since it was perceived that the enforcement of the act was costing 
corporations in their foreign trade. 
 
Renner 68 , chairman of the task force, assured the chairman and members of the 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, in the hearing that the act would not 
be scrapped as “many portions of the act … still would be applicable” (United States 
1979, p.12). Eckhardt argued that Congress had spent considerable time and effort 
regarding the issues that the task force were concerned with before the act was enacted. 
The witnesses, for example former Secretary of the Treasury, who had testified in the 
Congress stated that paying bribes was not necessary “to have a successful export sales 
program” as such payments were sometimes made to outcompete U.S. corporations 
(United States 1979, p.19). He later on concluded that as a chairman of a congressional 
subcommittee he  
is pretty tired of seeing a situation in which we hold open hearings, invite 
testimony … and attempt to get the facts, and then are confronted with a 
subterraneous attack on this bill itself, frequently by those who do not 
understand it and those who are not willing to expose their viewpoints to light 
(United States 1979, p.21). 
 
2. Ronald Reagan and His Administration’s Agenda 
In 1980 Carter was defeated by Ronald Reagan “in a landslide electoral victory with his 
legendary promise” of getting the Government off the back of Americans (Gutterman 
2013, p.11). Reagan and his administration advocated elimination of “ill conceived or 
unproductive federal regulations affecting business[es]” (Renk 1980, p.1) using a cost-
                                                             
68 He was the counselor and special envoy, office of the special representative for trade negotiations, 
executive office of President Carter.  
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benefit analysis technique. Reagan as the newly elected President was replacing Carter 
and his administration in the network created to weaken and amend the FCPA. He, as a 
neoliberalist spokesman, was promoting “free market competition and deregulation as 
essential to the nation’s well being” as non-human actors (Barbara et al. 2010, p.776). 
As argued by Cragg and Woof,  
Privileging realpolitik over human rights and other ethical concerns meant that 
the Reagan administration was prepared to overlook the failure of its foreign 
allies to maintain a strict division between private and public interests (a sine 
qua non in the war against corruption), just as the Nixon administration had 
failed to maintain a clear distinction between its political interests and its 
responsibilities for public administration during the Watergate debacle (2002, 
p. 130). 
 
Reagan indicated his alliance and friendship with the business community and had 
“been looking the other way” regarding corporate crime and opposing “anti-foreign 
bribery laws” (Williams 1985, p.3). He was interested in eliminating unproductive 
federal regulations from the point of view of corporations to publicise his concern for 
the increasing regulatory burden on the business community and their competitiveness 
towards international business. He and his administration indicated their dissatisfaction 
with the legislation as it was going to “cast a chill over the willingness of U.S. 
businessmen to push into foreign markets and thereby help boost U.S. export” (cited in 
Biegelman & Biegelman 2010, p.17). This argument was made contrary to the initial 
Congress consensus that was reached regarding corporations losing business was to be 
tolerated for the good health of the U.S. political and economic system.  
 
During Reagan’s presidency the number of prosecutions under FCPA was low, but 
significant amendments were made to the act (Biegelman & Biegelman 2010). For 
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instance, between 1977 and 1988 the DoJ “initiated only twenty antibribery cases under 
the FCPA, and the SEC only three” and only a few of these cases went to trial resulting 
“in minimal penalties” (Pines 1994, p.192-193). The drop in the number of 
enforcements of the act was partly due to the Reagan administration reducing “funds of 
agencies handling corporate misbehaviour” which led to the SEC adopting “a hands off, 
free market approach” (Geo-Jala & Mangum 2000, p.246). Reduction in enforcement 
was also linked to the President of the time, for instance Reagan, appointing five of the 
SEC’s commissioners, which meant that “at least a majority of the commissioners 
…tend to share the policy views of the current administration” (Mattli & Buthe 2005, 
p.415). Accordingly the SEC’s priorities and “approaches to regulatory matters … 
[would] very much [be] a function of the mood of a period, reflected in specific political 
and economic realities” (Mattli & Buthe 2005, p.415). This was apparent during the 
Reagan presidency as the “SEC Commissioners and senior officials did not make major 
speeches addressing any aspect of the FCPA” (Black 2012, p.1105-1106). Also Shad, 
the SEC chairman in 1981 and during Reagan’s Presidency, in comparison to Williams 
had “focused on capital formation issues, and the Enforcement Division returned to core 
enforcement priorities and insider trading” (Black 2012, p.1105-1106). Lockheed was 
one of the corporations that had been indicted multiple times from the 1970s until 2009, 
yet during Reagan’s tenure no charges in accordance with the FCPA were pursued. 
 
3. 1980’s FCPA Proposed Amendments 
The administration was in favour of repealing the accounting provisions of the FCPA 
completely, due to its unnecessary complexity, great cost and burden on U.S. 
corporations (United States 1981, p.177) without having “substantial benefit” for them 
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(United States 1983a, p.1). The U.S. corporations preferred the “loosening of both the 
FCPA’s accounting and anti-bribery provisions to a point effectively similar to repeal” 
(Gutterman 2013, p.12). This is while the Subcommittee on Citizens and Shareholders 
Rights and Remedies was conducting “hearings on the problem of corporate 
accountability” and governance (Sommer 1980, p.57). The subcommittee was piecing 
legislation together called the Protection of Shareholders’ Rights Act of 1980 dealing 
with “governance of corporate boards” (Sommer 1980, p.57). 
 
The AICPA president, Chenok, argued that “the business community was strengthening 
its recordkeeping procedures and internal controls” long before the FCPA was passed 
by the Congress (United States 1981, p.343). He further stated these costs were 
attributed as “classic start-up” and were “unavoidable and often associated with the 
implementation of a new law” (United States 1981, p.343) and were not without 
benefits. Accordingly, corporations in the future only faced incremental costs. Hills, the 
previous SEC chairman, also stated repealing of the accounting provision was 
“inadvisable since it has improved the corporations governance system in place” 
(United States 1981, p.367). Sommer too stated that because of the act, corporations’ 
managements had become more critical of the adequacy of their internal accounting 
system. However, Sommer’s statement can be claimed to be doubtful. As Treadway, 
SEC Commissioner, in one of his speeches, referred to three cases under SEC 
investigation during the early 1980s that had “cooked books” in a manner similar to the 
1970s illicit payment cases (Treadway 1983). The investigations revealed  
a failure of structure and governance … [since] information about improper or 
illegal behaviour failed to reach top management, or the Board of Directors, or 
the Audit Committee for years before the crisis broke … the Directors and 
senior management apparently failed to convey to others the need for accurate 
accounting, compliance with the securities laws, and the elimination of 
improper or questionable activities (Treadway 1983, p.6). 
234 | P a g e  
 
 
3.1 Enrolment of Actors in the Administration’s Network 
The DoJ welcomed the amendments and was enrolled in the network, as there were 
complaints regarding application of the act. The deputy attorney general of the 
Department of Justice, Schmults, accordingly argued that the FCPA was enacted only 
four years ago and it is not a statute that would have been “on the books since the late 
1700’s. It is not cast in stone” and changes are required for businesses to perform 
effectively (United States 1981, p.86). According to Bader and Shaw (1983, p.639) the 
purpose of the act was perceived differently as,  
[o]riginally the FCPA was intended to force corporations to clean up their acts 
and to set a high standard of behaviour for American business…. Given the 
changes in the FCPA proposed … one must question whether Congress is still 
committed to preventing such incidents. Ostensibly, the purpose of … [these 
changes are] to clarify, not to weaken the FCPA. 
 
Senator Brock, claimed the amendments to the FCPA were important as the act had 
undermined “export promotion” (United States 1981, p.41). He urged the Congress to 
eliminate “the export disincentive aspect of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act” as it was 
“a priority of this Administration and the Office of the USTR69”. The Congress had the 
“responsibility to make the act work well” (United States 1981, p.277), while this 
viewpoint was not shared by all the public witnesses or Senators or Congressmen. 
Proxmire for instance, stated that since 1978 U.S. trade had dramatically improved 
despite the fact that the cost of doing business had increased as well.  
 
                                                             
69 The United States Trade Representative 
235 | P a g e  
 
3.2 1981-1982 Amendments of the FCPA 
Between 1981 and 1986, around twelve bills in relation to amending the FCPA were 
presented to the Congress (Earle 1989; Longobardi 1987). The following sections detail 
some of the amendments introduced and extensively discussed in the Congress. During 
1981 and 1982 a proposal was put forward to the 97th Congress to make a number of 
considerable changes in the FCPA (Bader & Shaw 1983) which would have changed 
the accounting provisions significantly and weakened the FCPA. The testimonies that 
were heard in relation to the proposals mirrored “what was heard after the enactment of 
the SOX legislation in 2002” (Biegelman & Biegelman 2010, p.17). 
  
It is clear from the following sections that the corporations had “united and used money 
to promote neoliberal policies” (Barbara et al. 2010) as well as pushing for abolishment 
of the FCPA. Caron and Electric argued  
many of those companies that were under investigation for corrupt practices 
have contributed CEO’s to economic committees appointed by President 
Reagan … it is a signal to business to focus on profit, not accounting procedures 
(1981, p.21).  
Reagan’s message was that corporations had “concentrated enough time and money” on 
cleaning up efforts and it was “ time to get back to the business of getting business” 
(Caron & Electric 1981, p.21). Proxmire interpreted this message as the Republicans  
profess[ing] to be the true supporters of the free enterprise system, yet when it 
comes time for the difficult reforms that will enable the free market system to 
truly work the way it should, the administration shrinks from embarrassing 
corporate cronies at home and corrupt allies abroad (Journal Washington 
Bureau 1976, p.2). 
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3.2.1 Senate Hearings on the Bills Presented 
During 1981, several hearings were held in relation to Senator Chafee’s proposal, S. 
708, to amend the FCPA. The bill was the “first proposal to introduce a cost/benefit 
analysis” (Longobardi 1987, p.450) which, according to Brennan (1984), carried 
measurement difficulties. Senator Chafee can be argued to be representing the network 
that was initially established in 1978 by the administration (referred to as the 
administration network). Representatives from accountants, lawyers, academics and 
corporate executives, enrolled actors of the administration network, had testified at 
these hearings as the bill was in response to their numerous complaints (Brennan 1984). 
Another issue of concern from the Administration’s viewpoint was that hearings were 
held towards the end of the fall session of the Congress and there were doubts in the 
ability of the Senate to approve the legislation proposal on time.  
 
The proposed name of the legislation was “the Business Accounting and Foreign Trade 
Simplification Act” so that the “discussion could take place free from pro-bribery vs. 
anti-bribery rhetoric” (Koehler 2014, p.40). The legislation “was a political hot potato” 
(Koehler 2014, p.40; United States 1981, p.82) because of its name and the change in 
the title was also to avoid having businessmen “run away from undertaking business 
that might be misconstrued as being illegal” and not leaving “one with a chill” (United 
States 1981, p.81). The change of the bill’s name was argued by Senator Wirth70 as 
sending “the message that the United States Government was unconcerned about 
bribery- even to the extent that corruption would be called by another name” (Arieff 
1983; Brennan 1984, p.67).  
                                                             
70 Timothy Wirth, a Democrat Senator from Colorado, was a member of the House of Representatives 
from 1975 to 1987 and a member of the Senate from 1987 to 1993.  
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The bill was the preferred solution, presented by the administration network. It was 
modifying the FCPA in a way to correct the impression that U.S. corporations are 
corrupt and “greater corruptor[s] of others” (United States 1981, p.75). The 
modification also was aimed to reduce “the unjustified competitive edge that foreign 
firms” had due to “the wide sweep and lack of clarity of the act” (United States 1981, 
p.75). This argument was not agreed upon by witnesses testifying, as Heymann 71 
explained that the amendments would “create loopholes so wide that” would turn the 
FCPA “into a laughingstock or a nullity over time” (United States 1981, p.420). 
 
The chairman of the subcommittee, D’Amato72, and the co-chairman Senator Heinz, as 
enrolled actors of the network, stated their agreement and support for the proposed 
solution and making changes to the provisions of the FCPA. D’Amato argued, on the 
one hand based on the SEC observation, “the accounting provisions of the act have 
provoked unprecedented anxiety among honest businessmen about the scope and 
meaning of the act, and about what it takes to comply” (United States 1981, p.1). 
During the hearings, this provision of the act was referred to as the “fancy accounting 
rules” that were not related to bribery and were “simply a response to an ill thought out 
accounting set of rules in the FCPA” (United States 1981, p.183). Sommer, the previous 
SEC commissioner, argued that if the SEC had “embarked upon a course of 
interpretation and guidance soon after” the passage of the FCPA, there would be no 
concern from business and the need to amend the act (United States 1981, p.370). 
                                                             
71 Former Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division of the Justice Department. 
Graduated from Harvard law school. 
72 Chairman of the Subcommittee on Securities.  
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Senator Brock, who was in agreement with the changes, stated that the bookkeeping 
requirement was “overly broad” which was “unnecessary and excessive” (United States 
1981, p.40). He further stated his opposition to “the continuation of the accounting and 
recordkeeping provisions of the FCPA” while supporting “the continuation of an 
effective anti-bribery law and further attempts to obtain an international anti-bribery 
agreement” (United States 1981, p.43). While the U.S Ambassador was seeking 
elimination of part of the accounting provisions, the Department of Commerce was 
urging “repeal of all accounting provisions contained in section 102” as it was 
“unnecessary to prevent illicit payments” (United States 1981, p.67). The Department of 
Commerce, General Counsel, Unger, asserted  
[c]ompliance with… [the accounting] provisions is particularly difficult since 
their interpretation is unclear. This Administration is dedicated to eliminating 
unnecessary regulation of business. The removal of the accounting 
requirements is a positive step toward this goal (emphasis added) (United 
States 1981, p.71). 
This statement confirmed the administration’s position as well as their preference for 
the criminalisation approach where the Department of Justice would be the only agency 
enforcing the law. This was viewed as a “matter of good Government” in placing the 
enforcement authority “in one agency” and eliminating the differences in interpretation 
and coordination of the law (United States 1981, p.80).  
 
On the other hand, until then no other country had enacted similar legislation and would 
have reduced U.S. corporations’ competitiveness. Also, it was “naive to suggest that the 
United States … [was] in a position to dictate unilaterally the code of conduct in world 
commerce” (United States 1981, p.2). The then U.S. Trade Representative claimed that 
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the absence of other nation’s efforts in reducing the practice of bribery was due to the 
fact that the FCPA was ambiguous and confusing. So to resolve this problem, it was 
required to amend and pass a “workable, understandable and enforceable law” that 
would encourage international negotiations (United States 1981, p.60). Nevertheless, 
Chenok claimed the confusion followed partly due to the SEC’s objectives becoming 
broader which “was not clearly seen by many observers of the legislative forum” 
(United States 1981, p.344). The SEC was moving away from its traditional purpose of 
“investor protection to management supervision” (United States 1981, p.345). As the 
aim of the accounting provision was to promote corporate accountability and “to codify 
good corporate management practice and thereby improve overall business accounting” 
(United States 1981, p.345). 
 
Senator Proxmire, as the author of the original act and the principal actor of his network 
however was not in agreement with the proposed amendments and explained the 
changes as a backward step. Proxmire believed that the act had served its purpose by 
forcing corporations not to engage in contracts that they felt involved questionable 
payments to the agents or government officials. Its purpose was to make the 
corporations aware and concerned in this regard so that they would comply with the 
provisions of the act. But the main purpose of the FCPA, to prevent businesses 
engaging in bribery overseas, was overshadowed by their perceived losses in sales 
abroad and higher business costs. However, the losses in exports and sales were 
doubtful as corporations did not have the ability to “estimate with any precision the 
contracts lost to a competitor’s bribe” (United States 1981, p.454). Also a study by 
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Professor Graham concluded that the act had “no negative effect on the export 
performance of American industry” (Graham 1984, p.107). 
 
During the 1970s, Proxmire was able to successfully mobilise his network and persuade 
the actors to approve his solution being the preferred way forward. However, unlike the 
1970s, he was the ranking minority member of the committee during 1981. He claimed 
the amendments were because of “an unprecedented lobbying effort by big business to 
gut the bribery law under the guise of alleged ambiguities which chill foreign trade” 
(United States 1981, p.380). This argument was agreed upon by Soresen, who as a new 
actor in Proxmire’s newly established network73, argued that business complaints about 
the ambiguities in the act were not the main issue and was due to the fact they could not 
openly “authorize or permit the payment of bribes abroad when so requested by local 
officials or when urged by their local agents” (United States 1981, p.399). He also 
mentioned that their dissatisfaction with the U.S. “imposing its ethical standards” 
abroad or lack of clarification was not regarding “seeking … clarification of the act but 
vitiation, not guidance for those willing to stay clean, but loopholes for those willing to 
make payoffs” (United States 1981, p.400).  
 
Proxmire was in favour of the SEC issuing relevant guidelines and regulations rather 
than amending the act. The proposed bills were weakening the accounting provisions 
which would reduced the number of civil or criminal actions taken. He described the 
amendments in modest terms, stating S. 708  
                                                             
73 As discussed in chapter six, Proxmire’s network was defeated because of the lack of enforcement of the 
FCPA. 
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beheads the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and then puts the corpse of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to the torch and burns that corpse to a pile of 
ashes and scatters the ashes to the wind (United States 1981, p.5).  
In his judgement the bill was allowing bribery to “flourish in overseas trade” (United 
States 1981, p.56). While, Senator D’Amato, in favour of the amendments, argued that 
the “pride of authorship” had stood “in the way of improving an existing statute” and 
changing it to an act that would “work better” (United States 1981, p.131).  
 
Part of the perceived improvement in the legislation was observed by Soresen as 
granting permission to corporations to bribe “as a matter of practical commercial 
necessity” which meant that the legislation was going to be riddled “with loopholes … 
encourag[ing] some American businessmen to bribe to the disadvantage of other 
American businessmen” (United States 1981, p.400), since S. 708 meant U.S. 
corporations would again be doing “business overseas by bribery. Companies … once 
again wink[ing] at slush fund bookkeeping” (United States 1981, p.3). Proxmire called 
the bill a “probribery bill” as it gutted “the accounting sections of the act” requiring 
companies to “only keep books and records which reflect in all material respects its 
transactions” (United States 1981, p.4).  
 
During the 1970s the books and records section of the act was criticised as it did not 
contain a materiality test. It was a similar story being repeated during the 1980s and the 
concept was enrolled by the administration network as their non-human actor. The use 
of the materiality standard was widely accepted and favoured by the witnesses testifying 
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at the 1981 hearings74 and had overshadowed shortcomings of the concept. Thompson, 
chairman of the board of the Institute of Internal Auditors, explained that this concept 
was widely accepted as it had “long been accustomed to … , and some … [had] hidden 
behind the terminology materiality, admittedly” (United States 1981, p.479).  
 
The SEC’s voluntary program findings were also that companies had not met this 
standard and that it was not covering the observed abuses initially giving rise to the 
FCPA (United States 1981, p.456). For instance, Burton, an actor in Proxmire’s 
network, a professor of accounting and finance, asserted that the materiality test was 
weakening the FCPA. A similar argument to that was made by the SEC during the 
hearings held in the 1970s and briefly discussed in chapter five. The addition of this 
test, as Burton explained, would have “essentially rob[bed] the act of its significance in 
this area” (United States 1981, p.456), as this test was biased “against small- and 
medium-sized businesses” (United States 1981, p.456) and that large corporations 
would be exempted “from their effect” (United States 1981, p.454). While, based on the 
1970s hearings’ investigations, questionable payments were mainly found in large 
companies. 
 
Illicit payments non-disclosure based on the view of the SEC was material to investors 
since these payments would have an effect on “corporation’s managerial integrity” 
(Brennan 1984, p.60). The GAO indicated the same finding that the materiality standard 
was “inappropriate to bribery” (United States 1981, p.4). It also concluded that adoption 
                                                             
74 Witnesses from the Emergency Committee for American Trade (ECAT), the Department of Justice, 
Institute of Internal Auditors and Financial Executives Institute (FEI) favoured the addition of this 
standard. 
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of such a concept by the Congress “could weaken the … intent of the accounting 
provisions to enhance corporate accountability over assets” (United States & General 
Accounting Office 1981, p.90). The materiality concept, even though it is based on 
shareholders’ needs, fails to disclose illegal bribes entirely. The materiality concept was 
taken from the FASB’s 1980 definition. While the FASB had abandoned its materiality 
concept project after holding public hearings in this regard and had later advised to use 
individual judgement in this area. Also debates about the definition had already begun 
in the Senate by the introduction of S. 708 and demonstrated the confusion among the 
witnesses at the hearings held in 1981. 
 
The addition of the materiality standard to the law was however noted by the witnesses 
from the Emergency Committee for American Trade (ECAT) as a tool for reducing the 
cost and “unjustified overreaction to the disclosures of the mid-1970’s” (United States 
1981, p.141). This new accounting provision was perceived to be making the law “more 
accurate in its approach to the problem of overseas bribery of foreign government 
officials and more simplified in its enforcement and purpose” (United States 1981, 
p.43). However the AICPA representative argued the materiality standard, even though 
it was supported by them, depended on exercising “judgement in circumstances” and 
could not “be reduced to a precise formula” like the reasonableness concept which was 
already part of the act (United States 1981, p.346).  
 
The SEC too had doubts in applying this concept to internal control provisions of the 
act, since materiality “in generally accepted accounting principles … [was] not defined 
in the literature” (United States 1981, p.337). The GAO in their report also, pointed out 
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that materiality was not appropriate for assessing the adequacy of such systems (United 
States & General Accounting Office 1981). The SEC initiated the use of “the prudent 
man approach” as the definition of the materiality concept would be interpreted as 
application of only quantitative measures rather than including a qualitative testing as 
well (United States 1981, p.337). However, the previous SEC chairman, Hills, stated 
that both terms were similar in their approaches and that “neither standard properly 
catches the problem” (United States 1981, p.360). 
 
Some of the witnesses considered the new provisions were solving one set of problems, 
but at the same time, creating another set of problems mainly for smaller organisations. 
This provision was going to include “[a] scienter provision” meaning that the law would 
only be violated if the books and records and the internal accounting controls were 
falsified intentionally (United States 1981, p.9). This provision was favourable as it was 
intended to eliminate the issue of corporations’ liability for the actions of their foreign 
agents abroad. The SEC and the AICPA were both in support of this amendment since 
1976 when the act was recommended to the Congress. 
 
The other amendment was regarding elimination of the SEC from its enforcement role 
of the bribery provision of the FCPA and having the DoJ as the sole civil enforcement 
body. Since the enforcement authority was extending its jurisdiction and it was not in 
relation to the SEC’s objectives in protecting investors. The argument was that this 
change would make the enforcement “consistent and predictable” (United States 1981, 
p.52). Also, having the Department of Justice issuing “clear and comprehensive 
guidelines” (United States 1981, p.53) as the SEC and the AICPA up to then had their 
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disagreements “as to a firm’s responsibility under the accounting provision of the law” 
(United States 1981, p.51). The proposed changes from Proxmire’s viewpoint were not 
going to be passed by his network and through the Congress “without a major fight” and 
a “strong educational debate on the floor” (United States 1981, p.5).  
 
3.2.2 House of Representatives Hearings on the Bills Presented 
The Senate hearings ended with S. 708 being modified based on the opinions of 
different witnesses and Senators such as Proxmire, Heinz and the chairman of the 
hearings, Senator D’Amato75 (United States 1983a). The modifications were approved 
by the Senate as the thrust of the act which was prohibiting bribery had not changed and 
it made the act clear for corporations and enforcement agencies. Even Senator Proxmire 
and his network had  reached a compromise and agreed to the new version of S. 708 
(United States 1983a). The Senate passed the act by majority vote.  
 
While these hearings were held during the first half of the year, the House of 
Representatives started its hearings in relation to the FCPA by September 1981. The 
Senate’s proposed bill to amend the FCPA was passed on to this committee and the 
chairman said it was “the greatest thing since sliced bread”, even though the language 
was still as vague as the original bill (United States 1982, p.257). The Senate bill was 
pushed to be approved by the House of Representatives at an “extraordinary high 
speed” (United States 1982, p.257). However, “key members in the House” of 
Representatives were not convinced with “the merits of the bill, despite [their] sustained 
negotiations throughout 1982” (United States 1983a, p.3). Negotiations were mainly 
                                                             
75 Senator D’Amato had stated this point during his opening statement. 
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between Senator Chafee and Congressman Wirth, democrat and chairman of the 
Telecommunications Subcommittee and actor in the Proxmire network, in relation to 
amendments of the accounting provisions of the proposed bill by the Senate (United 
States 1983a, p.3). 
 
As the chairman, Wirth, put it at the initial hearing, there was “a Democratic caucus 
going on” (United States 1982, p.1). Wirth started the first day of the hearings by stating 
that this subcommittee would study and examine the effectiveness and impact of the act 
and the SEC and the Justice Department enforcement of the act, rather than “go roaring 
with the perception of a fix for a problem that isn’t yet defined, let’s first define the 
problem” (United States 1982, p.2). He wanted to define the shortcomings of the act and 
to amend it to be more explicit. Rather than acting the way the administration officials 
were, which was blaming the problem of “balance-of-payments … on the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, while neglecting to mention” the real problems (United States 
1982, p.320). The pattern of the Congress legislating was to act on assumptions rather 
than hard data or facts (United States 1982, p.158). 
 
The second and third day of the hearings followed the same theme as the first. The 
second hearing was in relation to enforcement of the act, where the SEC and the 
Department of Justice both reported the cases that they had investigated. The following 
hearing was in relation to the “impact of the act on American export performance” and 
the U.S. foreign relations (United States 1982, p.217). The aim was to separate the 
effects of the act on corporations’ sales and exports from “the alleged ambiguities” that 
were reported by different reports and surveys from 1977 (United States 1982, p.256). 
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These documents mainly included a report by the Carter administration entitled the 
‘Report of the President on Export Promotion Functions and Potential Export 
Disincentives’ and the published result of ‘a survey of business opinion’ by the GAO 
entitled the ‘Impact of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on U.S. Business’ (Koehler 2014; 
United States 1982, p.255). As stated earlier in this chapter, the report by the 
administration, similar to the GAO report, was mainly related to the FCPA being 
identified “as one of the most significant export disincentives … because of uncertainty 
within the business community about the meaning and application of some of its key 
provisions” (United States 1980b, p.9), which “was dismissed by the Justice 
Department” (United States 1982, p.256). Wirth claimed the administration letters to the 
Government departments such as the State Department, were “prefaced with … 
negative views of the act” as well as their intention to change the act (United States 
1982, p.268). He believed the departments as “responsive, [and] good civil servants”, 
were to be asked to “comment on the foreign trade impact of the FCPA” and to provide 
examples of the positive implications and shortcomings of the FCPA (United States 
1982, p.268). 
 
The Export Task Force report was used to explain the ineffectiveness of the act, stating 
a “$1 to $2 billion figure of lost exports” was from the enactment of the FCPA (United 
States 1982, p.228). The committee chairman however, believed that the reductions in 
exports were not mainly due to the act, as the figures were opinions rather than facts. He 
related the reductions to cuts in the U.S. “national commitment to research and 
development”, as well as changes in inflation, value of the dollar and the budget deficit 
(United States 1982, p.228). Wirth stated that using this argument to suggest “that any 
248 | P a g e  
 
problems we have around the world in the trade area” are as result of the enactment of 
the FCPA and to push for amendments, was “disingenuous” (United States 1982, 
p.253). 
 
Eckhardt, as he had argued in the 1979 hearings, claimed that the act would not be 
absolutely repealed but other methods would be “used these days to undermine what 
seems to me to be salutary legislation” which leads to the act having a weakened 
language and an enforcement ability which “when applied by a prosecutor … it 
becomes virtually impossible to win a case” (United States 1982, p.4-5). The 
amendments were viewed by Clinard, research professor of sociology at the University 
of New Mexico, as “putting corporate profits before principles” and “endangering the 
political position of the United States” (United States 1982, p.64). However, this view 
was not shared by the witnesses from the Government departments such as the 
Department of Commerce or the Department of State. The accounting provisions were 
perceived by Unger from the Department of Commerce to be creating a “substantial 
burden on all U.S. business” and there was a need for this provision to be eliminated 
from the act (United States 1982, p.305). 
 
The panel of witnesses76 on the initial hearing, agreed that the accounting provisions of 
the act came into place to send a message across to the companies that “they would be 
held accountable for proper management of the corporation” (United States 1982, 
p.101). They wanted to keep the message intact, and not to amend the act contrary to the 
                                                             
76 The panel of witnesses included Pollack, Hills, Clinard, Akins, former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi 
Arabia and Blum, former counsel to the Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations (United 
States 1982, p.8). 
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already established governance systems and codes of ethics of corporations since the 
enactment of the FCPA. The disclosure and accountability as described by Pollack, 
former SEC Commissioner, were based on the “core of the Commission’s thinking” and 
became the foundation of the actions that the Congress took in the 1970’s against the 
problem of questionable payments (United States 1982, p.101).  
 
3.3 1983 Amendments of the FCPA 
3.3.1 Senate Hearing on the Bills Presented 
As the Senate bill, S. 708, was not passed by the House of Representatives, by February 
1983 the Senate reintroduced the bill with the support of the Reagan administration and 
administration network. The reintroduction was, according to Senator Heinz, to stop 
shooting themselves in the foot (United States 1983a, p.3). This reintroduction of the 
Senate passed bill was due to the fact that the full Senate had believed that it was “an 
acceptable improvement” (United States 1983a, p.3) over the existing FCPA “without 
significant controversy” (United States 1983a, p.4). It was argued the reintroduction of 
the bill was going to help the U.S. export and economy as it was widely agreed upon by 
witnesses from the Government and the administration (United States 1983a, p.42).  
 
The identical bill reintroduced by the Senate, S. 414, was called the “business 
accounting and foreign trade simplification act” (United States 1983a, p.1). The 
chairman of the Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, Senator D’Amato, 
announced his opposition to any new major changes to S. 414, as corporations were 
continuing to loose sales and export opportunities. Senators Heinz and Chafee too 
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wanted this bill to be enacted as in their judgement the uncertainties were real and the 
impact on U.S. citizens was that they were losing jobs, and wages (United States 1983a, 
p.3 & p.42).  
 
The S. 414 accounting provisions were to some extent modified based on the SEC’s 
recommendations and had substantially narrowed the difference between Shad, the then 
SEC’s chairman, and Senator Chafee’s position on this provision, as will be shortly 
explained (United States 1983c). But Shad in a letter to Senator Chafee claimed that he 
was “discouraged” by the amendments as the final version of the provision appeared “to 
be several steps backwards - conceptually – from” the latter Senate hearings and 
previous discussions (United States 1983c, p.210). According to Shad, the problems 
stemming from the act were essentially misinterpretations and “misconceptions about 
what conduct may be prohibited by its provisions” (United States 1983c, p.210). 
Nevertheless, the attitude at the 1983 Senate hearing was that the newly proposed bill 
was simplifying and improving the accounting section and not necessarily reducing its 
effectiveness (United States 1983a). 
 
The major changes to the accounting provisions were in relation to the internal 
accounting system requirements, as the recordkeeping requirement was merged with 
this requirement. S. 414 required corporations to “provide reasonable assurance that the 
statutory objectives of their internal accounting controls are met” (United States 1983a, 
p.48, emphasis added). This amendment was based on the SEC’s request to add a 
prudent man standard to the bill which took into account a cost-benefit analysis. The bill 
included two new sections, one related to issuers being subject to a “good faith” test and 
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the other stating that “[n]o person shall knowingly circumvent a system of internal 
accounting controls established” (United States 1983a, p.12). Circumvention was added 
as it was intended to include the use of off-the-books slush funds and deliberate 
falsification of the books and records to escape the internal control requirement. As per 
the request of the SEC and other witnesses, the bill eliminated imposition of any civil 
injunctive or “criminal liability … for failing to comply with the [accounting control] 
requirements” (United States 1983a, p.11), if it could be shown “that it acted in good 
faith in attempting to comply with the internal accounting controls requirements” 
(United States 1983a, p.51).  
 
The witnesses at the hearing had all testified at the 1981 Senate hearing. They all still, 
as part of the administration network, believed that the FCPA needed to be modified 
and that the proposed bill was sufficient and clear to restore U.S. growth in its economy 
and exports. The committee chairman in the end congratulated Proxmire “for his 
willingness to consider language” that from his viewpoint was to be “more practical and 
more beneficial to the public in its application” (United States 1983a, p.107). Proxmire 
and his network were captured by the rhetoric that the administration network had used 
in persuading the acceptance of the bill by the Congress. The Proxmire network had no 
power or leverage in comparison to the Reagan administration and the backing of 
business in enrolling new actors or keeping the network active. 
 
3.3.2 House of Representative Hearings on the Bills Presented 
Congressman Dan Mica introduced H.R. 2157 in March 1983 to the International 
Economic Policy and Trade Subcommittee. The bill was called the “Foreign Trade 
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Practice Act” as it reflected a “neutral title … in this area” (United States 1983b, p.3). 
The bill’s content was similar to the Senate S. 414 bill, but it differed in two respects. 
One aspect was the fines and penalties for the violation of the act were double the 
Senate bill. The other difference was that the Department of Commerce was in charge 
of administrating the accounting provisions instead of the SEC. The Department of 
Commerce would have been in charge of “investigating violations of the disclosure 
requirements of the Federal securities laws” (United States 1983b). 
 
The witnesses at the initial hearings were similar to those at the Senate hearings and 
they had the same message. The message was that they were all against bribery but the 
FCPA needed to be amended as it was vague and costly to American businesses. The 
evidence that was presented was mainly referring back to the GAO’s survey in 1981 
which was based on businesses opinions rather than trade statistics. However, the 
hearings did not include any arguments in relation to shortcomings of the proposed 
amendments or that it was weakening the FCPA or the ability to enforce it.  
 
There was no discussion of the effectiveness of the FCPA as it was enacted in 1977. 
Brennan, Associate Professor from the Bowling Green State University, concluded from 
his interviews77 that the Congress had to initially reconcile the conflicting views in 
relation to the FCPA and the proposed amendments in the eyes of the American public. 
Since many still believed that the FCPA in its current format was “fair and just” (United 
States 1983b, p.250). Brennan stated this viewpoint had to be discussed in the hearings 
                                                             
77 Interviews were done amongst 34 men and women in the public and private sector regarding the impact 
of FCPA. 
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or that the public would perceive the Congress “gutting” the FCPA to benefit the 
business community in the short run and leading to “more stringent legislation in the 
future” which could result in legislation that “sends the wrong signals to the public and 
private sector and international business conduct of American multinationals returns to 
pre-FCPA patterns” (United States 1983b, p.250). This is while the public confidence in 
enforcement of the FCPA had been to some extent shattered as the Justice Department 
was no longer reporting its enforcements of the act to “the Multinational Branch of the 
Criminal Fraud Division” (United States 1983b, p.250), because of the Administration’s 
elimination of this branch, in 1981. Further, as detailed in this chapter, the SEC had 
dramatically reduced its enforcement priorities of the FCPA.  
 
The accounting provisions of H.R. 2157 were word for word taken from S. 414. The 
main focus and interest of the House of Representatives hearings was on the anti-
bribery provisions of the act as opposed to the accounting section. Mathews, a former 
SEC commissioner, during the last hearing raised concerns in relation to omission of the 
recordkeeping section and being part of the internal control requirements. He wanted 
the legislation to include “a Federal violation” for knowing falsification of “the books 
and records of a corporation” or cooking the books to have an effective law in place 
(United States 1983b, p.227-228). Cooking the books either to conceal an illegal act or 
illicit payments as described by Moore was an intentional alteration of the books and 
records which is against the law and accounting principles (United States 1983b, p.289). 
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3.4 1985-1986 Amendments of the FCPA 
During February 1985 the Senate reintroduced S. 708 and S. 414 as S. 430. The bill was 
initially referred to the SEC, the Department of Justice and the Department of 
Commerce. By June 1986 the Subcommittee on International Finance and Monitory 
Policy and the Subcommittee on Securities jointly held a hearing in relation to this bill. 
Proxmire, during his opening statement, was trying to re-establish his network and 
again asserted his disagreement with the bill naming it the “bring back bribery” 
legislation (United States 1986, 20). He believed that the push for amendments had 
come from “the Reagan administration, joined by a vocal group of trade lobbyist” 
(United States 1986, p.38). Again, the amendments to the accounting provision were 
only criticised by Proxmire and Mathews.  
 
The main criticisms were in relation to elimination of criminal liability and inclusion of 
the books and records provisions as part of the internal accounting control section. 
Mathews argued S. 430 would “needlessly curtail the SEC’s effectiveness in so-called 
‘cooked books’ cases” as corporate officers or employees would be able to falsify their 
accounts and books due to the fact that the amount is immaterial to the corporation’s 
financial statements or that it is not “contrary to management’s general or specific 
authorization” (United States 1986, p.119). The bill requirements included “the 
Attorney General and the SEC Commissioner to make yearly reports on all activities 
under the FCPA” encouraging “the President to seek an international treaty on illegal 
foreign payments” (Longobardi 1987, p.455). 
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By September 1986, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 
agreed to report the bill, but no further action was taken before the end of the Congress 
session. Congress and the House of Representatives during 1986 had considered “at 
least four bills containing amendments to the FCPA” (Longobardi 1987, p.454). These 
proposals were mainly identical to the bills that were presented to the Congress in 
previous years however, the bills all died with the end of the Congress. For instance bill 
H.R. 4389, was introduced in 1986 which was similar to H.R. 2157. The bill “would 
have amended the Export Administration Act of 1979 … [and] have omitted the 
accounting provisions of the Act entirely” (Longobardi 1987, p.456). The bill was later 
adopted into H.R. 4800, the Trade and International Economic Policy Reform Act 
which “did not disturb the accounting provisions” of the FCPA or its original structure 
(Longobardi 1987, p.457). H.R. 4800 according to Longobardi (1987, p.459) “was a 
tremendous improvement over all prior bills proposed to amend the FCPA”. The above 
bills were not supported by either the Senate or the House of Representatives, due to 
their emphasis on “the consequences of bribery rather than the nature of the act” 
(Brennan 1984, p.82). 
 
4. The Final Result of the Hearings 
By 1988, the Congress included the amendments to the FCPA as part of title v of the 
Reagan administration’s Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (OTCA) of 1988 
which was introduced in 1987 as H.R. 3. The OTCA was an “approximately four 
hundred page piece of legislation” of which the amendments to the FCPA were only six 
pages (Brennan 1990, p.230). The Administration network can be argued to have been 
unsuccessful in directly weakening mainly the accounting provisions of the act. OTCA 
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was the only resort this network had, to be able to move through the phases of the 
translation model as well as keeping the actors enrolled. The amendments were “a 
compromise on changes to the FCPA” that was initially proposed by Chafee and 
“supported by business-group lobbyists and the Reagan administration” (Gutterman 
2013, p.15). Section 352 of H.R. 3 was identical to H.R. 4800 that was not passed by 
the Senate at the end of 1986. The provisions in relation to the FCPA “were sandwiched 
into the lengthy and more controversial provisions of the OTCA, thus escaping 
significant public scrutiny” (Earle 1989, p.550).  
 
Even though the majority of the criticisms focused on the accounting section’s 
shortcomings, the amendments were in relation to the SEC’s recommendations relating 
to clarifying the accounting provisions by defining the ‘reasonable detail’ and 
‘reasonable assurance’ (Fremantle & Katz 1989; Sheffet & Calantone 1993). The bill 
also included limitation of “criminal liability for violations of accounting standards to 
those who knowingly circumvent a system of internal accounting controls or who 
knowingly falsify records kept pursuant to accounting requirements” (Fremantle & Katz 
1989, p.765). This limitation, as argued by Cragg and Woof (2002, p.186), was a 
“corporate friendly” provision which “made prosecutions more difficult by stipulating 
that officers of firms offering bribes must be proved to have direct knowledge that 
payments were being used for illicit purposes”. 
 
Having the amendments had not reduced the SEC authority to regulate as well as 
oversee the internal management of domestic companies (Bathen 1978; Dundas & 
George 1979-1980). For example, by July 1988 the SEC re-introduced a previously 
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withdrawn proposal regarding the management statement on internal accounting control 
(Solomon & Cooper 1990). The proposal was called the ‘Report of Management’s 
Responsibilities’. As argued by Solomon and Cooper (1990, p.56) “[f]or over a decade, 
financial statement preparers and auditors as well as legislators and regulators have 
advocated” the use of such a report. The old rule was proposed initially in 1978 based 
on one of the Cohen commission report’s recommendations, as discussed in chapter six. 
It required management to prepare a statement to form their opinion regarding the 
control systems providing  
reasonable assurances that specified objectives … were achieved; and … 
description of any material weaknesses in internal accounting control 
communicated by the independent accountants … which have not been 
corrected, and a statement of the reasons why they have not been corrected 
(Stanger 1980, p.88-89). 
It also required “an independent accountant examine and report on the management 
report” (Grundfest & Berueffy 1989, p.14). The withdrawn proposal had a “close 
correlation between disclosure of management’s opinion on internal control and 
compliance (or the lack of compliance) with the internal accounting control provisions 
of the FCPA” (Grundfest & Berueffy 1989, p.14). 
 
The new rule was as well in response to the thirteen recommendations made by the 
Treadway Commission report (Relevant details pertaining to the Treadway report will 
be explained in the following section) which required rulemaking by the SEC (Black 
2012; Grundfest & Berueffy 1989; Securities and Exchange Commission 2002; 
Solomon & Cooper 1990). The rule required registered corporations to include in their 
publicly available report a ‘management report’ to demonstrate the effectiveness of their 
internal control systems as well as “management’s stewardship responsibilities” (Bagby 
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1983, p.222; Fremantle & Katz 1989; Grundfest & Berueffy 1989; Solomon & Cooper 
1990). The purpose of the report was for management and independent auditors to 
disclose an acknowledgment of their responsibilities in relation to financial statements 
as well as establishment and maintenance of the company’s internal accounting control 
system (Fremantle & Katz 1989; Michael 1980; Securities and Exchange Commission 
1988; Securities and Exchange Commission 2002). Management responsibilities would 
have extended to describing and assessing the “actions taken in response to 
recommendations made by internal auditors and independent accountants” (Boury & 
Spruce 2005, p.30; Securities and Exchange Commission 2002). The management 
report was proposed by the SEC in the hope of helping auditors in finding “material 
misstatement of facts” and any shortcomings of the internal control system (Fremantle 
& Katz 1989; Securities and Exchange Commission 1988, p.2).  
 
This proposal was again withdrawn by the SEC in the 1980s (Boury & Spruce 2005) 
“after an unprecedented outcry from both the auditors” as well as American 
corporations not supporting the proposal (United States 1985, p.574). It was withdrawn 
“after the Auditing Standards Board of the AICPA issued its position statement on this 
matter” (Cascini & Vanasco 1992, p.25).The SEC issued ASR No.278 instead, which 
required companies to voluntarily report on their internal accounting control systems. 
The management report was later reconsidered by the Treadway commission. In 2002, 
the management comprehensive review and report of the internal control and the 
“public accounting firms attesting to” this report was included in the SOX act, section 
404 (Moeller 2004, p.105). The SEC had defined the term internal control, of section 
404, in reference to the Treadway Commission established framework in this regard. 
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The withdrawal of this proposal was partly related to the Department of Justice showing 
a willingness to provide guidelines on the act in helping the users to better understand 
the complexities of the law (Bagby 1983; Cascini & Vanasco 1992). The DoJ had 
released ‘the FCPA Review Procedure’ which provided their opinion and advice only 
“on the legality of the contemplated transaction”, on a case-by case basis, as well as 
protection of corporations “from disclosure of sensitive information under this 
procedure” (Cascini & Vanasco 1992, p.25; Lochner 1980). However, the DoJ advice 
was not mainly related to clarifying and explaining the accounting provisions of the act. 
This was because the SEC had decided to not join this review process (Cascini & 
Vanasco 1992). 
 
5. The 1980s Corporate Failures 
The lack of enforcement and guidelines for the accounting provisions of the FCPA, as 
previously explained in chapter six, as well as accounting issues surrounding corporate 
failures and audit frauds during the 1980s, led to three years of hearings named ‘SEC 
and corporate audits’. The hearing held by Rep. John Dingell, were related to “the 
adequacy of the accounting profession’s self-regulatory system” in setting accounting 
and auditing standards (Holtzman 2004, p.952; United States 1985; Zeff 2003b, p.273). 
This climate of criticism and scrutiny of the accounting and auditing profession initiated 
the formation of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting in June 
1985.  
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A Commission, a private sector initiative, known by the name of its chairman, James 
Treadway, former SEC Commissioner, was established to identify and improve “ways 
to better prevent and detect” management fraud so that “the auditing profession and 
business community can better assure the public that the system of corporate 
accountability is credible” (United States 1985, Part 6, p.65). It was “jointly sponsored 
and funded by five private accounting organizations” including the AICPA, the 
American Accounting Association (AAA), and the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) 
(Grundfest & Berueffy 1989, p.2; United States 1985, Part 6). The AICPA provided 
“major funding and support” (United States 1985, Part 6, p.65). The Treadway 
Commission formation was announced during the last ‘SEC and corporate audits’ 
hearings.  
 
5.1 The ‘SEC and Corporate Audit’ Hearings 
Dingell, Democrat and chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 
of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, during the first day of the hearings 
stated that the purpose of the hearings was to investigate “the effectiveness of 
independent accountants who audit publicly owned corporations and the effectiveness 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission which audits those accountants” (United 
States 1985, Part 1, p.1). Similar to Metcalf, Dingell also raised questions and concerns 
in relation to auditors’ independence in providing services to their clients as well as the 
SEC’s reluctance to use its powers granted by the Congress “to address problems in 
standard-setting and audit enforcement” (United States 1985, Part 1, p.3). The SEC was 
also questioned for defaulting “on its responsibility to establish an independent system 
of overseeing auditors” (United States 1985, Part 1, p.449). The subcommittee chairman 
261 | P a g e  
 
was urged not to let the “accounting establishment … beat this committee” just as they 
had taken “on the Metcalf committee and they beat the Metcalf committee, ... they took 
on the Moss committee and they beat the Moss committee” (United States 1985, Part 1, 
p.729).  
 
The first witnesses on the first day were Briloff and Chatov, who had previously 
testified and helped with the Metcalf and Moss investigations, as detailed in chapter 
three (Holtzman 2004; United States 1985; Zeff 2003b). They both argued that since 
their last testimony at the Metcalf and Moss hearings, “not a great deal of change … 
[was] manifested” (United States 1985, Part 1, p.6) and that “the more things change, 
the more they remain the same” (United States 1985, Part 1, p.70). Chatov added  
I believed in 1977, and I do today, that irrespective of good will and integrity on 
the part of different individuals, that the system itself simply is not capable of 
self-reform. It has got to be changed if you want something different (United 
States 1985, Part 1, p.7).  
The chairman of the committee believed the system that “was established more than 50 
years ago to safeguard … [the] economy from financial abuses and illegal business 
practices” was not working (United States 1985, Part 4, p.1). This is because the 
external auditors who are  
trusted blindly [by the stakeholders] … are like the necromancers and sorcerers 
of old. Nobody knows exactly what they are doing. There are vast clouds of 
smoke and lots of waving of arms and incantations and adjurations, 
occasionally a flash of light moves through the scene (United States 1985, Part 
1, p.286). 
The arguments of Chatov and Dingell were similar to what Proxmire had initially stated 
during his hearings regarding the illicit payment issue. Proxmire had emphasized that 
the problem was the system that was not working (United States 1976l). While the 
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AICPA and the SEC, like in the 1970s, denied these claims. The SEC stated “[t]he 
system is extremely cost effective” in bringing a “record number of cases” (United 
States 1985, Part 1, p.568). The AICPA believed the audit failures were  
as the result of human error …[not] a breakdown in the system. … We think 
we have a very powerful system … that is designed to assure the Congress and 
the public that the Nation’s auditors are able to discharge their responsibilities 
in an efficient and effective manner (United States 1985, Part 1, p.920). 
 
The role of independent auditors and their incompetence in providing warnings about 
corporations’ bribing foreign officials was raised by Chatov. Reasoning that either  
auditing is corrupt and auditors look the other way when they discover 
irregularities … [or] more likely, because of the sampling system … that it is 
relatively easy for insiders to hide what they want from outside auditors (United 
States 1985, Part 1, p.9).  
Briloff, Seidman, chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Bowsher, 
Comptroller General of the U.S. GAO, also believed that auditors, as part of their 
internal control review should be looking for financial fraud and illegal activities. Fraud 
detection and internal control evaluation had been part of the government auditing 
standards, as part of GAO’s duties to audit government agencies’ financial reports, 
since the 1970s 78  (United States 1985, Part 6). Auditors’ duty of reporting illegal 
activities to government regulators was recommended in the 1970s by the Metcalf 
Subcommittee but was never implemented by the accounting profession (United States 
1985, Part 6). The only standards that were implemented by the profession were SAS 
16, and SAS 17, as briefly described in the previous chapter, that were both effective as 
of January 1977. 
 
                                                             
78 Also as part of the Single Audit legislation requirements.  
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Briloff raised concerns with the independent auditors’ responsibility to the public and 
stakeholders arguing “the profession’s traditions and, I submit, its present role and 
responsibility to society are better defined as a ‘private priesthood’” (United States 
1985, Part 1, p. 85). This was because the phrases used by the auditors in their report 
would not convey the reality that a lay reader would observe and understand. Referring 
to Burton, he defined auditing practices as a commodity, providing tax and management 
services to increase their profits and abandoning their traditional services on behalf of 
society (United States 1985, Part 1). As advised before, in the 1970s, Chatov 
recommended the use of auditors provided by the Government to protect the public 
interest. As well Manson79, the then chairman of the National Conference of CPA 
Practitioners 80 , urged the subcommittee chairman to “consider the formation of a 
Federal Board” of Public Accountancy as an initial step to reform of the profession 
(United States 1985, Part 1, p.729). 
 
Briloff’s testimony was also related to recent corporate failures being partly due to their 
internal control system being “corroded or corrupted” (United States 1985, Part 1, p.74) 
even though “the Congress had given legislative approval … to auditing standards 
pertaining to internal control” as part of the FCPA (United States 1985, Part 1, p.103). 
The FCPA was enacted in the hope of companies “sufficiently or significantly 
upgrad[ing] their internal audit function” (United States 1988, Part 1, p.214). However, 
“this new cloak of authority and legitimacy for … [the] profession was too heavy for … 
[their] shoulders” and like corporation management and “their stalwart professional 
                                                             
79 Manson had previously served as the vice president of the AICPA and a member of its Executive 
committee for nine years. 
80 An organisation established “to preserve the viability and protect the interest of regional, medium-sized 
and local accounting firms” (United States 1985, Part 1, p.730). 
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representatives”, had resisted “the endeavors by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to implement the legislation” (United States 1985, Part 1, p.103). Despite 
the fact that the accounting provisions of the FCPA “were watered down” as observed 
by Briloff (United States 1985, Part 1, p.103). 
 
A new piece of legislation H.R. 4886 addressing auditors’ duties towards detecting 
fraud and illegal activities, was developed by several members of the subcommittee 
including Senator Wyden and the committee chairman. It was discussed during the last 
days of the hearings. The main concern was the enforcement of the act and the SEC’s 
ability to investigate more cases. Bowsher stated that it was “all a case of getting 
leadership and action” by the profession and not just forming study groups such as the 
Cohen Commission or the Treadway Commission (United States 1985, Part 6, p.30). 
The Treadway Commission was argued by the present Senators at the hearing, Luken 
and Wyden, to be going down the same road as the other study groups such as the 
Cohen Commission and looking at “the age-old problem” concerning independent 
auditors and their duties towards reporting fraud and illegality (United States 1985, Part 
6, p.79). 
 
The AICPA however, believed that the legislation should be abandoned as it would “not 
improve … [the auditors’] ability to serve the public interest” and that the study group 
would accomplish this goal as it was an act from “within the existing regulatory and 
supervisory framework” (United States 1985, Part 6, p.110). Shad, the then SEC 
chairman was also not supporting the proposed bill due to the accounting profession’s 
efforts in this area and the increase in cost for auditors that was not justifiable and 
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guaranteeing the reduction in audit failures and corporate frauds (United States 1985, 
Part 6). As part of his testimony he stated “[a]uditors are not lawyers or regulators. They 
do not presently have the expertise or tools to detect possible illegal or irregular acts 
that are not related to the financial statements”, but are related to internal control 
systems (United States 1985, Part 6, p.288). 
 
By 1987, when the findings and recommendations of the Treadway Commission were 
issued, members of the subcommittee had mainly praised the commission’s effort. 
Dingell stated that the report had diligently addressed “the question of what causes 
fraudulent financials and what can be done to reduce their incidence” (United States 
1988, Part 1, p.1-2). While there were some concerns among Senators about the 
recommendations’ ability to make any changes to auditing practice and management 
responsibilities, to report was argued by Wyden to be optimistic since during the last 
decade,  
[t]here was a unanimous Senate committee report calling for the very things 
that are proposed in my legislation. Ten years ago there was a flurry of reports, 
commissions, and studies not all that different than what we are seeing now. 
Somehow, in the real world, things didn’t change much. I am very hopeful … 
that something is going to be different this time (United States 1988, Part 1, 
p.41). 
Because the report’s recommendations were comprehensive and covered parts of the 
content of H.R. 4886, Treadway advised the Congress to wait until the substance of the 
report was significantly implemented before passing the proposed legislation. The 
AICPA had initiated reviewing and revising their standards in relation to independent 
“auditor’s responsibility for the detection of fraud”, and increasing their communication 
of information pertaining to the audit process and business failure to stakeholders 
(United States 1988, Part 6, p.160). The chairman was hopeful that the profession would 
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“clean up its own shop so that further legislation” would not be needed (United States 
1988, Part 1, p.99). However, as it is clear from the corporate collapses that took place 
in the early 2000s, these recommendations, like previous recommendations, were 
mainly window dressing. During 2002, the Congress once again had to step in and take 
charge of passing legislation that would seemingly put a stop to corporations’ corrupt 
and fraudulent activities. As argued in this study, the lessons were not learned and the 




The FCPA, from its inception, was under broad attack by the administration who had 
signed it into law; as well as the business community. The main reason was the 
perceived effect of this legislation on corporations’ business internationally and creation 
of export disincentives for them. The FCPA was viewed as an unproductive regulation 
having adverse effects on the U.S. economy and foreign affairs. When Reagan became 
the U.S. president, he had the same agenda, namely, in his words, getting the 
Government off the back of Americans or mainly American businesses. His promotion 
of free market and deregulation meant that he was willing to let the corporations’ 
bribery and corrupt activities go by without any penalties. For this reason there was a 
push by the White House to amend the provisions of the FCPA. 
 
The amendments to the act were mainly directed towards repealing the accounting 
provisions of the act. It was mainly supported by Reagan, his administration and the 
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U.S. corporations, while at the same time trying to “distance themselves from the 
appearance of condoning bribery” (Gutterman 2013, p.27). However, some of the 
Senators and Congressmen such as Proxmire, Eckhart and Wirth believed the original 
legislation was effective. The proposed bills for amending the FCPA “became the 
subject of legislative controversy in Congress for … seven years” (Gutterman 2013, 
p.13). The bills presented to the Senate and the House of Representatives wanted to 
either weaken the FCPA in total or to remove the accounting provisions altogether. The 
argument was that the presented bills would have eliminated the vagueness and overly 
broad provisions of the FCPA. The amendments would also have eliminated the 
perceived unjustified competitive edge that businesses had over foreign businesses. 
However, “despite continued support from business groups … it did not survive” as a 
separate bill (Gutterman 2013, p.13). A compromise of the proposed changes by the 
Chaffee bill was passed as part of an around four hundred page piece of legislation 
called the U.S. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (Brennan 1990). The 
goal of the act was, at best, to indirectly amend the 1977 FCPA (Brennan 1990), which 
was not what American corporations were hoping and lobbying for.   
 
While the Congress can be argued to be successful in passing legislation to curb 
corruption and bribery, they had failed in enforcing the law. As explained in this and the 
previous chapters, the political, legal and economic forces of the time had a negative 
effect on the enforcement and prosecution of corporations. The 1980s and 2000s 
corporate failures can partly demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the FCPA and its 
enforcement. Apart from enforcement issues, there were shortcomings with the auditing 
profession in executing their responsibilities and their providing warnings about 
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corporations making illicit payments. The SOX act similar to the FCPA, was a cosmetic 
fix, and was passed in 2002 to put an end to these shortcomings and issues, while not 
taking into account that the underlying problem was with the disclosure and corporate 
accountability system that was not working effectively. The next chapter will conclude 
the lessons that were not learned by the politicians, the SEC and the accounting 
profession, from the enactment and enforcement of the FCPA.  
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Chapter Eight: Lessens to 
be Learned 
 
Law may often be part of the problem of corruption. Too many laws, excessive 
formalism, and vexatious procedures help create corruption (by forcing people to get 
around them) and weaken attempts to control it. Law may encourage corruption by 
setting artificially low limits to political expense (Nelken & Levi 1996, p.9) 
 
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, as a political affair, was signed by President Carter 
in 1977, after two years of congressional hearings and legislative proposals. The act as 
described by Longobardi (1987, p.432) was “one of the United States’ most 
controversial federal laws”, although its “overall effect appears to be modest” 
(Darrough 2009, p.266). The Bills presented to the congress for this purpose represented 
the urge by Congress to do something about overseas and domestic bribery and 
questionable payments that were revealed during the investigations of the Watergate 
break-in. Moran (2010, p.220) states that “under a highly competitive political system” 
some of the legislators would be “constantly searching for scandalous regulatory 
failures to remedy”. The bills had “caused such emotional debate” that only a few other 
national and international bills had evoked (Brennan 1984, p.56). The Watergate 
scandal and post-Watergate findings by the press had helped to publicise the events that 
were perceived by some to be “a breakdown in moral values throughout society” 
(Williams 1985, p.1). As argued by Davis (2012b, p.498) moralism and partly self-
interest “played the most significant roles in shaping the original Act and its 1988 
amendments”.  
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1. Magnitude of the Problem at Hand 
Senator Williams on the senate floor stated,  
no one expected at the beginning of these hearings that corruption of such 
magnitude and at such high levels would be documented. No one expected that 
such disregard for good ethics and good business practices existed in the 
conduct of American overseas business (United States 1976d, p.30425).  
In brief  
[t]he response to Watergate was a powerful political force that built on all that 
came before Watergate. And what it ultimately produced was an array of ethics 
laws, rules, and procedures that had no precedent in the United States or in any 
other country in the history of the world (Mackenzie & Hafken 2002, p.35). 
The Congress was swift in reacting to the prevailing problem of widespread illegal use 
of corporate funds domestically for President Nixion’s re-election campaign and 
internationally. It became apparent that the problem of political contributions and 
payments “were not isolated occurrences but a way of doing business” in a majority of 
corporations (Neumann 1980, p.63). From the early 1970s, hearings were held in 
relation to the Watergate scandal, multinational corporations’ wrongdoings and the way 
of doing business internationally. The outcome of the congressional hearings was the 
twenty legislative recommended proposals addressing the issue of illicit payments and 
restoration of confidence in the integrity of American companies.  
 
The SEC also embarked on a Voluntary Disclosure Program to investigate publicly 
traded companies for the bribery of foreign government officials. The program had put 
the corporations in charge of determining and reporting the foreign payments that were 
deemed significant (material) to their stockholders. The SEC focus was the deception of 
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shareholders through payments made mainly from off-the books slush funds or 
improper invoicing practices. In many instances the failure to provide shareholders with 
accurate financial statements represented violation of the reporting requirements of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Longobardi 1987; United States 1976n). 
 
The voluntary program changed the SEC focus to corporate accountability. The SEC 
maintained that the integrity of the system of corporate accountability was related to the 
investors’ right “to have accurate financial information on which to base a prudent 
investment decision about a company” (Bill To Ban Overseas Corporate Bribes Dies  
1977, p.1). As identified by Koehler (2012, p.961), during the congressional 
investigations and hearings, the SEC, as a political institution81 , “played the most 
prominent and trusted role” as well as  
the most curious as the commission was a reluctant actor in Congress’s quest for a 
new and direct legislative remedy to the problem. It is clear from legislative record 
that the SEC wanted no part in policing the morality of American business or in 
determining what is an improper foreign corporate payment.  
The voluntary program also came to an end not because the active cases by the 
enforcement division were finalised, but because of pressures from the commissioners 
and the business community (Sporkin 2006). As explained in chapter four, some of the 
commissioners were eager “to put the cap on this volcanic situation” (United States 
1976i, p.20). Corporations, on the other hand were indirectly lobbying for the 
discontinuation of the program, as they did not want to be seen as supporting “foreign 
corrupt practices” (Siedel 1981, p.443)  
 
                                                             
81 As explained in the previous chapters, the SEC is “an institution that changes with the political winds” 
(Pollack 2003, p.26). 
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2. Corporations’ Role in the Formation of the Act 
The act was intended to serve as an expressive function telling corporations’ managers 
that corrupt payments are immoral. As argued by McCloy, in chapter two, the American 
corporations were supposedly over victimised in the process of congressional 
investigations while they were in the process of reforming itself. Nevertheless, from the 
twenty first century corporate collapses it can be argued that the act had not provided 
much of a deterrent effect or significant bearing on corporate behaviour (Cragg & Woof 
2002; Hess & Ford 2008). The agency issue, separation of corporation’s owners and 
managers, has created a unique design that is “a recipe for corruption and scandal” 
(Bakan 2012, p.6). Corporations and managers specifically, are in theory socially 
responsible for their stakeholders. They rely on portraying themselves as being seen to 
subscribe to a moral imperative, in maximising shareholders wealth and corporation’s 
profit, in fact they are immoral. Berle and Means (1991, p.2) have described 
management as “princes of industry”, and that no other power exists to control them. 
Corporate interests in relation to corrupt and fraudulent activities, have mainly been 
about funding to train employees in relation to matters pertaining to compliance with 
provisions of the FCPA. They also have employed “a substantial number of lawyers and 
internal auditors who do nothing other than FCPA compliance work” (Cragg & Woof 
2002, p.100). Sporkin (2006, p.1), the then enforcement Chief, in one of his speeches in 
relation to the effectiveness of the FCPA stated  
What I envisioned when the law was enacted was a new corporate regime where 
bribery of foreign officials would be almost completely extinguished at least as 
it pertained to major U.S. corporations. As all of us here observed, the wild-
eyed-do-gooder predictions never occurred. Instead statistics indicate that 
bribery of foreign officials has maintained a steady pace over the years. 
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3. Issues Concerning the Accounting Provisions 
Based on the legislative and political history described in the previous chapters, the 
accounting provisions had broad objectives, with the hope of discouraging “repetition of 
the serious abuses which the Commission … uncovered in this area” (Securities and 
Exchange Commission 1979b, p.1143). Hills, the then SEC’s chairman believed the 
lessons would be learned by a corporation’s management, as the provisions were hoped 
to be strengthening corporate accountability and responsibility to their stakeholders. The 
act was regarded by the Congress as “a fundamental tenet of the corporate enterprise 
system” with the objective of fostering “integrity in the process of corporate 
management” (Black 2012; Goelzer 1979, p.19). This was because, improper payments 
were alleged to be a symptom of “weak corporate accountability and governance 
mechanisms which transcended the disclosure requirements of the securities laws” 
(Goelzer 1979, p.6).  
 
However, the accounting provisions did not include any new requirements or disclosure 
requirements for corporations (Lesser 1979b). As argued in previous chapters, the 
provisions were not worded strongly partly due to political influences and a lack of 
accounting profession leadership and support. The lack of support, as pointed out in 
chapter three, can partly be related to the AICPA being dominated by the then 
accounting firms that had extraordinary influence over corporations and the 
government. The FASB also was financed by the business groups, especially large 
corporations, and the then accounting firms. The funding structure as briefly explained 
in chapter three, was the means of controlling and aligning the accounting bodies and 
profession’s interest. The funding was a way of keeping the government regulations at 
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bay, which can be argued to have led to the detriment of the integrity of the accounting 
records.   
 
As stated by Lesser (1979b, p.183), no “standard of tight management control of 
corporate expenditure” was included in the provisions and then only included 
“mandatory minimum accounting standards under the guise of enforcing the 
criminalization provisions”. The provisions were restricted to publicly traded 
companies, as the Congress did not have the power to “instruct the private-sector 
standard setter to issue, or not to issue, a particular standard” while only having the 
ability to “pass legislation directing the SEC not to require that listed companies 
implement any such standard” (Camfferman & Zeff 2011, p.302).  
 
For instance, the concept of an internal accounting control system was not new for the 
accounting profession, as corporations during 1960 and 1970 had some kind of a system 
in place. The FCPA explicitly imposed the internal control system requirements on 
corporate management. The internal control system of companies plays an important 
role in indicating where the responsibility lies and what is happening within a company, 
which is important from the perspective of management and stakeholders with an 
interest in the company. However, the main issue was in relation to the ability and 
effectiveness of this system in minimising management and employees’ wrong doings. 
As was explained in chapter seven, similar issues resurfaced during the 1980s, even 
though the FCPA was passed. The corporate failures during this time period also, were 
partly related to corporations’ internal control system being corrupted, as was 
demonstrated by the cases described in chapter two and four. The problem was that the 
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accounting industry and the corporate executives were vigorously opposing the 
mandatory control system requirements (Matson & Shapiro 2005). The other problem 
was with the ability of management in circumventing the control system and not to be 
easily held accountable for their wrongdoings, which was the circumstance in some of 
the cases investigated during the different congressional hearings in the 1970s. 
Circumvention of internal control would be preventable by having “effective corporate 
governance through independent boards of directors and external auditors” and not just 
having a system in place (Darrough 2009, p.257). Approval and review of the internal 
control system by the board of directors or external auditors would have supplemented 
the provisions of the act, as well as minimising the corporate scandals during the 1980s 
and 2000s. 
 
The accounting provisions also did not contain clauses pertaining to alteration of “the 
auditor’s duty to his client or the purpose of his study and evaluation of internal 
accounting control” (Rocco 1999, p.178). The problem of bribery and kickbacks was 
not a new one and the accounting profession had recognised it. For instance, during 
1939 a company called McKesson & Robbins had regularly overstated its assets by 
using fictitious documents and recordings, which were not detected by the external 
auditors (Olson & Wootton 1991). The issue was that “no wealth of authoritative 
guidance for the auditor” was available at the time (Solomon & Muller 1977, p.51). The 
auditing standards and pronouncements were mainly tackling the “philosophical 
aspects” of the issues at hand, though not offering any “practical guidance” (Solomon & 
Muller 1977, p.51). As early as 1938, the auditing or accounting standards issued and 
developed by the accounting profession, were not approved by the Congress (Olson & 
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Wootton 1991). The Metcalf Committee, as discussed in chapter three, and the hearing 
held by Congressman Dingell, explained in chapter 7, were among the many 
congressional hearings held questioning the adequacy of the independent auditors’ 
duties and function in protecting the public interest. The recommendations by these 
hearings however, were not implemented by the accounting profession or the SEC, as 
part of the FCPA or a new standard. 
 
The shortcomings of the FCPA accounting provisions was that these provisions, on their 
own would not deter bribery, since corporations, as was apparent in 2002, would find 
other channels and ways to pay bribes or illegal payments and evade their external 
auditors. The SEC was hoping and expecting, by enactment of the act, the external 
auditors would understand the effect of the accounting provisions, and modify their 
practice in relation to certifying the adequacy of the internal control systems (Williams 
1977). The SEC was confident that it was not necessary to dramatically change the 
governance and disclosure requirements for corporations (United States 1976l). The 
SEC believed, while the problem was “serious and widespread”, it was controllable and 
did not “represent an inherent defect in … [the] economic system” (Rubin 1976, p.622). 
It was hoped that corporations, external auditors’ clients, would have sought 
clarification and understanding of the rules from them. This expectation by the SEC was 
“considered unworkable by the accounting profession” (Williams 1977, p.60).  
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4. History Repeating Itself: A New Remedy for an Old Problem 
In 2002, the (Sarbanes-Oxley) SOX act was passed by the Congress and signed after six 
months of congressional hearings and debate, which was in “response to increasing 
public concern over corporate malfeasance” as well as a “renewed call for prosecution 
of U.S. companies engaging in bribery overseas” (Turk 2013, p.347). The response by 
the Congress to the corporate scandals of the early twenty first century, despite billions 
in investor losses, was similar to that in reaction to the Watergate scandal in the 1970s. 
The responses were both “sluggish and timid at best”, since the acts only provided 
remedies on paper (Bakan 2012, p.8). As claimed by Levitt (2002, p.xvii), the longest 
serving SEC chairman, Congress had  
reverted to its natural state by paying greater heed to the special pleadings of 
lobbyists for Wall Street firms and corporations than to the interest of individual 
investors, who have no lobbyists.  
The purpose of the SOX act was similar to the FCPA that was signed into law twenty 
five years earlier. The purpose was to improve the accuracy of accounting and record-
keeping of companies. 
 
Both pieces of legislation, namely the FCPA and the SOX act, were rooted in the 
corporate self-regulatory system of governance and accountability which can be said to 
have failed “to achieve regular compliance with baseline ethical and legal behaviors as 
evidenced by a century of repeated corporate debacles” (Weismann 2008, p.615). 
However, the main difference was that the FCPA mainly focused on self-regulation 
dominated by industry and reliance on corporations to ensure proper corporate 
governance systems being in place and accurate financial reports being produced. The 
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other difference was in relation to the stakeholders’ reaction to Congressional efforts in 
passing legislation.  
 
The SOX act, in comparison to the FCPA, gained immediate support in the Congress, 
after the news about the massive corporate frauds and significant losses of investment 
for the shareholders. The act was mainly derived by the publicity among investors, 
demanding far tighter regulations. For this reason, the SOX act became the centre stage 
of congressional debates, as there was a need for a swift political response and far-
reaching reform to regain the trust and confidence of investors in participating in the 
capital market. The act contained sections pertaining to accounting, auditing and 
corporate governance. The purpose of these provisions included enhancing confidence 
in the integrity of the information in financial reports and the perceived value of the 
corporation to the shareholders. However, the revelations in the wake of the Watergate 
scandal that multinational corporations had made illicit payments during the 1970s had 
little, if any, impact on shareholders. For instance, the study of the effect of 
corporations’ concealment of illicit payments during 1975 by Jacoby, Nehemkis and 
Eells (1977, p.55) concluded “that investors did not make any significant disposal of 
their stocks on learning of the overseas political payments by the management of the 
selected … companies”, since these payment were not considered to be having “adverse 
reflections on the integrity or competence of the managements of companies in which 
they have invested”. The previous chapters also support this view through analysis of 
the political framework and lack of immediate reaction by the Congress, governmental 
agencies and the accounting profession. 
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Enactment of the SOX act has served as a reminder that instances of fraud, bribery and 
illicit payments have continued to prevail and highlight the ineffectiveness and lack of 
enforcement of the FCPA provisions. The story described in this thesis is relevant and 
timely to remind the reader of the lessons to be learned from the enactment of the FCPA 
and for today’s environment after enactment of recent legislation such as the ‘Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and the Consumer Protection Act of 2010’ as well as the 
SOX act. The SOX act, as harsher legislation, included sections in relation to 
improvement of the accuracy of company’s record keeping and financial reporting to 
help remedy the situation. As explained in previous chapters, during the 1970s, the 
Congress and the accounting profession were not interested in improving the accounting 
and auditing standards. Chapter three explained the accounting profession’s struggle 
during the 1970s in keeping the Government away from setting accounting and auditing 
standards, even though studies such as Metcalf had recommended changes to the 
standard setting process and the role of independent auditors. 
  
The importance of the accounting provisions of the FCPA was enhanced and reinforced 
by the SOX provisions (Pollack 2003; Vega 2009). Section 1106 of the SOX act also 
added a substantial degree of transparency of accounting provisions by significantly 
helping to raise “the stakes for non-compliance with the FCPA” by amending “both 
civil and criminal securities laws to add provisions relating to disclosures and internal 
controls” (Conrad 2004; Vega 2009, p.438). The major difference between the internal 
control requirements of both pieces of legislation is the allocation of responsibility in 
relation to maintenance of proper internal controls. The FCPA responsibility lies with 
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the companies in general, while the SOX places responsibility on the officers in charge 
of corporations.  
 
5. Lack of Attention by the Accounting Profession  
Chapters two, four and five have provided historical account and analysis of the U.S. 
attempt to enact the FCPA that was a piece of legislation expected to be the solution to 
the problem of bribery and illegal corporations’ contributions to political players. This 
political history represents an instance “where accounting was expected”, to exist but 
was absent (Choudhury 1988, p.549). As stated by Choudhury, “the absence of 
accounting may tell researchers a lot about the nature of accounting and its existence … 
and thereby achieve a deeper understanding of the nature of accounting” (Choudhury 
1988, p.550). Moller argues  
the FCPA legislation … has dropped off the list of current hot management 
topics, replaced by others such as SOx. The FCPA is still very much in force, 
but today as more of an anticorruption, anti-bribery law. An FCPA-related 
search on the Web today will yield few if any references to the Act’s internal 
control provisions (2008, p.89). 
 
The events surrounding the enactment of the FCPA, suggest that there was a need to 
utilise the accounting profession and accounting knowledge, to address the issues with 
corporate managements’ ability to use accounting to conceal the use of corporate funds 
for illicit payments. The instances of off-books accounts and improper disclosure and 
record keeping, confirm the importance of the impact of accounting on minimising 
similar events in the future. However, the FCPA was mainly a non-accounting solution 
to the problem of illicit payments as the congressional hearings and debates mainly 
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addressed the anti-bribery section of the legislation. The House of Representative’s 
proposed bills were either missing the accounting related issues or were identical to the 
Senate accounting provisions, initially taken from the SEC’s recommendations. 
Accounting was not employed at a time when it was obvious and needed the most, even 
though the issues raised by different congressional hearings were all pointing towards 
problems with record keeping, governance and external auditors. Absence of accounting 
in this context contains information that needs to be investigated and explained, which 
this study has attempted to do.  
 
The SEC focus on corporate accountability, changed its emphasis to corporate 
governance and advocated practices such as “independent directors and an independent 
audit committee to exercise oversight over management and the role of the auditor as an 
independent gatekeeper” (Black 2012, p.1100-1101). The accounting profession on the 
other hand seemed to be side stepping the issue at hand and leaving it to the SEC. While 
the SEC wanted only to focus on their mission of corporations’ full disclosure of 
material facts to their investors (United States 1976l). Black argued that by enactment 
of the FCPA, the Congress had given “the SEC power that it did not want, that … was 
not part of its central mission”, putting a “strain on its resources” (Black 2012, p.1118-
1119). 
 
The accounting profession as stated by Carey (1970, p.4) 
is the product of an industrial, free-enterprise economy, mainly by private 
capital, but subject to widespread government regulation. Economic and social 
change created the need for an accounting profession - but accountants 
themselves created the profession … . Progress at times has seemed slow, and 
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often it has been painful. CPAs, being human, have rarely embraced change 
with enthusiasm, or happily abandoned the security of the familiar. Many of 
their advances, indeed, have been the result of outside pressures.  
In relation to the accounting provisions of the FCPA, no formal or direct investigation 
or study concerning corporate governance and internal affairs, independent auditors’ 
duties in reference to illicit payments was performed by the profession, during this time 
period. Relating to Carey’s statement, not until 1988 and in response to the Treadway 
Commission recommendations, issuance of any rules or interpretive guidance in relation 
to corporate accountability was not on the SEC’s agenda (Black 2012). These issues 
“were not fully achieved until after another era of corporate scandals … that resulted in 
the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002” as briefly explained earlier (Black 
2012, p.1101). As explained by Carey  
[t]he opportunities available to the profession … are almost limitless. The key 
word, however, is “opportunities”. To exploit them the profession must improve 
itself in many ways. An examination of what has happened, and why, and how, 
may facilitate the determination of what needs to be done (1970, p.13). 
 
The FCPA, was a cautioned response to the immense problem that had surfaced in the 
1970s (United States 1977g). It was passed by the Congress “in the context of a 
heightened focus on ethics in government and in business that was part of the political 
fallout of the scandal” (Gutterman 2013, p.3). The act’s accounting provisions were 
based on “the self-regulatory model of enforcement: corporate self-policing through 
mandatory reporting with regulatory oversight” (Weismann 2008, p.615). As noted by 
Senator Proxmire, Congressman Moss and Senator Metcalf, the self-regulation system 
itself was at the heart of the problem that required the attention of the SEC and the 
accounting profession. According to Levitt (2002), it is naïve to think that the self-
regulatory system would enable the accountants to work in the best interest of the 
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investors. The self-regulatory system was weakening the enforcement and application of 
the accounting provisions of the act. The system was argued to be insufficient to curb 
bribery and corrupt practices by corporations. Issuing another law was not as important 
and effective as tailoring the law “to the genuine problem and not to the optical one” 
(United States 1977d, p.178).  
 
Several affiliates of the accounting profession had opposed the accounting provisions 
when they were first introduced to the Congress, as being “counterproductive to the 
audit process” (Chira 1979, p.61). The AICPA objections in their testimonies to the 
Congress were in relation to the legislation’s accounting provision going “far beyond 
the problem of illegal corporate payments and establishing a required structure of 
corporate accountability and by making it illegal to distort proper recordkeeping” 
(United States 1977d, p.166). During 1976, as detailed in the previous chapters, the 
AICPA issued exposure drafts in relation to auditors’ responsibilities and duties towards 
detection of errors and irregularities. However the exposure draft’s focus was on  
unintentional mistakes in financial statements …[,] intentional distortions of 
financial statements, such as deliberate misrepresentations by management 
fraud, or misappropriations of assets, … [and] misrepresentations or omission of 
the effects of events or transactions; manipulation, falsification, or alteration of 
records or documents  
not enforcing the accounting provisions of the FCPA (Auditing Standards Executive 
Committee 1976, p.5). Changes to the auditing standards were happening but at glacial 
pace and seemed as if the AICPA was not getting the message. 
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6. Unnecessary Amendments of the FCPA 
Due to the claimed chilling effect of the FCPA on American businesses, during the 
1980s, bills pertaining to amendments of the act were introduced to the Congress. The 
amendments were broadly approved and pushed by the corporations. As argued by 
Moran (2010, p.219) influences of businesses “over regulation has been strengthened … 
by a shift in the priorities of politicians”. Corporations, as pointed out by Bakan (2012, 
p.5) increasingly “dictate the decisions of their supposed overseers in government and 
control domains of society once firmly embedded within the public sphere”. Their 
power over government has increased throughout the years, in a way that has weakened 
the “government’s ability to control them” (Bakan 2012, p.8). This shift in power has 
made it possible for the corporations to govern society, even more than the government. 
 
The administration of the time, the Reagan Administration, acknowledged the alleged 
export disincentives and negative economic effect of the act and wanted to repeal the 
accounting provisions and the SEC powers entirely, while distancing themselves from 
appearing to be condoning bribery. Reagan’s election promise was to soften the 
regulatory initiatives in the 1970s and reduce the burden of regulation on businesses. 
Deregulation was at the top of the administration’s agenda. The support for repealing 
the act by the corporations and the administration reflected the manipulation of the 
political environment of the time. Corporations were united in promoting neoliberal 
policies (Merino et al. 2010). However, some of the critics as stated by Gutterman 
argued that the modifications “rendered the FCPA toothless, the changes stopped far 
short of almost all the amendments that the businesses lobby had promoted” (2013, 
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p.16). The lobbying effect of the businesses in this instance proved to be ineffective, as 
the businesses wanted the amendments to weaken or abolish the act. 
 
7. Enforcement of the FCPA 
The accounting provisions of the FCPA were left by the Congress and the SEC to be 
vague and simple. The SEC had refused to issue any guidelines in relation to these 
provisions as it had left the standard setting authority with the accounting profession. 
Partly for this reason and the political and economic environment surrounding the 
enactment and amendment of the act, it was not enforced appropriately. Lack of 
enforcement allowed corporations to bend the legislation’s provisions to their own 
benefit, which meant that the system itself was corrupt. 
 
As illustrated by Weismann (2009, p.616), the act has not been operating in a 
“regulatory vacuum” and has been affected by “powerful political, legal, and economic 
forces”. For instance, during the Reagan administration, funding for the enforcement 
agencies was “significantly reduced” (Borgman & Datar 2012, p.12; Cragg & Woof 
2002) which partly led to relaxing the enforcement of the act and the Department of 
Justice fraud section having few authorised prosecutors in conducting the FCPA cases 
(Cragg & Woof 2002). Also, after Williams’ chairmanship of the SEC had ended in 
1981, the SEC’s attention was moved from the FCPA provisions’ enforcement to 
“capital formation issues … and insider trading” (Black 2012, p.1105). This resulted in 
an absence of any public speeches or any new rule proposals relating to the act or 
interpretative guidance (Black 2012).  
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According to Koehler, the SEC and the DoJ, as the two government agencies 
responsible for enforcing the statute and, no matter what they would enforce, the end 
result would be the same, which is “privately negotiated and subjected to little or no 
judicial scrutiny” (2010, p.924). Porrata-Doria (1985, p.49) also stated that “[m]ost of 
these … [cases] appear to have been settled by consent decrees rather than litigation”. 
For example, between 1997 and 2003, only “an estimated total of sixty cases” were 
prosecuted by the SEC and the DoJ (Turk 2013, p.341). This was possibly as a result of 
a “lack of political support for certain prosecutions” (Pines 1994, p.195). Private 
negotiations and lack of prosecutions would have signalled to the corporations that it is 
acceptable or part of business necessity to pay bribes with little fear of prosecution 
which explains the complex economic and political environment that surrounded the 
FCPA enforcement. However, from the SEC’s point of view, the settlements were used 
to intimidate businesses into “consciously avoiding the adverse publicity of litigation 
rather than recognizing the illegality of their activities” (Bagby 1983, p.232). In 
Koehler’s opinion, “FCPA enforcement actions ... reflect a risk-based decision 
primarily grounded in issues other than facts or the law” (2010, p.925). Based on these 
grounds, the persistent criticism by the OECD is  
the dividing line between bribe payments and facilitation payments remain 
somewhat unclear because with the absence of enforcement also comes the 
absence of a body of case law interpreting the scope of legislative application 
(Weismann 2009, p.619). 
 
8. Concluding Argument of this Study 
As illustrated in this thesis, the history of passing legislation in relation to fraudulent 
and corrupt practice has demonstrated the economic and political characteristics of the 
environment that surrounds setting legislation and the failure of the political system as a 
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whole. This study has explained the events surrounding enactment and enforcement of 
the FCPA to demonstrate this failure and lack of the capability of the accounting 
profession and the SEC in combating the corruption and bribery problems. The SEC 
and the accounting profession heavily relied on the self-regulation system, as the most 
efficient system, to resolve the illicit payment issue. However, from the arguments 
presented it can be concluded that the act was and “is a failed regulatory initiative in 
combating global commercial bribery” and the OECD “has repeatedly questioned its 
impact in the global business community” although it has been claimed otherwise by the 
SEC or the DoJ (Weismann 2008, p.615). 
 
The accounting scandals during the 1980s and 2000s exposed systematic failure of the 
corporate governance and internal control systems that was included in the FCPA. The 
scandals demonstrated the FCPA failure. The corporate scandals once again highlight 
the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the system as a whole. The self-policing system 
advocated by the SEC and the accounting profession has also proved to be incapable of 
self-reform. The Congress was in the spotlight again in the 1980s and 2002, and needed 
to demonstrate it was doing something constructive to put an end to the problems 
discussed in this thesis.  
 
The Congress initiated hearings that were related to the shortcomings and lack of 
enforcement of the accounting provisions of the act. The hearings held in the 1980s 
explicitly, parallel to the hearings held by Church, Proxmire and Metcalf in the 1970s, 
were related to the adequacy of the self-regulation system and the way accounting and 
auditing standards were established. In addition, the issues of external auditors’ 
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independence and their responsibility towards shareholders, resurfaced again during the 
1980s hearings as well. These issues and concerns were raised during the hearings held 
in the 1970s and were neglected by the SEC and the accounting profession. The absence 
of accounting discussion in the Congress, can be seen as the result of the power of the 
private sector over establishment of accounting and auditing standards and maintaining 
this authority in-house.  
 
The power which can be said to be fuelled by corporations and corporate executives, 
helped the accounting profession to defeat any regulatory or public scrutiny. The 
absence also represents the eagerness of the accounting profession and the SEC to 
protect and perpetuate the self-regulatory disclosure and accountability system. The 
effectiveness of the system was promoted and praised by the AICPA and the SEC and 
was claimed to be producing “the most efficient and effective corporate governance and 
internal control practices” (Matson & Shapiro 2005, p.5). Self-regulation has served the 
interests of both the accounting profession and the SEC.  
 
In 2002, in the wake of yet another wave of business, governance and audit failures, the 
Congress was forced by the public and the press, to pass legislation with intents similar 
to those of the FCPA. Clearly, the lessons of the 1970s were not learned nor effectively 
acted upon. The SOX act was enacted in the hope of strengthening the integrity and 
reputation of U.S. corporations and, to some extent, the accounting profession. The 
passage of the SOX act also demonstrated that the issues surrounding the role of 
independent auditors and their duties towards the public had not been resolved. 
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From the above concluding points and repeated corporate and legislative failures, it is 
clear that “the current self-regulatory system is broken and oversight of the self-
regulatory system by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has not been 
effective in addressing these issues to adequately protect the public interest” (General 
Accounting Office 2002, p.1). To conclude, as was wisely said by Levitt (2002, p.152) 
“[s]ometimes it takes a crisis to convince the world that the status quo has to change”. 
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Appendix 1: Details of the 
congressional hearings held 
from 1972 to 1986 
 
Name of the hearing From To  Chairman of the 
subcommittee/ 
committee  
Presidential Campaign Activities of 1972 hearings 
before the Select Committee on Presidential 
Campaign Activities 
1972 1974 Sam Ervin 
Multinational Corporations and United States 
Foreign Policy hearings before the Subcommittee 
on Multinational Corporations of the Committee 
on Foreign Relations  
1973 1976 Frank Church 
Lockheed Bribery hearings before the Committee 
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs  
1975 1975 William Proxmire 
Protecting the ability of the United States to trade 
abroad hearing before the Subcommittee on 
International Trade of the Committee on Finance  
1975 1975 Abraham Ribicoff 
The activities of American Multinational 
Corporations Abroad hearings before the 
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy 
of the Committee on International Relations, 
1975 1975 Robert Nix 
Oversight Hearings into the Operations of the IRS 
hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee 
on Government Operations 
1975 1975 Benjamin Rosenthal 
Abuses of Corporate power hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in 
Government of the Joint Economic Committee 
1976 1976 William Proxmire 
Corporate Rights and Responsibilities hearings 
before the Committee on Commerce 
1976 1976 Warren Magnuson 
Federal Regulation and Regulatory reform Report 
by the Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations of the Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce 
1976 1976 John Moss 
Foreign and Corporate Bribes hearings before the 
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs 
1976 1976 William Proxmire  
Foreign Payments Disclosure hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and 
Finance of the Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce 
1976 1976 John Murphy 
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Oversight on the Lockheed Loan Guarantee 
hearings before the Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs 
1976 1976 William Proxmire 
Prohibiting Bribes to Foreign Officials hearing 
before the Committee on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs 
1976 1976 William Proxmire 
SEC Voluntary Compliance Program on 
Corporate Disclosure Staff Study by the 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of 
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce 
1976 1976 John Moss 
Regulatory Reform hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of 
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce 
1976 1976 John Moss 
Federal Regulation and Regulatory Reform Report  
by the Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations of the Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce 
1976 1976 John Moss 
Accounting and Auditing Practices and 
Procedures hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Reports, Accounting, and Management of the 
Committee on Governmental Affairs 
1977 1977 Lee Metcalf 
Corporate Business Practices and United States 
foreign policy hearing before the Subcommittee 
on International Economic Policy and Trade of the 
Committee on International Relations 
1977 1977 Jonathan Bingham 
Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and 
Foreign Investment Disclosure hearing before the 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs 
1977 1977 William Proxmire 
Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977 
hearings before the Subcommittee on Consumer 
Protection and Finance of the Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
1977 1977 Bob Eckhaedt 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of 
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce 
1979 1979 Bob Eckhaedt 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-oversight hearings 
before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, 
Consumer Protection, and Finance of the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce 
1981 1982 Timothy Wirth 
The Foreign Trade Practices Act hearings before 
the Subcommittee on International Economic 
Policy and Trade of the Committee on Foreign 
Affair 
1983 1983 Don Bonker 
Business Accounting and Foreign Trade 
Simplification Act joint hearings before the 
1983 1986 Alfonse D’Amato 
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Subcommittee on International Finance and 
Monetary Policy and the Subcommittee on 
Securities of the Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs 
SEC Corporate Audits hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 
and the Committee on Energy and Commerce 
1985 1986 John Dingell 
Financial reporting practices hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of 
the Committee on Energy and Commerce, House 
of Representatives 
1987 1988 John Dingell 
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Appendix 2: SEC Commissioners and Chairmen 
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A.A. Sommer, 




















                          
Stephen J 
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Appendix 3: Bills presented to the Senate and 
House of Representatives 
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date 
senate House of Representatives 
Bill Number Sponsor  Bill Number Sponsor  
1975 3 June   H.R. 7539 Congressman Stephen Solarz 
1976 11 March S. 3133 Senator William Proxmire   
 5 May S. 3379 Senators Frank Church   
 12 May S. 3418 Senator Proxmire at the request 
of the SEC 
  
 18 May   H.R. 13870 (Identical to S.3133) Congressman Moss 
 21 May   H.R. 13953 (Version of S.3133) Congressman Pickle 
 11 June   H.R. 14340 (Identical to S.3379) Congressman Stephen Solarz 
 2 July S. 3664 (combined 
S.3379 and S. 3418) 
Committee on Banking, Housing 
and Urban 
H.R. 14681 Congressman Stephen Solarz 
 Septembe
r 
S. 3664 was passed H.R 15481 (Version of S. 3664) Mr Murphy 
1977  January  S. 305 Senator Proxmire and Williams H.R 1602 Mr Murphy 
 February   H.R 3815 Congressman Eckhardt 
 May S. 305 was passed  
 November   H.R 3815 was passed  
 December S. 305 (modified version 
based on H.R 3815) 
Senator Proxmire S. 305 was approved 
1981 March S. 708 Senator John Chafee  H.R. 2530 (Identical to S. 708) Congressman Rinaldo 
1983 February S. 414 Senator John Heinz    
 March   H.R 2157 Mr Mica  
1985 January S. 430 (Identical to S. 
414) 
   
1986 March   H.R. 4389 Mr Mica  
 
